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ABSTRACT 
As a relatively young field of academic inquiry, the transitional justice scholarship 
presents some important difficulties, not least of which is its lack of critical 
evaluation of the approaches to justice it adopts and promotes. This research argues 
that the framework used in the transitional justice scholarship is ill-suited to account 
for, and to think about, the philosophy of justice embodied in customary mechanisms 
of justice. It explains that the type of “justice” embodied in customary mechanisms of 
justice is difficult to appreciate by using the retributive, reparative, and the restorative 
approaches. These Western, individualistic and legally based approaches are often 
antithetical to the conception of “justice” embodied in customary mechanisms of 
justice. This study is substantiated with an examination of the Mãori  tradition and 
justice practices. It conceptualizes the type of justice that is embodied in traditional 
mechanisms of justice as a form of “relational justice,” which is described as an 
approach to doing justice that prioritizes relationships. This study argues that this is 
based on the primacy of communal well-being. It also discusses the implications 
research findings have for the field of transitional justice. That is, it addresses the 
problematic propensity of the scholarship to see the rule of law as the “end all, be 
all,” and to use it as a benchmark against which all other justice practices are to be 
measured. This research also takes the opportunity to push the boundaries of the 
transitional justice literature further by speaking to the need to revise the common 
understanding of what constitutes a transitional society. 
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PREFACE 
 
“As I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thought--our thought, the 
thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geography--breaking up all the 
ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild 
profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten 
with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other. This passage 
quotes a ‘certain Chinese encyclopedia’ in which it is written that ‘animals are 
divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, 
(e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) 
frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (1) et cetera, 
(m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies’. 
In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one great leap, the 
thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of another 
system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking 
that.”2 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of Human Sciences (New York: Routledge, 
2002), xvii. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Both settler and post-conflict societies often have to face the legacies of mass 
violations of human rights. Countries like Rwanda and Chile, for instance, have had 
to deal with the consequences of intra-state violence or genocide. In the cases of 
settler societies, like New Zealand and Canada, indigenous populations have been the 
targets of state-sponsored human rights violations and other discriminatory policies 
aiming at their complete assimilation or eradication. While the circumstances that led 
to these human rights violations differ significantly in settler and post-conflict 
societies,
3
 the measures used in both contexts are often similar. Truth-seeking bodies, 
such as truth commissions, are sometimes created to delve into the past. This was the 
case in South Africa, which set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the 
hope to facilitate reconciliation between black, “coloured,” and white South Africans. 
Although Canada is not going through a regime transition, as was the case in South 
Africa, it also set up a Truth Commission to shed light upon the human rights 
violations carried out under the government’s residential school policies.  
                                                 
3
 Broadly speaking, post-conflict societies include societies transitioning from warfare and unrest to 
peace. This thesis recognizes, however, that transitions between unrest and peace are not always 
clearcut and definite. Chapter Two discusses the link between transitional justice and conflict 
resolution. When referring to settler societies, this research considers countries that have been 
colonized, with as a primary concern, the occupation of land and creation of a new society. Settler 
societies differ from other forms of colonization where trade and resources, rather than the occupation 
of land, were the primary motivation. For more information, see for instance, Patrick Wolfe, "Settler 
Colonialism and The Elimination of the Native," Journal of Genocide Research 8 no. 4 (2007): 387-
409. 
 2 
 Transitional justice scholars have paid significant attention to post-conflict 
societies, but much less to settler societies. Yet, in both cases, a key question is 
raised: How can these societies deal with the past and come to terms with the present? 
More specifically, how can individuals live peacefully together after the occurrence 
of mass violations of human rights?
4
 While the circumstances and the kinds of human 
rights violations carried out in settler societies often differ from those in post-conflict 
situations, both types of societies have to grapple with similar moral, ethical, social 
and political concerns. These transitional societies, for instance, have to come up with 
ways to acknowledge a difficult past, to hold human rights abusers accountable, and 
to reconcile different segments of society. Using New Zealand as case study 
contributes directly to the broadening of the transitional scholarship, by showing that 
settler and post-conflict societies sometimes share similar challenges in facing the 
legacies of past human rights violations, and that lessons can be learnt and shared 
between both. In the case of New Zealand, a settler society, the government is trying 
to repair some of the harm caused by colonization, through, for instance, the creation 
                                                 
4
 When referring to human rights, this thesis takes, as a point of reference, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948). It does so recognizing the debates surrounding the universality of human rights 
as discussed, for instance, in Robert Patman, Universal Human Rights? (New York: St Martin’s Press, 
2000); Jack Donnelly, "Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights," Human Rights Quarterly 6 
no. 4 (1984): 400-419; Thomas M Franck, "Are Human Rights Universal?" Foreign Affairs 80 (2001): 
191-204; Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler, Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). A discussion of the debates surrounding the political nature of human rights is 
beyond the scope of this research. The thesis also briefly explains the link between human rights and 
the transitional justice scholarship, in Chapter Two.   
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of the Waitangi Tribunal,
5
 and the implementation of a number of policies aimed at 
accommodating Mãori cultural preferences and traditions.
6
 
   What motivates this project is an interest in community-based, customary 
mechanisms of justice used by indigenous and remote communities when dealing 
with offenders. This research answers the following questions: What is the philosophy 
of justice embodied in customary mechanisms of justice? And, to what extent can this 
philosophy of justice be accommodated by the approaches to justice used in the 
transitional justice scholarship? This study builds on existing but disparate research 
surrounding processes of reconciliation, truth commissions, and the legacies of mass 
violation of human rights. It also draws together the literature on peacebuilding, 
transitional justice, and legal pluralism, all of which questions the centrality of the 
state as the sole legitimate and normative source of order.
7
 Based on the examination 
of the philosophy of justice embodied in tikanga Mãori, this thesis argues that the 
framework normally used in the transitional justice scholarship is ill suited to account 
for, and to think about, the philosophy of justice embodied in customary mechanisms 
of justice.
8
 
 
                                                 
5
 The Waitangi Tribunal was established in 1975. It is a permanent commission of inquiry responsible 
for making recommendations on claims put forth by Mãori and pertaining to breaches of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. See, The Waitangi Tribunal, [website]; accessible at http://www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz/; 
accessed April 22
nd
 2010. 
6
 This research concentrates on the reforms that target the New Zealand judicial system. However, the 
government has been active in initiating reforms in other sectors such as in the health and education 
sectors. See, for instance, Patricia Laing and Eru Pomare, "Mãori Health and the Health Care Reform," 
Health Policy 29 no. 1-2 (1994): 143-156.  
7
 Rosemary Nagy,"Traditional Justice and Legal Pluralism in Transitional Contexts: The Case of 
Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts," in Reconciliation (s): Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies, ed. 
Joanna R. Quinn (Montreal: McGill University Press, 2009), 89. 
8
 This research refers to indigenous and customary mechanisms and approaches to justice 
interchangeably. This is done for practical reasons, as this thesis discusses customary approaches to 
justice broadly, but uses an indigenous approach (Tikanga mãori) as a case study to substantiate the 
argument. Further explanation of this choice of word can be found in Chapter Three (footnote 13). 
 4 
Transitional Justice 
Situating the field of transitional justice within the conflict resolution literature helps 
to draw attention to the some of the conceptual difficulties inherent in the field of 
transitional justice. These conceptual difficulties affect a number of the central 
concepts of the field including “truth” and “reconciliation.” This study illustrates the 
complexity of such a fast growing academic field of inquiry, through a critical 
assessment of the transitional justice scholarship. Understanding the field of 
transitional justice and its intrinsic complexities is an important step towards a 
discussion of alternative conceptions, and, subsequently, mechanisms of justice. 
Furthermore, highlighting the connection between transitional justice and the 
literature on peacemaking, peacebuilding and peacekeeping is useful as it allows us to 
highlight the extent to which the transitional justice scholarship borrows its ideas and 
assumptions about justice from the overly state-centred field of peacebuilding. This 
affects, for instance, the literature’s current understanding of what constitutes a 
society in transition. This is important because it leads scholars of the field to focus 
their attention on post-conflict cases, at the expense of other potentially relevant 
instances where serious human rights violations have been committed, including 
settler societies such as New Zealand. This research underlines the need to broaden 
the scholarship’s view of what characterizes transitional societies, to include societies 
where no overt regime change is taking place, but where states are dealing with the 
legacies of state-sponsored mass violations of human rights. 
 The transitional justice scholarship has generally been reluctant to engage 
with customary mechanisms of justice outside of the legalistic and over-
 5 
individualistic framework that it uses to categorize approaches to justice.
9
 When 
accounted for, customary mechanisms of justice are often described as embodying a 
mix of retributive, reparative and restorative values. These mechanisms have rarely, if 
at all, been examined outside of the existing and well-established framework in which 
the field of transitional justice is grounded. This deontological liberal framework has 
clear roots in the Western intellectual tradition and favors a certain understanding of 
the individual, the society and justice, which do not jive with other, in this case 
Mãori, intellectual traditions and cultural sensibilities. This has important 
                                                 
9
 A significant number of scholars use the retributive, reparative and restorative approaches to 
categorize and describe customary mechanisms of justice. In fact some researchers simply equate 
‘traditional’ and ‘local’ approaches with restorative justice. See, for instance, Erin Baines, "The 
Haunting of Alice: Local Approaches to Justice and Reconciliation in Northern Uganda," The 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 1 no.1 (2007), 96; Lucy Hovil and Joanna R. Quinn, 
"Peace First, Justice Later: Transitional Justice in Northern Uganda," Refugee Law Project Working 
Paper Series, Working Paper no. 17, July 2005, 14; Jonathan Rudin, "Aboriginal Justice and 
Restorative Justice," in New Directions in Restorative Justice: Issues Practice and Evaluation, ed. 
Elizabeth Elliott and Robert Gordon, 89-114. (Devon: Willan Publisher, 2006); Mechthild Nagel, 
"Ubuntu and Indigenous Restorative Justice," Africa Peace and Conflict Network, 2008. [Report on-
line]. Accessible at http://www.africaworkinggroup.org/files/UbuntuBriefing3.pdf; Luc Huyse and 
Mark Salter, "Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from African 
Experiences," Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2008. 
[ISBN: 978-91-85724-28-4], [report online]; accessible at 
http://www.idea.int/publications/traditional_justice/upload/Traditional_Justice_and_Reconciliation_aft
er_Violent_Conflict.pdf; James Guest, "Aboriginal Legal Theory and Restorative Justice," Native Law 
Centre of Canada, 4 no. 3, 1999, [article online]; accessible at 
http://www.usask.ca/nativelaw/publications/jah/1999/Ab_Legal_Theory_Pt2.pdf; Donna Durie Hall, 
"Restorative Justice: A Mãori Perspective," in Restorative Justice. Contemporary Themes and 
Practice, ed. Helen Bowen and Jim Consedine, 25-35. (Littleton: Ploughshares, 1999); Sinclair 
Dinnen, "Traditional Justice Systems in the Pacific, Indonesia and Timor-Leste," a paper presented at 
the UNICEF Conference on Justice for Children in the Pacific, Indonesia and Timor-Leste, Papua New 
Guinea, 2009; Jim Consedine, "The Mãori Restorative Tradition," in Restorative Justice Reader: Texts, 
Sources, Context, ed. Gerry Johnstone, 152-57. (London: Willan, 2003); Phil Clark, "Hybridity, 
Holism and ‘Traditional’ Justice: The Case of the Gacaca Courts in Post-Genocide Rwanda," George 
Washington International Law Review 39 (2007): 765-835; Jane Dickson-Gilmore and Carol La 
Prairie, Will the Circle Be Unbroken? Aboriginal Communities, Restorative Justice, and the 
Challenges of Conflict and Change (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005); John Braithwaite, 
"Encourage Restorative Justice." Criminology and Public Policy 6, no. 4 (2007): 689-96. A few 
exceptions include, for instance, Rupert Ross, Returning to the Teachings: Exploring Aboriginal 
Justice (Canada: Penguin, 2006); Harry Blagg, Crime, Aboriginality, and the Decolonization of Justice 
(Sydney: Hawkins Press, 2008); Matt Hakiaha, "Resolving Conflict from a Mãori Perspective," in 
Restorative Justice: Contemporary Themes and Practice, ed. Jim Consedine and Helen Bowen, 91-94. 
(Christchurch: Plougshare, 1999). 
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implications for the transitional justice scholarship, as well as for customary 
approaches and mechanisms of justice, which often end up being misunderstood and 
altered to correspond to the expectations of the existing legal framework. Indeed, the 
framework used by transitional justice scholars makes these three approaches to 
justice inapt and unsuitable to explain customary mechanisms of justice. It claims that 
their overly legalistic and individualistic focus renders the retributive, reparative and 
restorative approaches partly incongruous.  
 This has an important impact on the ability of the transitional justice 
scholarship to remain relevant to the work carried out in transitional societies. As the 
UN Secretary-General noted in his Report on the Rule of Law and Transitional 
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, “due regard must be given to 
indigenous and informal traditions for administering justice or settling disputes.”10 An 
examination of these mechanisms, and of the philosophies of justice that underpins 
them is well overdue. For this reason, this thesis suggests that a communitarian 
approach is better equipped to account for the kind of justice that is embodied in 
many traditional and customary mechanisms of justice.
11
  
 
                                                 
10
 Rachel Kerr and Eirin Mobekk, Peace and Justice: Seeking Accountability after War (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2007), 156; Report of the Secretary-General, "The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies," The United Nations (S/2004/616), 2004. 
11
 It is important to note, here, that this research does not claim that all customary mechanisms of 
justice adopt the same philosophy of justice. Rather it seeks to explore one existing approach to justice 
that is embodied in some customary mechanisms of justice, such as Tikanga mãori, and that cannot be 
accommodated by the deontological liberal framework used by transitional justice scholars. 
 7 
 Customary Mechanisms of Justice  
In a number of cases, customary mechanisms have been revived and adapted to deal 
with the return of offenders to communities. Customary mechanisms are (neo)-
traditional processes based on local customs and often used by communities, across 
Africa, Latin America and the South Pacific, for instance, to deal with offences and 
violations of rules. They differ from other judicial mechanisms, such as tribunals and 
courts, in that they seek to remain largely uncodified, uninstitutionalized and 
community-based. Rwanda’s Gacaca courts are one of the most famous and debated 
examples of customary mechanisms of justice being modified to deal with the 
outcome of grave human rights violations.
12
 In practice, such mechanisms are often 
supported by the international community on “an ad hoc basis…but without a 
coherent policy or guidelines,” as in Timor Leste and Mozambique.13 Customary 
mechanisms of justice have also, sometimes, been entrenched in states’ legal systems, 
such as in Uganda, and Bolivia. Yet, customary mechanisms of justice and the 
philosophy they embody generally remain misunderstood and largely under 
examined.  
 For this reason, Chapter Six advances a typology of customary mechanisms of 
justice based on the evidence furnished by the existing transitional justice scholarship. 
It also highlights the importance and value of these mechanisms, and explores some 
of the challenges that are frequently raised against their use. For instance, it questions 
the extent to which transitional justice is able to tolerate practices that may be 
                                                 
12
 See, for instance, Mark Drumbl, "Sclerosis: Retributive Justice and the Rwanda Genocide," 
Punishment and Society 2 no. 3 (2000): 287-307; see also Stephen Brown, "The Rule of Law and the 
Hidden Politics of Transitional Justice in Rwanda," a paper presented at the Annual Convention of the 
International Studies Association, New York, 2009.  
13
 Kerr and Mobekk, Peace and Justice, 151. 
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contrary to some fundamental principles that underpin the scholarship, such as gender 
equality and fairness. Indeed, in some instances, customary mechanisms of justice 
may limit the role of women or be fraught with power struggles over authority. Such 
cases raise important concerns, regarding, for instance, whether the transitional justice 
scholarship could, or even should accommodate these practices, or whether, the 
recognition of the cultural bias of the literature’s approach to justice places an 
obligation on scholars to accept approaches and practices that may be fundamentally 
contrarian to some basic human rights principles. Here, the view that a middle ground 
can and must be reached is adopted. This research contends that the field of 
transitional justice must engage in the search for this common ground, if the research 
that comes out of the field is to remain relevant to the challenges encountered by 
transitional societies.  For that, however, transitional justice scholars must step out of 
the traditionally legalistic confines of the field and be willing to question their own 
assumptions when examining alternative approaches to doing justice.  
 In addition, this thesis examines two philosophies of justice, namely the 
African, Bantu concept of Ubuntu and the Canadian Aboriginal notion of “healing 
justice.” Both approaches are useful instances of indigenous, non-Western alternative 
mechanisms of justice, and help highlight some crucial differences between these 
philosophies of justice and the legalistic approaches used in the transitional justice 
scholarship.
14
 In fact, both Ubuntu and Aboriginal “healing justice” put great 
                                                 
14
 This research broadly refers, throughout, to ‘Aboriginal,’ ‘indigenous’ and ‘Western’ approaches. 
While there is a danger of grossly generalizing different cultures and regions, it is important to stress 
that this is not the intention. Rather, this thesis seeks to highlight the commonality of the philosophical 
and intellectual traditions as well as historical experiences that make up ‘the West’ and ‘indigenous 
peoples.’ It appreciates the variety of cultures and peoples that make up these broad categories and 
does not claim their uniformity. For an interesting discussion on the subject, see Ashis Nandy, The 
Intimate Ennemy:Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
 9 
emphasis on notions of interconnectedness and holistic justice, which are rarely 
accounted for in the existing literature. This thesis provides important clues about 
what indigenous, customary and community-based approaches to justice have in 
common and how they differ from the conceptions of justice adopted in the 
transitional justice literature. 
 
The Mãori Conception of Justice: A Case Study  
This study is substantiated with an examination of Mãori practices and approach to 
justice. Three months of ethnographic research were conducted in New Zealand, 
during the summer of 2010, during which 33 interviews with individual Mãori were 
gathered. New Zealand is a very good example of a democratic society in transition, 
struggling to accommodate and include Mãori cultural practices and judicial 
processes within its institutions.  
 Throughout its history, New Zealand has been the site of political, economic, 
territorial, and social struggles between the settler society and the indigenous 
population. More recently, the New Zealand government has launched numerous 
policies and initiatives to remediate some of the impact these struggles have had on 
the Mãori, and while at the same time seeking to redress historical wrongs. Yet, the 
evidence gathered shows that many Mãori, still, to a large extent, doubt government 
policies. They also often continue to rely on their own customary mechanisms and 
                                                                                                                                           
1989), xi. Nandy discusses how colonization has provided a ‘shared culture’ (i.e. language, experience, 
understanding) for the colonized and the colonizers respectively. See also, Linda Tuhiwai Smith, 
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traditions in their everyday lives, rather than resort to state intuitions, which they 
distrust.  
 The three months spent conducting ethnographic research in New Zealand and 
interviewing Mãori community members provided invaluable information on tikanga 
Mãori and the cultural sensibilities that underpin the Mãori conception of justice. The 
evidence gathered through fieldwork and the examination of the transitional justice 
scholarship leads this study to question the extent to which the philosophy of justice 
embodied in customary mechanisms of justice can be accommodated by Western, 
legal and individualistic approaches used in transitional justice. 
 The thesis makes an important contribution to the field of transitional justice 
by providing an in-depth examination of tikanga Mãori, the Mãori approach to 
justice. Indeed, studies of alternative mechanisms of justice and the philosophy of 
justice they embody are sparse. And, while there is some research available on 
tikanga Mãori, the latter is generally dated or is silent on its current interaction with 
government policies. In this research tikanga Mãori is defined as a form of “relational 
justice,” which stresses the importance of kinship to the Mãori. This research also 
identifies the pillars of the Mãori approach to doing justice, including the principles 
of i) interconnectedness and collective responsibility, ii) community participation and 
iii) collective well-being. It touches upon the current attempts of the New Zealand 
government to include Mãori values within the official legal system, with the creation 
of the family conferencing model, and other calls for attention to be paid the tendency 
of the government to equate the Mãori legal traditions with the restorative tradition. 
This tendency is problematic. Yet, it is symptomatic of some existing international 
 11 
efforts to include and promote customary mechanisms of justice within existing legal 
systems. 
 
Tikanga Mãori, Restorative Justice and Implications for the Field 
This project critically assesses the validity of the claim that tikanga Mãori can be 
equated with the restorative justice approach. It does so by carrying out a comparison 
between i) restorative justice practices, as described in the transitional justice 
literature, ii) the family group conferencing model set up in New Zealand to 
accommodate tikanga Mãori, and iii) the practice of tikanga Mãori in Mãori 
communities. Most importantly, this comparison helps debunk the widely accepted 
claim that customary mechanisms of justice and restorative justice practices are one 
and the same. It also addresses the communities’ responses and dislike of the 
government’s propensity to dilute Mãori culture to fit its legal framework. While, at 
first sight, tikanga Mãori shares some characteristics with restorative justice 
mechanisms and approach, the values that underline both approaches significantly 
differ. Current efforts to account for, and accommodate “relational” justice are 
fraught with a severe lack of understanding of the different cultural sensibilities that 
give essence to customary conceptions of justice. 
 This research is valuable, for it draws attention to the wider implications for the 
field of transitional justice when dealing with approaches and mechanisms that fall 
outside of its frame of reference. In practical terms, this research seeks to shed light 
on the philosophy of justice that underpins the Mãori customary mechanism of justice 
and customary law. This thesis also highlights, through the examination of the New 
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Zealand government’s policies, the inherent limitations of any accommodation 
movement that does not, in the first place, seek to engage with customary laws and 
beliefs outside of the existing deontologically-driven legal framework.
15
 As it turns 
out, this is seen as dangerous, since it risks delegitimizing the transitional justice 
scholarship along with any solutions and recommendations that it may provide. 
                                                 
15
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any community. In addition, this deontologically-driven framework assumes that the conception of 
justice is largely independant of one’s cultural orientation, and is guided by a universal notion of the 
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Three. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: THE STATE OF THE FIELD 
 
 
Transitional justice scholarship deals essentially with the legacies of mass violations 
of human rights and how to best come to terms with them.
16
 As a rapidly growing 
field of study and research, transitional justice has to deal with important conceptual 
and practical challenges. Understanding the nature and purpose of the field of 
transitional justice is of crucial importance to this research. It is essential to situate the 
field of transitional justice within the broader spectrum of conflict resolution, 
discussed below, in order to understand the relevance of the transitional justice 
scholarship to conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts, and to understand the 
origin of some of the inadequacies of the field, including its focus on state 
mechanisms and the rule of law. 
 Many of the core elements of the field of transitional justice present 
significant challenges. Concepts such as truth and reconciliation are some of the most 
problematic. Indeed, both concepts are often referred to, but hardly examined and 
evaluated. Yet, they are critical elements to be considered in transitional societies. A 
similar observation can be made regarding scholars’ choice of case studies, which 
reflects the field’s understanding of what constitutes a transitional society. Indeed, 
traditionally, the scholarship has largely focused its attention on human rights 
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violations in post-conflict situations, thereby ignoring all other instances where there 
had been no overt regime change, including Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
 Here, this research examines the conception of justice that is embodied in 
alternative mechanisms of justice in the aftermath of mass violations of human rights. 
This chapter seeks to demonstrate some of the inconsistencies and challenges that 
plague the transitional justice literature, and argues that the Western liberal 
framework within which the scholarship of transitional justice originated and 
continues to operate largely defines it.  
 
Making Sense of Transitional Justice 
Bringing about the conditions around which justice can safely develop is one of the 
central elements of transitional justice. As such, the field of transitional justice is 
deeply concerned with the anchoring of peaceful, democratic norms and values in the 
aftermath of mass violations of human rights. Yet, as a relatively young field of study, 
transitional justice is filled with uncertainties regarding some of its core elements and 
how best to implement them. This section introduces the reader to the nature and 
purpose of transitional justice as a field of study, for reflections inspired by scholars’ 
and practitioners’ experiences of transitional societies. As a fundamentally inter-
disciplinary subject, it can be a thorny task to try to fit transitional justice within any 
one particular area of study. Nonetheless, transitional justice deals extensively, 
although not exclusively, with countries in transition from a troubled past, most 
frequently resulting from social unrest and divide or conflict. Therefore, this chapter 
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situates the field of transitional justice within the broader topic of conflict resolution, 
in order to define the field and some of its challenges. 
 
What is Transitional Justice? 
As it first emerged in the 1980’s, the field of transitional justice was mostly 
concerned with “how justice could be administered fairly in a time of political and 
institutional ﬂux.”17 In fact, the scholarship was shaped by a specific experience of 
transition from oppressive rule to liberal democracies, characterized by the third wave 
of democratization, during which some thirty countries across Latin America and 
Europe transitioned to democratic rule.
18
 From its inception, the field of transitional 
justice was, therefore, largely defined by a specific notion of transition, implicitly 
understood as transition to peace, and democracy. Only more recently, has peace been 
discussed in connection to justice.
19
 This quickly became “the dominant normative 
lens” of the field.20  
 Transitional justice encompasses the “legal, moral and political dilemmas that 
arise in holding human rights abusers accountable at the end of conflict.”21 It is 
important to add, here, that it also does so in settler societies dealing with historical 
wrongs. Teitel suggests that the field of transitional justice has to deal more generally 
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with “the grounding within society of a normative shift in the principles underlying 
and legitimating the exercise of state power.”22 Transitional justice is engaged in the 
(re-) creation of institutions inclusive of society members and reflective of peaceful 
social norms and new order. In this respect, it signals a breakaway from the previous 
social order, and provides a tool for rethinking and casting a new vision and direction 
for society. In the cases of settler societies, it also symbolizes a government’s 
acknowledgment of policies that contributed to the violation of the human rights of 
parts of its population. This is the case, for instance, in Australia, Canada, and New 
Zealand, which have taken a step towards redressing past wrongs.  
 Lydia Bosire prefers to say that the very endpoint and goal of transitional 
justice is reconciliation.
23
 This account of reconciliation is problematic since it 
narrows, and by the same token, severely weakens the field of transitional justice and 
its primary concern for justice. The concept of reconciliation, as it is discussed in 
more length below, lacks complete theorization. As such, considering reconciliation 
as the endpoint and goal of transitional justice further complicates any account of the 
field of transitional justice, and assumes that reconciliation is the most desirable goal 
in the aftermath of mass violations of human rights. Viewing reconciliation 
accordingly risks dimishing the importance and role of other central aspects of 
transitional justice, including the re-establishment of democratic institutions. 
  The definition of transitional justice adopted, in this study, echoes the 
definition put forth by Hugo van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter and Audrey Chapman, 
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23
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who hold that transitional justice refers to “societal responses to severe repression, 
societal violence, and systemic human rights violations that seek to establish the truth 
about the past, determine accountability and offer some form of redress, at least of a 
symbolic nature.”24 To this, one could add that transitional justice provides a space 
for addressing, coming to terms with, and healing past wrongs, in a variety of 
contexts, such as in settler or post-conflict societies. This definition is valuable 
particularly because of its breadth. Indeed, it is broad enough to include both post-
conflict and settler societies in their search for truth, accountability, social repair and 
reconciliation. 
 Truth commissions, national tribunals, and the International Criminal Court 
are some of the mechanisms commonly used to establish justice in the aftermath of 
mass violence. A small number of transitional justice scholars
25
 have only very 
recently turned their attention to “the legacy of indigenous practices of dispute 
settlement and reconciliation,” processes whose nature and features have so far 
gathered little consensus.
26
 Indeed, Borer claims that existing accounts of various 
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transitional justice mechanisms demonstrate an “insufficient understanding of how 
exactly these mechanisms contribute to peace.”27  
 Although research in the area of traditional mechanisms of justice is as yet 
insufficient, scholarship on transitional justice has succeeded in bringing attention to 
the existence of such practices and the implications the can have for the 
implementation of justice in the aftermath of mass violations of human rights. Quinn, 
for instance, notes the importance of what she calls customary practices in the 
promotion of acknowledgment—an essential element in justice and reconciliation.28  
Hovil and Quinn explain that the traditional African sense of justice exemplified 
through traditional, customary processes, incorporates retribution as one part of “an 
overarching process that also encompasses rehabilitation, reconciliation, 
compensation, and restoration.”29 Such accounts demonstrate the embedded-ness of 
legal traditions within a culture, a way of life and network of meanings.
30
 Other 
authors draw our attention to alternative ways to view and carry out justice emanating 
from Canada’s First Nations, for instance, and note the difficulty in protecting such 
practices.
31
 While alternative modes of conflict resolution and alternative mechanisms 
of justice remain largely under examined, existing testimonies note the latent tension 
between those traditional, grassroots, and informal mechanisms, and Western, 
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legalistic and state centred approaches to justice. The field of transitional justice is 
only just starting to grapple with some of these issues. 
 As noted by Bell, Campbell, and Nì Aolàin, discourses and accounts of 
transitional justice are themselves also in transition.
32
 As a relatively recent field of 
study, transitional justice is as yet unable to define and address all dimensions of 
conflict transformation and transitions to peace and justice. Transitional justice 
widely deals with concepts of accountability, responsibility, reparation, forgiveness, 
reconciliation, acknowledgment, apology, healing and truth telling, to name a few. 
Moreover, it also addresses the need for justice and questions its role and nature 
within the process of reconciliation. Although these are all central elements of 
transitional justice, little attention has been paid to what they actually mean. As a 
relatively young and rapidly growing field of study, many concepts central to 
transitional justice are posited at the crux of animated debates. Transitional justice is a 
field of study where theory and practice heavily impact and influence each other. 
Debating and questioning these concepts is therefore necessary if the field of 
transitional justice is to move forward and reflect the complexities involved in 
transitions to reconciliation in different contexts.  
 
Where Does Transitional Justice Fit? 
Before going any further, it is important to situate the field of transitional justice 
within the existing literature on conflict resolution. The literature on conflict 
resolution seeks to identify the necessary means to ensure a successful transition from 
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unrest to peace, a concern more or less shared by transitional justice scholars.
33
 
Conflict resolution can be defined as the active search for peace, and the best way to 
sustain it in troubled societies. It is equated with the de-escalation of tensions.
34
 
However, the nature of conflict resolution differs, depending on the phases it is called 
upon to address. The transition from mass violations of human rights towards positive 
peace, understood as the absence of fighting, is usually divided into three broad 
categories: peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping. While many discuss these 
categories separately,
35
 Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall provide the most 
convincing account of these three aspects as components of conflict resolution.
36
  
 Peacemaking is seen as the first step in that process. In Miall’s view, 
peacemaking is otherwise understood as conflict settlement, which can be considered 
as an elite process, in that it does not engage citizens per se, but, rather, government 
officials.
37
 Others define peacemaking as “the process of forging a settlement 
between disputing parties.”38 This echoes the United Nations, which regards 
peacemaking as the “action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through 
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peaceful means.”39 Settlements and peace treaties can be achieved through 
negotiations, and generally require the involvement of a third party to mediate the 
process. In a number of its publications, the United States Institute of Peace, for 
instance, equates peacemaking with mediation, or, in other words, negotiation 
between different formerly conflicting parties.
40
 It appears that peacemaking is 
generally considered the first step towards peace and consists of the immediate 
cessation of hostilities and the signing of treaties and peace agreements.  
 Peacebuilding is seen as the second step. It is equated with conflict 
transformation. The bulk of the literature on conflict resolution describes this second 
step as the (re)-creation of democratic institutions.
41
 Jeong explains that 
peacebuilding activities are designed to “enhance public security, generate economic 
recovery, facilitate social healing and promote democratic institutions.”42 To that, 
Lederach adds that peacebuilding is “an array of processes, approaches and stages 
needed to transform conflict towards more sustainable, peaceful relationships.”43 This 
step is also the one that triggers the most discussion and debate in the literature. 
Surely, if peacebuilding is about conflict transformation, it will then require more 
than the mere institutionalization of peaceful practices of governance. One can, 
therefore, distinguish between a minimalist approach to peacebuilding, which consists 
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of the promotion of democratic state institutions, law and order; and a maximalist 
approach, which seeks to engage different layers of a divided society in promoting 
social healing and recreating social trust.
44
 The maximalist approach, for instance, is 
adopted in a number of United Nations reports,
45
 as well by the Canadian 
International Development Research Centre, which defines peacebuilding as “the 
pursuit of policies, programs and initiatives that seek to create the conditions war torn 
countries need to transform or manage their conflict without violence so that they can 
address longer terms developmental goals.”46  
 The last step identified by the literature on conflict resolution is 
peacekeeping—distinct again from peacemaking and peacebuilding—or conflict 
containment,
47
 which is generally understood as a post-ceasefire prevention of a 
return to violence.
48
 The United Nations notes that the purpose of its peacekeeping 
efforts is primarily to maintain a ceasefire, once it has been established, and to 
stabilize situations on the ground.
49
 The Department of Peacekeeping Operations of 
the United Nations (DPKO), nevertheless, notes the existence of changing 
circumstances that prompt a shift in the traditional understanding of peacekeeping, as 
involving strictly military forces, to “complex multidimensional enterprises designed 
to ensure the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements and assist in laying 
the foundations for sustainable peace.”50 Peacekeeping is, therefore, no longer 
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restricted to preventing the return of violence and unrest, but, rather, is more readily 
involved in conflict transformation and in what used to be considered strictly 
peacebuilding activities.  
 These three categories, peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping are in 
no way fixed. As a result, they often overlap in much of the literature. The United 
Nations’ Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, often called the 
Capstone Doctrine, notes, for instance, that “the boundaries between conflict 
prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding have become increasingly 
blurred.”51 Others, such as Lederach, prefer to talk about a post-agreement phase 
which takes place after peacemaking, and consists of the “ability to create a vision of 
change that does not see the post-agreement phase as a distinct time period but rather 
as systematically connected to broader processes of change within a given context.”52 
Doyle and Sambanis encourage an even broader notion, encompassing everything 
from peace building, peacemaking, peacekeeping to post-conflict reconstruction.
53
  
 In this research, peacebuilding is seen as being inclusive of all activities that 
support the transition from conflict to long, lasting peace. This understanding of 
peacebuilding builds upon Lederach, Doyle and Sambanis’ views, which seem to 
provide an appropriate framework to discuss countries in transition, where the 
fighting is not always over and the lines between peacemaking, peacebuilding and 
peacekeeping are often blurred. Transitional justice has, at times, even been 
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considered as a sub-section of peacebuilding. Thallinger, for instance, argues that 
transitional justice “forms an absolutely essential component in every post-conflict 
peacebuilding process.”54  
 
 It is important to note that the focus on the stages of conflict resolution, as 
presented in the majority of the literature, is largely devoted to the state and the 
institutional settings that may facilitate the end of violence, and the establishment and 
maintenance of peace.
55
 Communities, and the web of relationships that constitute 
them, often remain uninvolved in, and unaffected by, the conflict resolution process. 
This state-centric view is challenging since it limits the role of reconciliation, as part 
of the peacebuilding phase, to the launch of national and international judicial 
prosecutions and programs that seek to engage reconciliation and may result in 
discouraging local endeavours.
56
  
 Civic engagement in the re-recreation of a peaceful society, therefore, often 
remains marginalized and unaccounted for in most theoretical accounts of 
peacebuilding. Saunders alludes to the importance of reconciliation among citizens of 
divided societies when he explains, “only governments can write peace treaties, but 
only human beings, citizens outside of the government can transform conflictual 
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relationships […] into peaceful relationships.”57 Arguments such as those by 
Lederach, Assefa, and Saunders help in opening up the discussion.
58
 In turn, they 
raise a number of questions regarding the type of change to be brought about, as well 
as the mechanisms and processes necessary, for justice and long lasting peace to be 
achieved. Peace and justice are, in fact, mutually reinforcing, although not everyone 
agrees that this is the case.
59
 In fact, there exist a number of instances where peace 
seemed to prevail, while injustices continued to be carried out.
60
 This was, for 
instance, the case in Australia, throughout the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 Centuries, 
where, despite apparent peace, the country’s Aborigines suffered severe injustices, 
such as the removal of children from their families--widely known as the “Stolen 
Generations.”61 This is also the case in Aceh (Indonesia), where despite the cessation 
of hostilities with a 2005 peace settlement, justice has been difficult to implement. In 
fact, “few people expect that perpetrators of past abuses will be brought to justice.”62 
Nonetheless, this thesis adopts the view put forth by the United Nations’ Secretary 
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General, in his Report on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, that “peace and 
justice are not contradictory forces. Rather, properly pursued, they promote and 
sustain one another.”63 If the roots of conflict and tension are to be removed, for 
peace to flourish, truth must be told, individuals must be held accountable and justice 
must be carried out.
64
 Peace and justice must go hand in hand, and, must, therefore, 
be explored as such. The demand for justice is also where the literature on 
peacebuilding and transitional justice have most in common.
65
  
Complexities of Transitional Justice 
Dealing with and addressing past violations of human rights requires that attention be 
paid to some of the inherent complexities of transitional justice. Most importantly, 
attention must be paid to the specific context of any efforts that are undertaken. This 
research underlines the need to adapt justice efforts to local realities and experiences, 
rather than resort to a one-size-fits-all approach. Truth-telling and reconciliation, for 
instance, are recurrent themes in transitional justice. Yet, they are conceptually 
indeterminate and require further theorization. The kind of truth to be sought, as well 
as the type of reconciliation to be promoted, among others, for example, deserve to be 
examined.  
 Understanding the field of transitional justice and its uncertainties is an 
important step towards our discussion of both alternative mechanisms and 
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conceptions of justice. Each of the two elements that will be dealt with in this section, 
reconciliation and truth, have a direct relevance to the alternative conception of 
justice examined in this research. Yet, they require further definition and conceptual 
refinement to catch up with the ever-growing body of cases analyzed, and questions 
raised by transitional justice scholars. As noted by Duggan and Thom, Paris and Ron, 
“research on this subject is still nascent, and many of its early findings are 
questionable and contradictory.”66 
 
Conceptual Elements 
Reconciliation and truth are two elements frequently mentioned in the literature on 
transitional justice. They are, however, often taken at face value and require further 
conceptualization. It is critical, in order to understand the kind of complexities that 
make up the transitional justice scholarship, to explore in further depth, these two 
important elements. 
Reconciliation 
Reconciliation aims at the transformation of conflicting relationships into peaceful 
ones, and justice is positioned to be at the crux of any effort at “reconciliation.”67 Yet, 
reconciliation, “an often-stated objective of transitional justice, is a contested 
notion.”68 It is “often vaguely defined, if at all.”69 Reconciliation is generally 
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understood and assumed, in much of the literature, to be a means of conflict 
prevention and transformation.
70
 Hoogenboom and Vieille, for instance, describe it as 
both an ideal and a process.
71
 In this study, reconciliation will be understood as, both 
a concept and a process that seeks to create harmonious and peaceful relationships 
between previously disputing parties. There is little consensus in the literature, since 
beyond basic disagreements over what reconciliation precisely entails, definitions 
also either focus on reconciliation as an abstract construct of the mind, or as a planned 
series of actions directed to some specific endpoint.
72
 In this respect, whether one 
looks at reconciliation as a concept or a process raises different questions, and will 
provide different answers regarding the purpose of reconciliation.  
 Much of the literature in transitional justice regards reconciliation as a 
process.
73
 This is seen in the amount of work that focuses on existing attempts at 
implementing reconciliation through truth commissions and other institutions. Much 
attention, for example, has been devoted to the South African case as an instance of 
how, and by what means, reconciliation can be brought about in deeply divided 
societies. Reconciliation is also described as a process that is likely to “allow future 
positive and harmonious relationships between opposing parties.”74 Dwyer sees in 
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reconciliation “an end to antagonism” and the beginning of “healing and repair of 
relationships,”75 while Jeong argues that reconciliation aims at rebuilding “social 
trust.”76 These definitions, though, are insufficient. They do, nonetheless, provide a 
springboard and a fertile amount of information for a possible conceptualization of 
reconciliation. 
In any case, justice brought about by reconciliation is often considered the 
best means to alleviate and reduce victimization and scapegoating, two particularly 
dangerous elements often present in the aftermath of abuses of human rights that have 
been directed at a certain portion of the population. Assefa describes justice as being 
“the core of reconciliation,”77 while Rigby quite forcefully adds that reconciliation 
that does not bring about justice is a “failed reconciliation.”78 Reconciliation is often 
described as requiring the full participation of different sides to a dispute. It is 
presented as “pro-active”79 and “dynamic,”80 in that it requires the highest degree of 
“mutual participation,”81 compared to any other kinds of processes of conflict 
resolution, such as negotiation or arbitration. Reconciliation can also, more simply 
and rather comprehensively, as presented by Govier, be conceived as a spectrum. 
Govier presents a spectrum starting with a thick conception of reconciliation, “full of 
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emotional richness” and ending with a thin conception of reconciliation “where there 
is little emphasis on attitudes and feelings.”82  
Much of the literature fails to consider the different levels at which 
reconciliation may occur. Jeong and Dwyer are among the few who discuss the multi-
tiered nature of reconciliation, thereby acknowledging the variety of actors who may 
take part in the process. Jeong explains that reconciliation may occur at three different 
levels, including the state, inter-group and intra-group group levels.
83
 He explains that 
reconciliation may take different shapes and forms including institutional re-
organization at the state level, and personal healing.
84
 Dwyer insists on a division 
between macro-reconciliation, that is, reconciliation between groups, and micro-
reconciliation, which emphasizes individuals.
85
 She thereby disregards altogether 
national or state reconciliation. Definitions or understandings of reconciliation may 
differ depending on at which level the latter is taking place and whose relationship is 
to be mended. National reconciliation, for instance, may not require as much citizen 
participation as inter-group or macro-reconciliation. Likewise, the requirements and 
outcomes of such processes may differ. Indeed, inter-individual reconciliation may, 
for instance, be sought through some kind of local, community-based process that 
involves individuals on a one-to-one basis, while national reconciliation is more 
likely to require national and almost impersonal measures. This is important since it 
illustrates how transitional justice scholars disagree over the essence of one of the 
central concepts of the field.  
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 In the aftermath of its well-known 1994 genocide, the Rwandan government 
chose to set up a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission.
86
 The purpose of 
the institution was to sensitize the Rwandan people about the need for reconciliation 
and unity, as well as to promote tolerance. Various actions were taken to promote 
national reconciliation, such as re-burying of individuals whose bodies were thrown 
into mass graves during the genocide.
87
 Memorials were created on various sites.
88
 
Reconciliation and justice were also sought through the modifying of customary 
mechanisms called gacaca courts, which clearly targeted inter-individual, rather than 
national, reconciliation. The gacaca courts operated within local communities and 
required the attendance of community members. For less serious crimes, they also 
provided a forum for truth-telling and favoured community service as a penalty, 
rather than the imprisonment of individuals who had taken part in the killings.
89
 Each 
level of reconciliation fed into the other. National reconciliation, it is argued, could 
not have succeeded without any attempt to reconcile individuals within divided 
communities, and vice versa.
90
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Truth 
The most basic understanding of truth is as indisputable fact, considered to 
correspond to an immutable reality.
91
 As such, truth is often considered a crucial 
element in reconciling opposing parties. Yet what exactly truth is, is very often 
assumed. It is described as a central element of peacebuilding and transitional justice, 
as well as an act of justice in itself.
92
 As Goldstone argues, “the public and official 
exposure of the truth is itself a form of justice.”93 Mendeloff explains that truth-telling 
facilitates the psychological healing of victims and their families, and therefore, 
directly contributes to peace and justice.
94
  Indeed, the act of talking about the past is 
considered to be “a key ingredient in reckoning with the past, both on an individual 
level and in the context of societal recovery.”95 Michael Humphrey echoes this view, 
but warns, however, that truth-telling alone is “no substitute for the reconstruction of 
an inclusive political community.”96 Claire Moon notes the rise of a 
“psychotherapeutic discourse and practices” in transitional settings.97 In her view, the  
“therapeutic moral order” has become “one of the dominant frameworks within which 
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states attempt to deal with the legacy of violent conflict.”98 Dealing with the trauma 
and other psychological dimensions past atrocities have had on societies (for instance 
through truth-telling mechanisms) has become central to any attempt at postconflict 
reconciliation.  
 Judith Herman explains that truth is necessary, not only for individuals, but also 
for the community as a whole.
99
 Direct involvement, inaction, or tacit consent of 
community members can be seen to have contributed, one way or the other, to the 
crimes that have taken place. Regardless of whether individuals have been directly 
involved in the crimes committed or not, all have been affected. As a result, it is 
important for the community itself to acknowledge the harms committed by its 
members and to take a stand against these acts. The act of truth-telling before 
community members is essential. By listening to the testimony of offenders and their 
victims, the community acts as a recipient of their stories. The community also bears 
witness and recognizes the harm done to all.
100
  
 Truth telling helps in shedding light upon the past and breaks the silence about 
past violations of human rights such as torture and mass killings. In fact, telling and 
learning the truth about past wrongs not only provides knowledge about the past, it 
also, and most importantly, provides acknowledgement.
101
 It allows communities to 
reckon with their own difficult past. Truth-telling also plays an important in the 
establishment of an authoritative record of the past, but also in helping victims to 
                                                 
98
 Ibid., 71.  
99
 Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery (New York: Basic Book, 1997). 
100
 Howard Zehr, The Little Book of Restorative Justice (Pennsylvania: Good Books, 2002), 16-17. 
101
 Michelle Parlevliet, "Considering Truth: Dealing with a Legacy of Gross Human Rights 
Violations," Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 16 no. 2 (1998), 143.  
 34 
heal, in making recommendations for reform and promoting accountability.
102
 Volkan 
highlights the danger of not addressing the past, which, in his view, would result in 
“unresolved trauma” and lay the seeds for future conflict.103  
 While Parlevliet argues in support of truth-telling,
104
 it is not always favoured 
throughout the literature. Truth-telling is said to contribute to the psychological, 
social and political restoration of countries in transitions.
105
 Yet, the assertion is at the 
centre of much debate. It is not clear, for instance, if national efforts ought to be 
directed towards forgetting rather than remembering a painful and sometimes 
shameful past. As noted by Borer, seeking the truth about the past risks re-opening 
wounds unnecessarily.
106
 In some cases, truth is sought, but only in exchange for 
amnesty.
107
 In the case of Guatemala, as in Chile and El Salvador, truth was favoured 
over trials.
108
 In El Salvador, for instance, an amnesty was passed immediately after 
the publication of the truth commission’s report, thereby granting immunity from 
procedural proceedings for all individuals who had participated in political crimes.
109
 
 What this reveals is the need to recognize the specific context and embedded-
ness of truth and the act of truth-telling itself. Truth may not be considered favourably 
in all cases. While truth-telling may be favoured for its intrinsic value, it is sometimes 
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encouraged for more practical reasons, as in El Salvador. “The problem is that the 
truth neither is nor does all that we expect of it.”110 So while Hamber and Laasko, for 
instance, praises the value of truth-telling for reconciliation and personal healing,
111
 
others, including Thoms, Ron, and Paris, stress that there exists no clear evidence that 
truth-telling really produces any psychological benefits for victims.
112
 In fact, 
Mendeloff states that there is no consensus in clinical studies regarding the benefits of 
truth-telling in the aftermath post-traumatic disorder.
113
 Seeking truth in divided 
societies may, in fact, provoke further tension and provide new grievances that may 
fuel additional unrest.
114
 In the case of Rwanda, studies have shown that truth-telling 
has worsened the situation for some of those who participated by telling their stories. 
For instance, some women have been themselves threatened or harassed after having 
given testimony.
115
 
 In reflecting about the experience of the South African Truth Commission in its 
search for truth, many tackle the difficulty of truth-seeking by discussing different 
kinds of “truths,” and make distinctions between historical truth, moral truth, factual 
truth, narrative truth, and social truth.
116
 Each type of “truth,” in their view, sheds 
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light upon a different aspect of past experiences.
117
 Chapman and Ball address the 
multiple dimensions of truth by comparing and combining four types of truth, namely 
forensic, narrative, social and restorative truth, within the exercise of truth-telling and 
reconciling disputing parties.
118
 Borer asserts that the exercise of truth-telling is 
merely the “dissemination of a private into public truth” involving the recognition and 
acceptance of the past.
119
 Wilson, on the other hand, argues that all types of truth can 
be narrowed down to two basic “truth paradigms,” namely forensic and narrative 
truth.
120
 Mendez talks about structural versus individualized truth.
121
  
 Parlevliet sees truth-telling as a form of communication between members of 
society. She defines the act of truth telling as “the facts about what happened in a 
country’s recent history, and to the preservation, or reassertion of essential norms 
regarding social relations between people and the organization of the state in the 
future.”122 She argues that trying to define truth may be a never-ending quest, and 
concedes that identifying conditions that may facilitate truth-telling in the aftermath 
of mass violations of human rights is likely to be more fruitful.
123
 Open debate, as 
free encounter and cooperation, in her view, is the best instrument in that it provides 
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all the necessary elements (equality, equal chance, reason and sincerity) for 
communication and truth to be engaged.
124
 
 Most interesting is the view that the act of truth-telling in itself constitutes some 
form of communication and recognition of the rational “other,” whose identity and 
self was denied by the violent act that was committed. The act of sharing the truth 
between a former offender and his or her victim signals the recognition that there is a 
relationship between the two individuals, as well as the necessity to see the other as a 
partner in the healing process. Christodoulidis goes as far as to argue that truth-telling 
is “the experience of community as communication,” whereby the act of telling the 
truth, in itself, establishes a peaceful link between perpetrators and their victims.
125
 
 This research adopts the view that there exist two types of truth, which are 
referred to as individual truth and collective truth, each of which has its own goal.
126
 
As such, personal truth, individualized truth,
127
 or narrative truth
128
 communicated 
through truth-telling mechanisms, for instance, serves to provide a sense of closure, 
whereby victims may narrate their personal experiences of an event. In turn, the 
sharing personal truth, defined as one’s perception and experience of an event, 
contributes to the creation of a national narrative, collective truth or consensus about 
the past.
129
 Van der Merwe, in his case study of South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, explains that the sharing of personal experiences and 
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testimonies of some of the victims of the apartheid helped “the whole country to 
confront its past, and to make it impossible for people to deny the suffering that had 
been caused.”130 In this respect, hearing the personal truths of victims directly 
contributed to the acceptance of a difficult past and the creation of a common 
narrative, understanding and collective truth about what had happened.
131
 
 
 Another example may help in clarifying this view. Each soldier who fought in 
the Second World War, for instance, has a unique experience of the fighting he 
experienced. Each may have fought in a different region, been wounded, or have 
killed. Emotional responses, in each case, differ. Each former soldier tells about his 
own personal experience and, therefore, his personal truth to children and 
grandchildren. Collective truth can be viewed as a reductionist form of personal 
truths, which builds on the similarity between the multitude of personal truths in 
order to establish a common sense or knowledge of the past. Collective truth is 
communicated and passed down through history books, reports, memorials, 
museums, and so on.  The following quotation successfully captures the nature of the 
two “truths” outlined above, and the tension that exists between them. Indeed, 
“collective truth” will never be able to fully reproduce and account for the “personal 
truth” of those who experienced it.   
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 Even the most comprehensive and objective recounting cannot fully 
communicate the experience of those who have lived through atrocities. The 
cries, the terror, the smell of death, the helplessness, the feeling of abandoning 
one’s child – these all get lost in the translation from experience to word. 
Ironically, truth reports are designed to relate what survivors most commonly 
refer to as the unspeakable. To speak is not necessarily to convey what 
happened and to read what happened is not necessarily to know the truth.”132  
  
 However, the question of whose truth is acknowledged remains unanswered. 
It is uncertain, for instance, whether the victim’s truth is more important and valid 
than that of the perpetrator, or if we should solely adopt the victors’ truth and discard 
that of the wrongdoers.
133
 While a mutual acknowledgement of the truth is recognized 
as a necessary element to bring about justice, the process through which truth is 
agreed upon, and the nature of the truth to be acknowledged, remains largely 
assumed. Favouring victims and providing them with a forum for expressing their 
grief, anger, pain and the experience in general, may cause further isolation and 
ostracize offenders. This will, in fact, further divide already deeply divided societies 
and undermine all efforts to bring about reconciliation, peace and justice.  
 Parlevliet rightly questions whether all “truths” ought to be treated equally.134 
For instance, it is unclear whether forensic truth is more valuable than narrative truth.  
Forensic truth may contribute to the establishment of facts about the crime such as the 
time and location of death for instance. Narrative truth, however, facilitates the 
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expression of feelings such as grief, anger and of personal experiences that have, too 
often, been kept silent.
135
 Both types of truth contribute to the creation of a common 
truth, a common version of the past and collective memory. Both are needed, in that 
they shed light on different facets of the past.  
One ought also to be clear about the expected outcomes and goals of the 
process of truth-telling. Addressing only forensic truth will not achieve the same 
result as providing a forum for narrative truth. It is equally important to address the 
conditions under which truth may be sought. Victims of rape and torture may not feel 
comfortable sharing their experiences in a public place, with individuals of the 
opposite sex also in attendance. As a result of this, personal accounts may be 
changed, even by the victim herself, so as not to have to share particularly traumatic 
events. The scope and mandate of the institutions through which truth is sought are 
likely to affect the quality and kind of truth. All these are need to be considered when 
discussing truth and the exercise of truth-telling in transitional societies.  
 
Transitional Societies 
Another consequence of the newness of the transitional justice scholarship is its lack 
of critical evaluation of the cases that are being examined. Transitional justice focuses 
on the search for justice in transitional moments and seeks to address the political, 
judicial and human challenges such transition raises. Yet, the idea of a transitional 
moment is problematic, for it assumes the existence of a delimited period of time 
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spanning two stages.
136
 Unfortunately, the boundaries of transitions are often too 
murky to be identified that clearly. Of particular interest here is the question of the 
end goal of transition. In other words, there is little assessment of what a transition 
tends to and precisely entails. Transitions necessarily involve change from one state 
or condition to another. However, until recently, there has been little discussion 
regarding the desirable outcome or nature of the transitions presupposed by the 
scholarship.  
 To a large extent, scholars of the field focus their analysis on post-conflict 
situations and countries transitioning out of unrest towards democratic rule. The 
language of the field reflects this bias, and the first part of this chapter clearly 
illustrated this tendency. In her seminal work, Teitel purported that “debates about 
transitional justice are generally framed by the normative proposition that various 
legal responses should be evaluated on the bias of their prospect for democracy.”137 
To this extent, Ní Aoláin, and Campbell are right to argue that the transitional justice 
discourse is intimately tied to democratic ideals.
138
  
 Kritz’s famous three-volume study on transitional justice, for instance, depicts 
the field as an academic domain devoted to the study of “how emerging democracies 
reckon with former regimes.”139 The foreword of the first volume, written by Nelson 
Mandela, sets the tone with a clear reference to how these books make an invaluable 
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contribution to the study of how countries “make their road to democracy.”140 In fact, 
while research conducted in the transitional justice scholarship is applied to wide 
array of situations spread across the globe, a large majority of cases are usually 
emerging from a violent past, such as warfare or authoritarian rule and moving 
towards democratic rule.  
 Nagy notes that “transitional justice has typically appeared salient only after 
massive direct violence has been brought to a halt.”141 This is reflected in much of the 
literature. In her book on confronting past human rights violations, Sriram supports 
her investigation with examples from five countries, Argentina, Honduras, El 
Salvador, South Africa and Sri Lanka, all of which are emerging from either 
oppressive military rule, civil war or severe repression.
142
 Chayes and Minow focus 
their research on countries emerging from violent ethnic conflict, such as Rwanda and 
Bosnia
143
 while Dougherty investigates the hybrid experiment in Sierra Leone.
144
 
Others, including Govier,
145
 Baines,
146
 Brown,
147
 Hayner,
148
 Quinn,
149
 Finnström,
150
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Lanegran,
151
 Drumbl,
152
 Chapman and Bell,
153
 Thomson,
154
 and Roth-Arriaza
155
 
reproduce a similar bias in their choice of case studies.  
 That scholars of transitional justice generally focus their attention on post-
conflict and deeply divided societies transitioning to democracy is not entirely 
surprising. As explained earlier, transitional justice is often considered a subset of 
peacebuilding, and therefore shares a number of assumptions with the peacebuilding 
literature. Another reason for this assumption can be identified in the fact that the 
field of transitional justice came together as academics from different disciplines, 
including Political Science, Law, Anthropology, and Sociology among others, in 
reaction to the third wave of democratization, during which some thirty countries 
across Latin America and Eastern Europe transitioned to democratic rule.
156
 The first 
years of the field of transitional justice were therefore largely defined by a specific 
experience of transition from oppressive rule to liberal market type democracies. 
Transition, implicitly understood as transition to peace and democracy, became “the 
dominant normative lens” of the field.157  
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 The belief that democracies do not go to war with one another surely also plays 
its part in the scholarship’s preference for post-conflict cases.158 The assumption 
underpinning much of the writing in transitional justice is that a regime that commits 
grave human rights violations must be “to a greater or lesser degree, illegitimate.”159 
The idea of democracies taking part in or allowing civil strife or gross violations of 
human is simply not envisaged, because a democracy is supposed to represent the will 
of its people. Moreover, democratic states are expected to have the necessary 
institutional safeguards in place to protect their citizens and redress abuses.
160
  
 However, authoritarian regimes are not the only kind of governments which can 
partake in serious and systematic human rights violations. That human rights 
violations in alleged democratic countries are rarely addressed in the field of 
transitional justice does not mean they do not take place. Human rights violations can 
and do take place in democratic states, but are often ignored. This is a result of a 
“dichotomy of standards,” whereby the international community chooses to remain 
blind to the abuses taking place in wealthy democratic states.
161
 In turn, failing to 
address the violations taking place within democratic states sustains the belief that 
these kinds of violations simply do not occur. Orford criticizes the field of transitional 
justice precisely for creating “the sense that large-scale human rights violations are 
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exceptional” and that they do not happen in liberal democratic states.162 She also 
brings attention to the “everydayness and bureaucratization of genocide and of 
massive human rights violations,” in referring to Australia’s legacy of human rights 
violations with regard to the forcible removal of indigenous children from their 
families.
163
 Similar human rights violations have been committed against indigenous 
populations around the world. Canada’s Indian Residential School system, which was 
designed to “eradicate Aboriginal people’s culture and rights,” is but one of many 
example.
164
  
 That the transitional justice literature fails, to a large extent, to examine the 
legacies of human rights violations in democratic states represents a major downfall 
of the field. It also renders its findings and theories in many ways inaccurate, since 
they do not take into consideration the full range of challenges that surface when 
seeking justice, peace and accountability in both democratic and non-democratic 
societies. Bell, Campbell and Ní Aoláin advocate for the broadening of the field of 
transitional justice, and contend that only within a broader context can “debates about 
dealing with the past…be fully understood.”165 Both Jung and Arthur note that the 
transitional justice framework, while originally devised to deal with transitions to 
democracy, is only just starting to be used “to respond to certain types of human 
rights violations against indigenous peoples, even in cases where there is no regime 
                                                 
162
 Anne Orford, "Commissioning the Truth," Journal of Gender and Law 15 no. 3 (2006), 863. 
163
 Orford, "Commissioning the Truth," 854. 
164
 Beverley Jacobs and Andrea Williams, "Legacy of Residential Schools: Missing and Murdered 
Aboriginal Women," in From Truth to Reconciliation Transforming the Legacy of Residential Schools, 
ed. Marlene Castellano, Linda Archibald and Mike Degagne (Manitoba: Aboriginal Healing 
Foundation, 2008), 142. 
165
 Bell, Campbell and Ní Aoláin, "Justice Discourses," 305. 
 46 
transition.”166 In Canada, for instance, the government chose to employ transitional 
justice tools, including a truth commission and a national apology to address the 
historical injustices against its Aboriginal population.
167
 
 Ní Aoláin and Campbell encourage scholars of transitional justice to pay more 
attention to democracies that have experienced “prolonged, structured, communal, 
political violence.”168 They go on to set specific criteria for what they call “conflicted 
democracies,” which are considered too narrow, in this thesis. Both researchers claim 
that “conflicted democracies” are to be identified on the basis of “deep-seated ethnic, 
religious, class or ideological…[divisions] so acute… as to have resulted in or 
threaten significant political violence.”169  
 While Ní Aoláin and Campbell put forth an interesting suggestion, this thesis 
argues that the scholarship needs to be broadened still further. Adopting Ní Aoláin 
and Campbell’s categorization leaves out a number of instances of human violations 
in states espousing democratic values. Countries like Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand do not fit within Ní Aoláin and Campbell’s definition of “conflicted 
democracy.” Yet, each of these countries is actively seeking to acknowledge and 
redress former state-sponsored human rights violations against their indigenous 
populations. Canada, for instance, established a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission to acknowledge the experiences of those who survived the Indian 
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Residential Schools system, and to recognize the Residential Schools system’s impact 
and consequences on aboriginal communities.
170
 This creation of a truth-seeking body 
is part of a larger attempt to facilitate, although questionably, in my view, 
“reconciliation among former students, their families, their communities and all 
Canadians.”171 The Indian Residential School Settlement Agreement, as of September 
2007, also provided for a compensation scheme called the Common Experience 
Payment (CEP), which consists of a lump sum payment to former students.
172
 An 
Independent Assessment Process (IAP) has also been set up to deal specifically with 
claims of sexual and other physical abuses perpetrated in the Indian Residential 
Schools.
173
 The Australian government chose to launch an inquiry into the past 
violations of human rights in question. In 1997, it published a report documenting the 
abuses and violations carried out by the government against Aborigines and the 
Torres Strait Islanders.
174
 In 2008, the Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, also 
formulated a national apology for past wrongs committed by successive governments 
against the nation’s Aborigines.175 New Zealand adopted yet another approach, by 
setting up the Waitangi Tribunal to investigate land claims alongside the launch of a 
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number of other policies aiming at cultural accommodation.
176
 All three countries are 
actively dealing with their difficult pasts, in their own different ways.  
 For this reason, it is argued, in this research, that even though neither Canada 
nor Australia nor New Zealand is experiencing “significant political violence,” as Ní 
Aoláin and Campbell require in their definition, the aboriginal population in all three 
countries, has experienced significant political violence at the hands of the 
government. Each country and government is also seeking, more or less successfully, 
to face what wrong have been committed against its indigenous population. The 
national apologies formulated by governments, along with the truth-seeking bodies 
set up, demonstrate a commitment to acknowledging past wrongs and moving away 
from formerly assimilationist policies. While the success, intentions and degree of 
commitment of each government can be legitimately questioned, the fact that the 
public discourse is changing, to different degrees in each country, cannot be 
ignored.
177
 Reconciliation is a lengthy process, which will require further 
commitment to addressing the inequalities resulting from colonization. But, 
reconciliation based on acknowledgment of the past is also most likely to trigger a 
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real change and renewal of relationships between the parties involved.
178
 Jung argues 
that, in these cases, transitional justice measures are “designed in part to reinscribe a 
common national identity, legitimate the government and re-establish the moral 
authority of state sovereignty.”179 It is argued, here, that a transition does not 
necessarily have to be tied to a regime change, but can also be defined in terms of the 
acknowledgement of past wrongs and acceptance of new discourse regarding national 
history. Moreover, in all three countries, indigenous communities have suffered 
severe human rights violations and continue to be economically, socially and 
culturally marginalized. All three countries have since made a conscious decision to 
address some of these circumstances. New Zealand, for instance, chose to incorporate 
Mãori values in various social policies in order to be more culturally sensitive but 
also to better address some of the structural inequalities that affect Mãori. While these 
countries are not transitioning towards democracy, they are starting their journey 
toward acknowledgment, inclusion and reconciliation. Again, this varies to different 
degrees, in each case. However, these governments are seeking to re-establish or 
consolidate their moral authority and legitimacy. Transitional justice, it is argued, is 
relevant to cases where there is no obvious regime transition. Indeed, while 
transitions to peace and democracy may be a sufficient condition to qualify for that 
status of transitional societies, they are in no way a necessary condition.  
 In conclusion, this research stresses the need to reshape the boundaries of 
transitional justice so as to include a wider array of cases and transitions. It suggests 
that transitional justice scholarship would strongly benefit from broadening its inquiry 
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to include democratic countries dealing with legacies of past violations of human 
rights and the necessities of historical redress. Lessons regarding the dilemma of 
transition can be learnt from both post-conflict and settler societies. This is only part 
of the work that still needs to be undertaken for the transitional justice scholarship to 
become more comprehensive and relevant to the realities of transitional societies. As 
has been shown, a number of the central concepts of the field, including reconciliation 
and truth, also and still need to be further analyzed and conceptually refined. As a fast 
growing field of inquiry, transitional justice presents a number of inconsistencies and 
uncertainties that need to be questioned.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: A COLONIZING FIELD? 
 
 
The transitional justice scholarship raises a number of contentious issues and is the subject of 
ongoing debate regarding how to best come to terms with the past in transitional societies. 
This usually involves, for instance, the creation of specific judicial institutions to carry out 
justice and hold individuals accountable in the aftermath of conflict or grave violations of 
human rights. As noted by Thomson and Nagy, the field of transitional justice has only 
recently started to pay attention to “more localized, traditional mechanisms as a corrective to 
the shortcomings of internationalized, ‘one-size-fits-all’ approaches.”180 This chapter 
contends that the transitional justice literature is defined by a Western, legalistic
181
 approach 
to doing justice which affects the ability of the scholarship to account for indigenous and 
customary mechanisms of justice that do not espouse this legalistic lens. Here, two things are 
discussed. First, this chapter examines how transitional justice scholars and practitioners 
favor the implementation and development of certain institutions, at the detriment of others, 
in transitional societies. These are usually based on a neo-liberal democratic framework. This, 
in turn, leads to a discussion about how this preference for particular institutions and 
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mechanisms reveals latent assumptions about the primacy of the rule of law, as well as about 
the societies where the creation of these types of institutions is promoted.  
 
 
Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law 
 
As noted earlier, transitional justice shares close ties with the literature on conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding where the promotion of the rule of law is perceived as an essential element 
in sustaining peace and security. In fact, it appears that a legalistic approach to justice has 
come to dominate the field of transitional justice.
182
 McEvoy, for instance, contends that 
“transitional justice has become over dominated by a narrow legalistic lens which impedes 
both scholarship and praxis.”183 This is clearly visible in the sort of institutions favored by 
transitional justice scholars and practitioners. The international push to do justice,
184
 or what 
Oomen calls “the judicalization of international relations,”185 has led the international 
community to respond to the call for accountability by setting up major legal institutions, 
including the Tokyo and Nuremberg Tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR, and other, more recent, 
hybrid models such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
186
 The creation of the ICC is 
certainly the most significant illustration of this global move towards judicalization. In recent 
years, the crimes committed in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and the 
Central African Republic have been referred to the ICC.
187
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 This push to do justice is also visible outside of the prerogative of the ICC. In 2003, 
for instance, under pressure from the United States government, the Iraqi Special Tribunal for 
Crimes Against Humanity was set up to investigate crimes committed under the government 
of Saddam Hussein.
188
 The creation of such judicial institutions, according to Amnesty 
International, is an “international responsibility,” which the international community must 
carry out.
189
 Today, the idea that persons who “commit international crimes are 
internationally accountable for them has now become an accepted part of international 
law.”190 
 Transitional justice strategies, however, have quickly expanded to encompass a range 
of activities that are not directly about making those responsible for violations of human 
rights accountable for their acts, but, rather, encompass such things as the “institutional 
reform of judiciaries, training of judges, reformulation of military and other security 
doctrines…and institutions, which are indistinguishable from peacebuilding efforts.”191 The 
2010 Annual Report of International Center for Transitional Justice illustrates and confirms 
this tendency. The document lists security sector reforms and criminal justice reforms as part 
of the activities that comprise the field of transitional justice.
192
 These reforms include the 
restructuring of national security forces, intelligence and the reorganization of the justice 
sector, alongside measures to strengthen civil society.
193
 Transitional justice strategies have 
generally supported the development of institutional measures that are mapped onto a neo-
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liberal understanding of peace and peacebuilding. This is not entirely surprising, given that 
transitional justice is often considered a subset of peacebuilding.
194
 To a great extent, many 
officials equate transitional justice with the establishment of human rights and peacebuilding 
activities.
195
 Sriram contends that the fields of transitional justice and peacebuilding “share 
key assumptions about preferable institutional arrangements, and a faith that other key goods 
- democracy, free markets, ‘justice’ – can essentially stand in for, and create, peace.”196 This 
belief has clear roots in the neo-liberal doctrine,
197
 which encourages the “opening up of 
political space, including improvement regarding contestations, participation and human 
rights.”198 Teitel adds that the “justice seeking phenomena…is intimately tied to the 
fashioning of a liberal political identity.”199  
 The unquestioned and absolute promotion of the rule of law at the international level, 
however, creates challenges on two levels. First, it raises questions on an ethical level vis-à-
vis the ideological assumptions that ground the judicalization of international relations and 
transitional justice. Second, it also brings up concerns vis-à-vis the practical level and the 
feasibility and applicability of this model to a variety of contexts. Both these issues are 
discussed in the following section.  
Ethical challenges 
That the transitional justice scholarship is “steeped in western liberalism”200 is problematic 
for a number of reasons. First, this tendency makes it difficult for the scholarship to account 
for mechanisms and approaches to doing justice that do not fit within its legalistic and 
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individualistic framework. Indeed, liberalism conceives of the individual as the basic and 
irreducible unit of society, and finds it difficult to accommodate practices that do not 
correspond to this view.
201
 This liberal principle of individuation, although culturally and 
historically specific, serves to shape much of existing international humanitarian, 
peacebuilding efforts in transitional societies.
202
 Nagy, who is highly critical of what she 
refers to as the “global project,” accuses transitional justice of seeking to “produce subjects 
and truths that align with market democracy and are blind to gender and social justice.”203 
Lundy and McGovern, who denounce international efforts for promoting “a pattern of 
development determined by the dominant ideology of neo-liberalism,” echo Nagy’s 
concern.
204
 Transitional justice, just like peacebuilding, with which it is often associated, is 
informed by a given “epistemic knowledge base and ontological view of the world” which 
influences the social, economic, political strategies employed.
205
 Orford warns of the fact that 
the establishment of transitional justice institutions and mechanisms is informed by “powerful 
ideas of the international human rights movement, part of the forward march of liberal 
internationalism.”206 This chapter draws attention to how transitional justice strategies are 
designed and channeled to fit a specific ontological view of society embodied in the 
deontological liberal tradition. In fact, apart from a handful of scholars,
207
 the transitional 
justice literature has remained silent on the issue.  
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 This one-size-fits-all approach has been most clearly visible through the uninhibited 
promotion of the rule of law and the institutional arrangements that support its development 
in transitional societies. The last couple of decades have seen a “surge in American and 
international efforts to promote the rule of law around the globe, especially in post-crisis and 
transitional societies.”208 European and North American foreign policies, as well as the UN, 
the World Bank, and a number of philanthropic foundations, have all engaged in the 
promotion of the rule of law, based on a given standardized understanding of it. This research 
adopts the UN’s definition of the rule of law, which refers to: 
 a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and 
private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly 
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent 
with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to 
ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, 
accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, 
participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and 
procedural and legal transparency.
209
 
 
 It is, therefore, clear that the rule of law is associated with certain institutions, such as 
an independent judiciary, which embody and promote specific values, including respect for 
human rights, social responsibility and democratic governance.
210
 The UN’s definition is 
representative of the definitions and rationale adopted by a number of other international 
institutions such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
211
 and 
the Organization of American States (OAS).
212
 Both embrace a very similar and detailed 
understanding of the institutional and procedural elements of the rule of law, which they link, 
more or less openly, with peace and democratic governance. This corresponds to what 
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Carothers calls the “Rule of Law Assistance Standard Menu,” which guides the work of the 
international community in developing countries and transitional societies.
213
 This 
international emphasis on the rule of law and legal institutions has become one of the main 
ways in which countries deal with one another.
214
 Over the years, international efforts in 
transitional societies have increasingly focused on the building of courts, the punishment of 
human rights violations, and the writing of laws.
215
 Justice has become one of the main areas 
of international assistance and cooperation.
216
 In order to obtain funding, a number non-
western states have had to conform to donors’ priorities and therefore adopt such 
standardized practice and understanding of the rule of law, as in the case of the African Union 
(AU) and its leading members.
217
  
 One of the striking elements of this globally unbridled promotion and adoption of the 
rule of law is the lack critical examination of its underlying assumptions. The concept of the 
rule of law is “rarely examined or understood by key international decision makers.”218 The 
rule of law, justice, and law itself are naively associated with order and a source of societal 
peace. It is also prescribed on the basis of being inherently good, coherent, and independent 
from society.
219
 The rule of law is perceived as existing “beyond culture,” and is therefore 
thought to be easily applicable to different contexts through the creation of written laws and 
formal judicial structures.
220
 Accordingly, law is considered a foundational element that 
precedes all other factors, including culture and religion. As a result, courts and legal texts are 
seen as the embodiment of this universal and impartial rationality. It is generally accepted 
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that courts, as neutral instruments of the law, are well able to provide an “official version of 
reality to which a majority would subscribe.”221 In transitional societies, where abuses of 
power and violence were rampant, the advent of the rule of law not only symbolizes a 
breakaway from a difficult past, but is most importantly seen as “capable to construct 
liberalizing change.”222  
 
 The problem, therefore, does not lie with the rule of law itself but, rather, with the way 
it is presented and promoted. As Oomen writes, one of the reasons that justice and the rule of 
law have become a major area of international cooperation is that law is presented as “neutral, 
universal and apolitical.”223 This approach to law and justice, as apolitical and easily 
abstracted from its social context, is itself an exclusively Western and ethnocentric notion.
224
 
Seeing law as an unbiased and impartial instrument is highly problematic, for it fails to 
recognize the cultural contingency of legal practices and understandings. Yet, the concept of 
the rule of law continues to be used and remains unquestioned. International legal norms and 
theory are defined by this discourse, which informs language about what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong,’ 
or in other words what is legal and illegal. The main difficulty becomes how this 
understanding of law guides much of the ongoing international efforts to do justice and the 
kind of institutions transplanted into transitional societies, with no appreciation of the cultural 
embedded-ness of such conception of law. This thesis does not reject the rule of law, nor does 
it claim that legal institutions, such as courts and tribunals, are the wrong mechanisms to use 
in all situations. Rather, it draws attention to the fact that the rule of law is placed on a 
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pedestal, and is typically considered a “heightened legal reference point.”225 This narrow 
legal focus “produces a parochial perspective that limits the range of conceivable 
remedies.”226 The crux of such a challenge, according to Nagy, is that “the West arrogates the 
universal to itself and then brings all others into its fold of humanity.”227  
 
 Transitional justice is a field highly defined by legal norms.
228
 It is an active promoter 
of judicalization and it is a prime site for this universalizing tendency. Scholars of the field of 
transitional justice appear to remain unaware of the fact that the institutions and mechanisms 
the literature endorses in transitional societies are “held together by common concepts, 
practical aims, and distinctive claims for legitimacy," embedded in a specific intellectual 
tradition.
229
 The scholarship is driven by given norms and assumptions about the nature of 
law. The rule law is viewed a “set of benchmarks rather than a lived ethos within society.”230 
That is, the rule is seen as a value-free standard to be sought out and achieved. This, in itself, 
is contrary to a number of indigenous traditions that see law and justice as a lived experience, 
always reflecting the needs and preferences of those involved, as opposed to a rigid body of 
rules disconnected from local realities.
231
 As a result, the field transitional justice emerges as 
a “site where conflicting social rationalities test the limits of law order, guaranteeing peace 
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and sustaining integrity.”232  
 
 The universalizing undercurrent of the legalist paradigm that underlies the transitional 
justice scholarship has extended beyond the mere promotion of international criminal law 
through international institutions such as the ICC. It now seeks to incorporate the 
standardization and transplantation of legal institutions and practices. This, evidently, has 
important implications for the range of activities undertaken in post-conflict, transitional 
societies. 
 
Strategic challenges 
 
The assumed impartiality and universality of the rule of law is most visible in the transfer of 
certain legal practices and judicial institutions to transitional societies. This is referred to by 
Bell as a transitional justice “toolkit,” whereby a specific array of mechanisms is chosen and 
delivered to address the legacies of mass violations of human rights.
233
 This usually includes 
the establishment of domestic criminal trials, truth seeking bodies, and other hybrid or 
restorative mechanisms. Oomen also argues against the implementation of “prefabricated 
justice packages,” dictating the appropriateness of specific criminal codes and procedures in 
countries emerging from a variety of situations.
234
 This was the case, for instance, in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Liberia, where the international community intervened and pushed for 
the creation of specific judicial institutions that mirrored international legal preferences.
235
  
 Again, transitional justice and peacebuilding efforts are blended together and bear the 
brunt of similar criticism vis-à-vis their use of ‘IKEA type, flat-pack peace made from 
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standardized components.”236 So while, as discussed earlier, the ontological and ideological 
assumptions that underpin the rule of law remain largely unaddressed, the practice of the 
international community in promoting specific mechanisms and patterns is often disparaged. 
The sharing of information and best practices for dealing with grave violations of human 
rights is certainly to be encouraged. Yet, there exists a very real danger that transitional 
justice interventions and practices become both non-reflexive and homogenized across the 
board.
237
 As noted by Duggan, transitional justice mechanisms are too often “transferred 
across settings with insufficient reﬂection given to contextual relevance and 
appropriateness.”238 In this respect, they risk being ineffective, or, worse, detrimental to the 
societies where they are implemented.  
 The implementation of this one-size-fits-all approach lacks the social, historical and 
cultural connection to the people who are primarily affected by the transition. It is based on 
the faulty belief that what has worked in a few developed and industrialized countries will 
work elsewhere.
239
 As a result, local ownership of these processes and engagement in the 
rebuilding of a just society is not always optimal. This is troublesome, for it is well known 
that ignoring local needs and failing to engage local actors is likely to undermine the 
anchoring of a lasting peace.
240
 Local actors and communities must be involved in the design 
and implementation of transitional efforts for the process to work at all,
241
 which is not 
                                                 
236
 MacGinty, "Indigenous Peace-Making,"145. 
237
 See for instance, Adrian Guelke, Democracy and Ethnic Conflict: Advancing Peace in Deeply 
Divided Societies (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), 168-83; and John Darby, "Borrowing and Lending in 
Peace Processes." In Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes, edited by 
Roger Mac Ginty, 245–55. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003. 
238
 Colleen Duggan, "Editorial Note," The International Journal of Transitional Justice 4 (2010), 317. 
239
 A.H Somjee, "Non-Western Theories of Development: Critiques and Explorations." In New 
Directions in Comparative Politics, edited by Howard Wiarda, 119-140. Boulder: Westview Press, 
1991, 135. 
240
 Alex Austin, Martina Fischer, and Norbert Ropers, Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict: The 
Berghof Handbook (Wiesbaden: Berghoff Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 
2004), 388 . 
241
 Hannah Reich, Local Ownership in Conflict Transformation Projects Partnership, Participation or 
Patronage? (Wiesbaden: Berghoff Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2006), 6; 
and Simon Chesterman, You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-
 62 
always the case with the top-down creation of judicial institutions. This is particularly needed 
in societies that have been scared by deep social and cultural divides, such as in Rwanda.
242
 
Recreating dialogue between parties, via locally led and owned programs, is often the best 
way to bridge differences and restore trust.   
 Unfortunately, the international community continues to concentrate much of its 
efforts around the strengthening of state institutions.
243
 Often, the kinds of judicial institutions 
and reforms promoted in transitional societies reflect a specific understanding of the source of 
law and order, as well as the role of the state in maintaining both. Typically, a majority of 
governmental and non-governmental donors target their funding towards a given array of 
programs that support the strengthening of state legislature.
244
 The general tendency of the 
international community is to “see justice and justice delivery as quintessentially the business 
of the state or state-like institutions.”245 The Belgian Development Agency, the United 
Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency, for instance, partnered in a 3 year Projet D’Appui Institutionel et 
Operationel à la Justice in Burundi, whereby 8.7 million Euros were devoted to the 
strengthening of the country’s judicial institutional capacities.246 Activities include such 
things as the establishment of a Judicial Training Institute, the publication of legal texts and 
documentation, and the training of state lawyers, as well as the provision of material support 
and legal expertise to the Ministry of Justice.
247
 Similar projects have been launched by a 
number of countries including, France, Germany, and Canada amongst others. The European 
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Union, for instance, also requires and assists in the creation of stable institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law and human rights, as a condition of accession in the European 
Union.
248
  
 This one-size-fits-all approach effectively limits the space for alternative modes of 
doing justice and making peace. According to MacGinty, the “template style intervention” of 
western donors and the ensuing structural power that it endows them with, contributes to the 
“marginalization of traditional and indigenous approaches.”249 Even though the international 
community has adopted a discourse of accommodation of traditional and other non-state 
approaches, the standardizing practices put in place often confine alternative processes within 
a legalistic framework.
250
 Some organizations, like the UK Department for International 
Development, believe that customary mechanisms can serve to complement formal judicial 
and state mechanisms, and continues to promote this idea in their development aid and 
programs.
251
 In fact, some even argue that international efforts have “simultaneously enabled 
and disabled attempts by indigenous people to gain greater control” over the policies and 
institutions that target them.
252
 Yet, the international community’s position vis-à-vis 
customary justice mechanisms is clearly spelled out in the UN Secretary General’s Report on 
the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice. The document talks about conforming indigenous 
and traditional processes with international standards.
253 This means that customary 
mechanisms are to be tolerated so long as they can be judicialized to correspond to 
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international legal norms and expectations. As MacGinty explains, the relationship between 
international law and local traditional justice practices is more often one of “co-option rather 
than a co-existence of equals.”254 
 A quick look at the existing research on customary mechanisms of justice clearly 
illustrates this tendency. Rwanda’s gacaca courts are a prime example of how the 
international interest and support of customary mechanisms led to their co-option. Drumbl, 
for instance, exposes the call for gacaca courts to become “as legal as possible” so as to 
emulate the trial model and thereby conform to the international law paradigm.
255
 The overall 
coordination and organization of gacaca courts was in the hands of the Rwandan state and its 
Department of Gacaca Jurisdiction within the Ministry of Justice.
256
 The intervention of the 
state and the international community has, in fact, radically altered the traditional Rwandan 
process of doing justice,
257
 removing the voluntary and grassroots aspects of the process. This 
has resulted in gacaca courts having little authenticity in the eyes of those who knew how 
these processes were traditionally (in the sense of pre-genocide) conducted.
258
 A similar 
conclusion can be drawn in the case of New Zealand, the government’s ongoing attempt to 
include Maori practices within its judicial framework has produced, at best, mixed results. To 
a large extent, many Maori remain suspicious of the government’s attempts, which they view 
as mere tokenism.
259
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Concluding thoughts 
Judicial reform has become a hallmark of transitional justice, and an “enabling condition or 
precondition” of the field.260 There is no doubt that the unquestioned faith of the transitional 
justice scholarship and the international community in the rule of law influences the type of 
interventions led in transitional societies. The nature and underlying assumptions of the rule 
of law are, however, rarely assessed. The kinds of institutions transplanted, and the legal 
assistance provided to transitional societies is often based on a given, preconceived template 
borrowed from the European legal tradition. As a direct consequence of this clear preference 
for the rule of law and its state institutions, non-state, local and customary approaches are 
often marginalized, if not assimilated within the push for judicalization. As noted by Nagy, 
tensions between international norms and local context “is and will continue to be an 
increasing challenge for the project of transitional justice.”261 The difficulty, therefore, lies in 
finding ways to accommodate differences, without one way of knowing being subservient to 
the other. There is a real danger that the field of transitional justice simply serves to promote, 
maybe even involuntarily, a biased approach to doing justice, which fails respond to local 
needs and realities. It is crucial, therefore, that the transitional justice scholarship recognizes 
that its promotion of a specific legal tradition and institutions is akin to a “form of 
unconscious eradication of alternative understandings of the world.”262 Transitional justice 
scholars absolutely need to interrogate their own way of understanding law, if they are to 
even start to comprehend different ways of knowing.
263
 The scholarship’s unquestioned 
preference for and promotion of the rule of law and its judicial institutions, regardless of 
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context, risks rendering the work carried out in the field grossly inapplicable and 
disconnected from a variety of other local realities. Worse yet, by continuing to blindly 
promote its own legal framework and institutions, the transitional justice scholarship runs the 
risk of being perceived as illegitimate and dangerously homogenizing.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ENGAGING CONCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE 
 
 
The history of transitional justice has been marked by a variety of efforts to promote 
peace and achieve justice in the aftermath of mass violations of human rights. The 
majority of mechanisms used since the Second World War have primarily sought 
redress through retribution and punishment via the use of tribunals and courts. The 
Nuremberg Trials and the Tokyo Tribunal, as well as the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal Court (ICC), are examples of this 
approach to justice. More recently, attempts to bring about justice have been 
complemented by less-retributive mechanisms, such as truth commissions, and 
adapted customary mechanisms of justice. These mechanisms of justice are often 
described as promoting a combination of retributive, reparative, and restorative 
justice.  
 Transitional justice tends to classify existing mechanisms as falling within 
these three categories. Each of these three approaches to justice is used and 
understood within an individualistic framework that is representative of the Western 
legal tradition. This chapter explores how the framework used by transitional justice 
scholars to make sense of justice is unsuitable to account for the type of justice that is 
embodied in customary mechanisms of justice. It is also suggested that a 
 68 
communitarian approach,
264
 which emphasizes the centrality of the community to the 
individual, would be better equipped to discuss alternative mechanisms and 
conceptions of justice. 
 
 Justice  
Justice is an elusive concept, which can be difficult to capture. There exist a number 
of approaches and theories of justice, spanning across different schools of thought, 
starting with the works of ancient Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle. 
Both were interested in the nature of justice and its importance to life in society. In 
The Republic, for instance, Plato defined justice as the greatest good, or a form of 
social harmony whereby all members of society perform their duties and, as a result, 
live the good life.
265
 Aristotle, on the other hand, identifies two types of justice: 
distributive justice, which is concerned with the distribution of resources to be shared 
amongst all; and rectificatory justice, which governs personal transactions between 
individuals.
266
  
 For practical reasons, this cursory glance at justice focuses only on how the 
concept has been articulated in the literature on global justice and transitional justice. 
For instance, one of the most famous definitions of justice is the one put forth by John 
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Rawls, who defines justice as fairness, anchoring his definition around two principles: 
liberty and equality.
267
 Accordingly, while all individuals ought to benefit from equal 
liberties and opportunities, the system ought to be set up in such a way as to alleviate 
social and economic inequalities in favor of the least advantaged.
268
 Justice, in his 
view, is, therefore, about ensuring some degree of social and economic fairness. 
Rawls distinguishes between three types of justice: perfect procedural justice, which 
functions according to a specific standard regarding what is a just outcome, and 
which procedurally ensures that this just or fair outcome is reached; imperfect 
procedural justice, which functions according to this same specific standard regarding 
what is a just outcome, but which does not guarantee fair process; and pure 
procedural justice, where only the fairness of the procedure matters--regardless of the 
outcome.
269
 Amartya Sen adds that justice cannot be measured in terms of just 
institutions, but, rather, in terms of social outcomes, and the satisfaction of public 
reason.
270
  
 Others also describe justice as “distributive,” that is, in terms of the 
distribution of goods and services. This is the case with Frankena, who sees justice as 
“the allotment of something to persons-duties, goods, offices, opportunities, penalties, 
punishments, privileges, roles, status and so on.”271 In other words, justice seeks the 
equal and fair distribution of goods and services. Some feminist scholars, like Susan 
Mollar Okin, go further by arguing that existing theories of justice “neglect women 
                                                 
267
 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
268
 Ibid., 60-65. 
269
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 74-75. 
270
 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, (Harvard: Belknap, 2009). 
271
 William Frankena, "The Concept of Social Justice," in Social Justice, ed. Richard Brandt, (New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 5. 
 70 
and ignore gender.”272 In her view, it is necessary to question the ontological and 
experiential positions adopted by contemporary theorists when attempting to define 
justice.  
 As noted by Daly and Stubbs, “a sketch of existing theorizing about justice, 
even a highly selective one, is daunting because the term justice has many 
referents.”273 The existing literature rarely discusses justice devoid of attributes, or 
what Amartya Sen calls “materials of justice.”274 Often, justice is described as being 
retributive, reparative, restorative, social or distributive, thereby putting emphasis on 
different facets of justice. The difficulty in defining justice may come from the fact 
that the concept is inherently paradoxical. Like reconciliation, discussed earlier, 
justice is both an end goal and a guiding moral principle. In other words, we seek 
justice in the name of justice.  
 The root of the word justice can be identified in the Latin jus, which means 
“right” or “fair.”275 These notions of “rightness” and “fairness” often guide human 
actions. We do certain things in the name of “fairness,” and, therefore, justice. 
Likewise, after a crime has taken place, we seek to make things better, and “fair” in 
the name of justice. In this sense, justice is procedural. It is a process or a set of 
arrangements, that differ in various contexts, and that are used to redress a wrong. But 
justice is also an ideal and an end it itself. It is neither “just” nor “fair” to have one’s 
car stolen without the issue being addressed, the offender identified and the victim, 
compensated. We seek justice for wrongs committed and harm done. When an 
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individual’s rights have been violated, we want to re-establish the value of these 
rights and the individual who holds them, and ensure this will not happen again. By 
seeking justice, we want to establish this moral principle of “rightness” and 
“fairness.” In other words, we want to make things right, as a way to ‘correct’ 
wrongdoing. Deterrence theorists would add that the value of justice also comes from 
the fact that it can help discourage wrongdoing, simply by outweighing the benefits of 
criminal action.
276
 In other words, Deterrence theory is founded on the belief that, if 
the consequence of committing a crime offsets the benefit of the crime itself, 
individual will be deterred from carrying criminal action.
277   
 Broadly speaking, justice is the end goal that governments, courts, truth 
commissions and other mechanisms seek to achieve, when dealing with crimes that 
have been committed. And while the ideal of justice is the same, the means to achieve 
it differs. Practices take different shapes and forms, depending on varying 
circumstances and needs, as this chapter will show in its exploration of the 
approaches to justice within the field of transitional justice.  
 For the purpose of this research, this discussion of justice is limited to the 
understanding of justice as a means to address and redress the impact of crimes. It is 
recognized, nonetheless, that this definition of justice is, in and of itself, 
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fundamentally exclusive and reflects the bias of a certain legal tradition. Adopting 
this narrower definition of justice serves two purposes: First, looking at justice in 
relation to crime and violations of rights is directly relevant to the transitional justice 
scholarship, which is the focus of this research. Second, adopting this intrinsically 
legal understanding of justice helps to demarcate alternative and indigenous 
philosophies of justice examined in this research.
278
 As this research will show later 
on, other traditions and indigenous approaches to justice do not distinguish between 
such things as criminal and social justice, and therefore move beyond the legal 
understanding of justice that is adopted in much of the transitional justice scholarship.   
 Of particular interest to this study is the way justice is conceptualized in the 
field of transitional justice. The literature on transitional justice tends to think about 
how to do justice in different ways, by using retributive, reparative, and restorative 
approaches. Each approach, in essence, seeks the same thing, which is to make things 
right after a crime, but tries to do so using different means. The retributive approach, 
for instance, favors the use of tribunals and courts, while the reparative approach 
encourages the enactment of material and symbolic reparations. Restorative justice 
sees truth-telling as an important element in its pursuit of justice. So, while the end 
goal of justice remains the same, views of how to do justice, in the field of 
transitional justice, vary.
279
 Here, further clarification is needed. This study does not 
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reject altogether the use of these paradigms, for each has its own merits and 
downfalls. Rather, it is critical of the way they are used and understood in the 
transitional justice scholarship. As will become clear, the individualistic and legalistic 
confines of the framework used by transitional scholars influence the kind, and nature 
of institutions used in transitional societies. Moreover, the inability of transitional 
justice scholars to think about these paradigms of justice outside of the 
individualistic, legalistic, and Western framework severely affects the validity and 
applicability of the scholarship to the needs of transitional societies.  
 
Doing “Justice” in Transitional Justice 
A large proportion of the literature on transitional justice is based on three different 
approaches that take root in deontological liberalism.
280
 This study adopts Sandel’s 
definition of deontological liberalism, which, in his view, is very much indebted to 
Kant’s writings.281 He explains that: 
Deontological liberalism is above all a theory about justice and in particular 
about the primacy of justice among moral and political ideals. Its core thesis 
can be stated as follow: society, being composed of a plurality of persons, 
each with his own aims, interests and conceptions of the good, is best arranged 
by principles that do not themselves presuppose any conception of the good: 
what justifies these regulative principles above all is not that they maximize 
social welfare or otherwise promote the good, but rather that they conform to 
the concept of right, a moral category given prior to the good and independent 
of it.
282
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What is problematic with this approach to justice is its reliance on the assumption that 
there exists some form of foundational ethic, or right that can universally accessed 
through human reason, and can be defined independently of one’s perception and 
conception of the utility, or good of something. That is, justice is guided by principles 
that are independent of anyone’s understanding of what is useful, and beneficial for 
themselves or society. Rather, it assumes a “first-order ethic containing certain 
categorical duties and prohibitions which take unqualified precedence over other 
moral and practical concerns.”283 In other words, the principles that justify and guide 
justice are prior to any social, cultural, practical considerations and directly defined 
by higher, foundational, and guiding moral principles.  
Each of the three approaches to justice used by transitional justice scholars, 
that is, the retributive, reparative and restorative approaches,
284
 is anchored in a view 
of justice which gives precedence to the rational self, and conceives of the individual 
as a holder of rights, regardless of any other factors that may be involved. Cultural 
differences and backgrounds come only second to this assumed universal moral law 
or ethic. Conceptions of justice can be “justified independently of particular 
conceptions” of what is good or bad.285 Again, it is important to reiterate that it is the 
manner in which these paradigms are used within this framework rooted in 
deontological liberalism, rather than the paradigms themselves, that is problematic. 
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As discussed later in this research, alternative conceptions and mechanisms of justice 
sometimes do comprise some elements of retribution, reparation and restoration. The 
difficulty lies with the way these approaches are being framed, used, and 
implemented in transitional justice.  
 This research argues that this understanding of how justice ought to be carried 
out, and also of the understanding of the role of the individual, has clear roots in the 
Western, Judeo-Christian tradition, which views human beings as imperfect 
reflections of God.
286
 The deontological-liberal approach to justice embodied in the 
restorative, reparative and retributive modes of justice is “the creation of a specific 
legal tradition,”287 that of the West, and can be considered “a cultural artifact… 
masquerading as universal, immutable values.”288   
 These approaches to carrying out justice traditionally shaped liberal thinkers, 
including Kant and Nozick.
289
 In the liberal approach, individuals are conceived as 
morally autonomous, and fully rational beings. As such, individuals are the bearers of 
rights.
290
 Justice is seen as a “foundational priority” that precedes other 
considerations, preferences, and cultural particularities.
291
 The majority of the 
literature in transitional justice is embedded within this deontological liberal 
approach. As a result of the way transitional justice frames these three approaches, the 
individual remains the primary source of concern, and the need for justice is justified 
either in the restoration, reparation, or retribution for individuals, whose rights have 
                                                 
286
 Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 133. 
287
 Anthony Padgen, "Human rights, natural rights and Europe’s imperial legacy," Political Theory 31 
no. 2 (April 2003), 173. 
288
 Padgen, "Human rights, natural rights," 173. 
289
 Benhabib, Situating the Self, 78. 
290
 Sandel, Liberalism and The Limits of Justice, 2. 
291
 Benhabib, Situating the Self, 176. 
 76 
been violated. A more in-depth discussion of the three dominant views and categories 
of justice, within which most accounts on theories of justice and reconciliation fit, 
follows.  
 
Retributive Justice 
Micheal Moore defines the retributive approach as “the view that punishment is 
justified by the moral culpability of those who receive it.”292 Accordingly, the 
retributive theory is normatively grounded and justifies the use of punishment on 
moral grounds. Simply put, individuals who violate the social order ought to be 
punished.
293
 Duff holds that retributivism’s “central slogan punishment can be 
justified only as being deserved.”294Wrongdoing merits punishment.295 Yet, various 
proponents of the retributive approach put forth different justifications for 
punishment.  
 
 According to classical theorists, such as Kant, punishment in response to 
wrongdoing as inherently good, and represents an end, in and of itself.
296
 This view is 
premised on the idea that all individuals are endowed with equal moral worth and act 
as autonomous moral agents. By acting in violation of the law, a person is choosing to 
put himself and his interests above that of others. As a result, it is morally sound that 
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a person who has caused harm should suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing.
297
 John 
Finnis explains that “punishment is essentially a matter of removing from wrongdoers 
a kind of advantage they gained, precisely in preferring their own will to the 
requirement authoritatively specified for that community’s common good.”298 In this 
sense, punishment is a “self-evident obligation” that ensures that wrongdoers repay 
their debt to society.
299
 By willfully engaging in wrongful action, and therefore 
knowingly violating rules in spite of consequences, an individual deserves 
punishment. In fact, “the moral culpability of an offender also gives society the duty 
to punish.”300 It is a moral obligation.  Murphy explains: 
In receiving punishment, he [offender] pays a kind of debt to his fellow 
citizens – to those other members of the community who, unlike him, have 
made the sacrifice of obedience that is required for any just legal system to 
work. Since all men benefit from the operation of a just legal system, and 
since such system requires general obedience to work, it is only fair or just 
that each man so benefiting make the sacrifice (obedience or self-restraint) 
required…Those who do not must pay in some other ways (receive 
punishment).
301
 
 
 
 The concept of desert is intrinsically linked to those of equality and reciprocity.
302
 
The principle of equality requires that all members of society be treated in a fair, 
proportional and equivalent manner. As such, an individual who commits a crime 
causes an imbalance, by treating other members of the society in an unequal manner. 
Wrongdoing denies the equal moral worth of those who suffered from it. Retributive 
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justice, according to Govier, symbolizes a moral attempt to redress wrongs, and seeks 
to go beyond the initial crime committed.
303
 In this respect, it is about re-asserting the 
moral value and dignity of the victim, rather than vindication and revenge.
304
 It would 
be unjust to leave wrongdoing unpunished for both the community and the 
wrongdoer. The purpose of punishment is, in some sort, to restore the balance.
305
 As 
such, the retributive approach seeks to negate the advantage acquired through 
criminal behavior, while maintaining the equal moral value of all community 
members. It would be wrong to assume that the retributive approach seeks to diminish 
the moral worth of wrongdoers. In fact, legal practices limit and define the kind of 
retribution, and, therefore, punishment, through the consideration of such things as 
mitigating circumstances and prosecutorial discretion, which provide opportunities 
for leniency and the granting of clemency.
306
 Finally, some prefer to highlight the 
communicative or “expressive” dimension of retribution. By punishing wrongdoers, 
society is effectively communication its condemnation of criminal action.
307
 
There are, however, a number of difficulties with the way the retributive 
approach is approached, and its application throughout history. Dzur and Wertheimer, 
for instance, criticize what they call “abstract proceduralism”308 and the “use of 
controlled vocabulary”309 that result in this highly institutionalized approach to 
justice. The retributive approach limits the ability of victims to truly express their 
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grievances and needs, thereby preventing them from coming to terms with their past. 
Through the practice of retributive justice, as embodied in the retributive judicial 
system, neither victims nor offenders have the opportunity to express their feelings 
and frustrations. In the case of Sierra Leone, the media and local non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) complained about the lack of access to information and 
communication about the SCSL trials, which severely affected the process and its 
impact on national recovery and reconciliation.
310
 As a result, the general population 
often felt angered and cheated.
311
 Furthermore, legal proceedings focus on the central 
and basic elements such as the “who” and “when” of the event investigated. Factual 
and forensic evidence is key to the investigation.
312
 This type of investigation is 
designed to render an objective history of what happened, and rejects the idea of 
relativity in truth seeking.  
 Critics argue that the findings and knowledge produced by legal proceedings 
are limited, as they only reveal immediate factors, but do not address the human 
dimension of the conflict, its origin and its effects on individuals as well as the wider 
community. These proceedings, it is argued, contribute to a second victimization of 
both victims and offenders by limiting their autonomy and recovery.
313
 Drumbl adds 
that retributive justice, in the form of trials, does little to promote justice in cases of 
genocide, which must consider mass participation rather than isolated acts of 
deviance, with which retributive justice is usually better equipped to deal.
314
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Reparative Justice 
Reparative justice often comes into play when a government decides to provide some 
sort of repair and acknowledgment for crimes committed in the past or in the 
immediate aftermath of conflict. Reparative justice seeks to repair what has gone 
wrong, to the benefit of the victims. Restitution and apology are two means through 
which reparative justice is carried out.
315
 
Spelman explains the act of repairing what wrong has been committed using 
the analogy of a bicycle.
316
 She explains that when a bicycle has been damaged, it can 
be taken to the shop for repair. Parts that have been affected will be mended so that 
the bike can be returned to its previous condition and used again. Thompson defends 
the idea of reparative justice on the ground that this approach is fundamentally rights 
centered.
317
 In her view, regardless of the circumstances and period the crime was 
committed, society has a duty to seek to repair it.
318
 
Reparative justice is fundamentally victim-oriented and does not exclude 
punishment. Roht-Arriaza concedes that reparative justice is as forward-looking as it 
is backward looking, and notes that moral, rather than material, reparation is essential 
for victims.
319
 Reparation, in her view, is a delicate balancing act that seeks to 
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acknowledge the wrong committed without furthering victimization of one of the 
parties to the dispute.
320
 Roht-Arriaza discusses collective reparations as a community 
development paradigm,
321
 which, she argues, is more likely to diminish the moral and 
symbolic effect of reparation when targeted at specific individuals. De Greiff adds 
that the act of providing reparation for past crimes is “the most tangible manifestation 
of the efforts of the state to remedy the harms” suffered by victims.322 Most 
importantly, in contrast to retributive justice, which embodies the society’s “struggle 
against perpetrators,” reparative justice is an “effort on behalf of the victims.”323 
 Reparative justice, however, presents major difficulties. Waldron, for instance, 
warns against the use of the “counterfactual method” in evaluating what would have 
been, had the wrong not been committed.
324
 He explains that while it is crucial and 
essential to recognize past injustices, it can become difficult to repair injustices when 
they took place a long time ago. The counterfactual method requires imagining what 
life would have been like for the victims of a crime, had the crime not taken place. 
Based on this calculation, reparations are made to correct the present to resemble a 
situation in which the injustice had not occurred. When the redress of historic 
injustices goes against the principles of justice by creating further injustices, however, 
Waldron argues that such historic injustices should be superseded.
325
 That is to say, if 
redressing past injustices is likely to affect the current well-being of the population, 
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then redress should not take place. Waldron’s approach to reparation focuses on the 
outcome of redress, rather than on its symbolic nature. 
This thesis argues that it is difficult, if not outright impossible, to repair and 
return something to a pre-crime situation. It is questionable whether one can ever go 
back to the way one lived his or her life prior to the crime. This research is critical of 
the attempt of reparative justice to repair something that cannot, in fact, be repaired. 
Seeking to return to a pre-crime situation would risk denying the suffering that has 
taken place. Such an approach, it seems, misses the point of justice, since it seeks to 
repair something that cannot be fixed, and to return to a situation that has forever 
been changed. However, as noted by Hamber, while it is impossible to “undo” what 
has been done, one has to concede to the psychological contribution and value 
stemming from the symbolic dimension of the will to repair.
326
  
 
Restorative Justice 
Restorative justice is often presented as a philosophy and understanding of communal 
life, as much as a conception and “comprehensive theory of justice.”327 It can be 
described as a forward-looking, collaborative and inclusive approach to justice. 
Contrary to retributive justice, which focuses on the crime, and reparative justice, 
which claims to focus on the victims, restorative justice focuses on broken 
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relationships and the mending of them. Stovel explains that it is “the form of justice 
most directly concerned with reconciliation.”328  
 Zehr contends that the very first concern of restorative justice is the 
identification of the harms and needs of the victims, offenders and the wider 
community.
329
 Each is given an opportunity to express her feelings and identify what 
she needs in order to move forward.
330
 The community is empowered, in that it is 
provided with the opportunity to participate in the process.
331
 This approach is 
anchored in the belief that a crime committed is often the result of a perceived 
injustice or actual structural, societal imbalance. This conception of justice “reflects 
an ethic of care which argues that people are ethically responsible for those around 
them.”332 Restoration is all the more relevant in cases of long-term, protracted 
conflicts, which are embedded within a cycle of revenge and generational 
grievances.
333
 In such cases, injustices and the oppression of a certain portion of the 
population have sometimes even been institutionalized. Restorative justice requires 
that the roots of oppression be redressed. Reasons for the crime need to be examined 
and tackled in order to prevent the crime from occurring again, and truly achieve 
justice. This involves “looking deeply at a situation to determine the web of forces 
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which contribute to harming behavior.”334 The restoration of offenders contributes to 
the restorative process, by recognizing that the cause of the dispute is not one-sided 
and that all are responsible.  
 The focus of restorative justice is on the transformation and restoration of the 
broken relationships that constitute the community.
335
 However, restorative justice 
also encourages offenders to take responsibility and possibly also to make amends for 
the wrongful act committed.
336
 This is usually done through the recognition of the 
effect(s) a crime has had on a victim and the community, as well as some form of 
material restitution and apology.
337
 In this respect, the restorative and reparative 
approaches share some similarities. Just like the reparative approach, restorative 
justice encourages that reparations, whether symbolic or material, be made. Where 
they both differ, however, in “the significance placed upon the victims, the offender 
and the community.”338 
 Indeed, the process of restorative justice, as fundamentally inclusive, requires 
the engagement of community members in holding the offender accountable, 
recognizing the pain caused, and recognizing their own failure in preventing the crime 
from occurring.
339
 In the case of re-introducing past offenders to a community, the 
community must be engaged in genuine effort to welcome him back and give him a 
real chance to return to a stable life rather than let him be ostracized. This is visible in 
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the active involvement of community members in providing opportunities to past 
offenders, such as employment. 
 Johnstone and Van Ness identify six elements which, in their view, help 
characterize the restorative approach to justice.
340
 These six elements are also 
strongly reminiscent of the various aspects touched upon by various proponents of 
restorative justice. They help us put together a clearer picture of what restorative 
justice entails. First, Johnstone and Van Ness contend that the restorative approach is 
often embodied in relatively informal processes, which aim to involve the victims, 
offenders and those affected by the crime.
341
 Second, the emphasis is put on the 
empowerment of individuals, which they describe as active involvement.
342
 Third, 
Johnstone and Van Ness explain that the way the restorative approach seeks to 
respond to a crime is less stigmatizing than the retributive approach. Rather than 
punishment, the restorative approach seeks to give an opportunity to the offender for 
taking responsibility and making amends.
343
 Fourth, restorative justice is also 
fundamentally inclusive.
344
 Fifth, Restorative justice also seeks to pay close attention 
to the victims’ needs in order to address them. Sixth, it focuses on the mending of 
broken relationships.
345
  
Restorative justice, therefore, seeks the restoration of broken and damaged 
relationships, based on the recognition of the harm that has been caused. Unlike 
retributive justice, it focuses on individuals and their relationships, and seeks to give 
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them an active role in bringing about justice.
346
 Unlike reparative justice, restorative 
justice builds upon past wrongs, rather than attempting to erase any trace of that 
wrong. Instead of denying the harm caused, it draws lessons from it order to enhance 
and strengthened the network of relationships. It is equally important to note that the 
process of restorative justice is not limited to, and not always associated with judicial 
proceedings. It is usually accompanied and supported by other social programs that 
seek to address needs and encourage social healing and restoration.  
 One of the major difficulties with the restorative approach to justice is that it 
lacks clear boundaries and is often very context-specific. There exist no clear 
standards to evaluate or guide the process and implementation of this kind of 
approach to justice.
347
 Concepts such as community involvement and collaboration, 
which are central to the process, are difficult to define. The nature of the collaboration 
that is sought, as well as the degree of community involvement and participation 
desired, remains unclear and often context-specific. While the restorative justice 
approach claims to ‘restore relationships,’348 it is often unclear which relationships 
are targeted and whether they include relationship to the wider community or are 
restricted the relationships between the parties to the dispute. As a result, a large 
portion of the literature of transitional justice resorts to defining restorative justice as 
just about anything that retributive justice is not.
349
 This lack of conceptual 
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boundaries and clear definition problematic for restorative justice in theory, but also, 
for the application of restorative justice practices themselves.  
 This is highly problematic since restorative justice simply becomes a category 
into which all alternative, customary and indigenous practices are swept. The 
transitional justice scholarship uses the restorative approach within the same 
individualistic, and deontological framework that it uses for the reparative and 
retributive approaches to justice, thereby rendering the restorative approach even less 
applicable to customary mechanisms and conceptions of justice.  
  There has also been much debate about the risk that truth-telling mechanisms, 
such as truth commissions, may forsake justice for truth. Gutman and Thompson are 
very critical of truth-seeking mechanisms, which, they argue, “sacrifice the pursuit of 
justice… for the sake of promoting other social purposes, such as historical truth and 
social reconciliation.”350 Both authors specifically denounce the “amnesty for justice” 
trade-off of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which, in their 
view, is “morally problematic.”351  
 Political circumstances also have a great impact on the nature, mandate and 
product of truth commissions. Hayner, for instance, stresses the fact that truth 
commissions are sometimes created to legitimize a new government and possibly also 
to manipulate the national and international perception of the past, and sometimes, 
even the present.
352
 Hayner vehemently insists on the fact that time constraints, staff, 
funding, political pressure, and “the information management system that collects, 
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organizes and evaluates the information”353 all affect the final version of the truth 
adopted in various truth bodies. An illustration of this can be found in the failure of a 
large number of truth-seeking bodies to address and document widely-experienced 
sexual abuses perpetrated against women, as they are not deemed to be political and 
are often relegated to a lower category of crimes. As noted by Slyomovic, a large 
number of the torture, rapes, violence and hardship suffered by Moroccan women 
during the so-called “years of lead” were often kept silent, simply because such 
crimes were not considered a priority.
354
 As a result, restorative justice was not fully 
enacted. A significant portion of the Moroccan population and the abuses they 
suffered did not receive the attention they deserved. Women’s suffering was relegated 
to a lower category of crime, hereby contributing to further victimization of women.  
 Each of the three types of justice presented above has demonstrated different 
flaws and merits. Each is the embodiment of a different approach and understanding 
of the role of the community and individuals within it. Each also uses a different 
language, focuses on different aspects, and identifies different justifications for 
justice. This research, however, contends that the transitional justice literature anchors 
these paradigms within deontological liberalism and rights centered lens, which as a 
result, limits the ability of these three approaches to justice to properly account for the 
philosophy of justice embodied in customary mechanisms of justice. It argues that 
one of the dangers in using this framework is that it appears to ignore the influence 
that cultural, social and historical circumstances may wield on the conceptions of 
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justice, by presupposing that the principle of justice derives from some higher moral 
law or ethic. This will become evident in my investigation of the Mãori approach to 
justice, and how the New Zealand government has decided to deal with it. 
This study contends that transitional justice scholars use these approaches to 
justice within a Western liberal framework, which “rests on an overly individualistic 
conception of the self.”355 For this reason, this thesis argues that the way these 
paradigms are presented and used, in the transitional justice scholarship, renders them 
ill-suited to discuss the type of justice that is embodied in customary mechanisms of 
justice. Attempts to discuss customary mechanisms of justice within the existing 
deontological-liberal framework are inscribed within what Nagy notes to be a 
“worrisome tendency to impose a one-size-fits-all technocracy and decontextualized 
solutions” to all experiences.”356 Yet, deontological approaches are the framework 
employed by nearly all transitional justice scholars.   
 One of the main difficulties with approaches to justice that are rooted 
deontological liberalism is that they assume too much commonality amongst 
individuals, regardless of their social, historical and cultural context. As noted by 
Yack, these approaches presuppose that individuals are moral agents a priori of their 
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membership to any kind of community.
357
 Individuals are seen as endowed with a 
“shared identity” or moral self, inherent to all human kind, which can be abstracted 
from each individual regardless of her situated-ness. The authority and legitimacy of 
these approaches, therefore, stems from the understanding that these deontological 
conceptions and categorizations of justice are impermeable to cultural variations.  
 Deontological liberal approaches consider individuals as the sole unit and 
moral agent in any social interaction. So, while the restorative approach to justice is 
preferable, when presented with a choice between retributive, reparative and 
restorative justice, in that the restorative conception stretches as far as it can to 
include the community and recognize the web of relationships that it comprises, it is 
still deontologically driven, and is, therefore, limited in its application and relevance 
to non-Western cases. Despite all efforts made in the existing literature on 
reconciliation and theories of justice to account for alternative mechanisms of justice, 
it is necessary to question and challenge the lens through which conceptions of justice 
have been examined. What is necessary is a move beyond this deontological 
liberalism point of reference to consider justice outside of the legal sphere. 
 Furthermore, this study contends that this tendency of the transitional justice 
scholarship to use this framework to explain a wide range of mechanisms of justice 
contributes to a kind of “epistemic violence of commensurability,” which seeks to 
silence other subaltern ways of knowing.
358
 As will become clear throughout the 
following chapters, customary practices are often tolerated only to the extent that they 
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can imitate and adopt tenets of the legalist tradition. In his examination of the 
Aboriginal and English understandings of property, Bryan explains that “we enframe 
Aboriginal reality in a particular way in order to structure it according to the dictates 
of our own society.”359 In other words, we create space for the other—in this case, the 
Aboriginal way of knowing, within our conceptual framework and language.  
 Mbembe notes that the Western philosophical and political tradition “has long 
denied the existence of any ‘self’ but its own.”360 As a result, and in response to this 
inability to see other ways of knowing in their entirety, we constantly seek to redefine 
them. According to Frantz Fanon, this is emblematic of colonialism, which 
relentlessly reminds “the others” of their difference and the need to re-define 
themselves in opposition to the dominant society.
361
 Referring to the Mãori, Moana 
Jackson explains, “colonization has damaged the wholeness of who we are.”362 In an 
exploration of Mãori traditional knowledge and identity, Jackson discussed the 
constant challenge that is being brought against the wholeness of Mãori identity, 
which has constantly had to adapt itself in order to be “accepted” and understood by 
the settler society. This has also very clearly been the case with Mãori customary 
mechanisms of justice, which have had to be redefined to absorb elements of the 
legalist paradigm in order to be tolerated.
363
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Transitional Justice Mechanisms 
These three approaches to justice are embodied in variety of judicial mechanisms and 
institutions. Courts and tribunals, for instance, are often described as embodying 
retributive values. Other mechanisms of justice, such as truth commission and 
customary mechanisms of justice
364
 are said to represent either the reparative or 
restorative approach.
365
 However, various mechanisms rarely embody a single 
approach to justice. As this section illustrates, retributive, reparative and restorative 
principles sometimes overlap in various judicial processes.
366
 Moreover, mechanisms 
often operate alongside other justice processes and serve to complement each other. A 
consideration of these mechanisms is necessary to gain a fuller understanding of how 
these approaches to justice feature and interact.  
 
 Mechanisms such as international and domestic trials are often the first 
response to dealing with the legacies of mass violations of human rights and feature 
predominantly in the history of transitional justice. It is argued that the post-World 
War II tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo gave birth to international criminal law and 
enforcement, as we know it today.
367
 Both the Nuremberg Trials and the Tokyo 
Tribunals
368
 were created by Allied forces and formerly occupied nations, 
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immediately following the Second World War, to deal with the atrocities committed 
by the Axis powers, and sought to hold individuals accountable for specific crimes, in 
times of war.
369
 The Nuremberg Trials, officially known as the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg, specifically aimed at uncovering and making public the 
heinous nature of the acts that had been carried out by Nazi supporters during the 
war.
370
 A similar tribunal, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, known 
as the Tokyo Tribunals, was established to try Japanese war criminals for crimes 
committed during the Second World War. Their establishment and conduct, however, 
were the target of much criticism. The tribunals, and their subsequent sentences were 
perceived as being victors’ justice.371 All of the judges came from Allied nations, and 
the trials excluded the abuses that had been committed by the winning side.
372
 The 
tribunals focused their attention on crimes that were alleged to have been committed 
by a handful of high-ranking individuals who supported and contributed to war efforts 
in Germany and Japan. Most importantly, the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals clearly 
established the fact that there existed crimes of international concern, under which 
persons could be held individually, and criminally responsible for their actions, even 
in times of war.
373
 Nuremberg and Tokyo also set legal precedents, and established 
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the basis for the creation of two ad hoc tribunals, namely those of the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), established in 1993, and Rwanda (ICTR) created in 1994.
374
  
 The ICTY was the first international tribunal of its kind, established by the 
United Nations (UN) as an independent organ. It was remarkable in that it introduced 
further nuance to the understanding of individual criminal responsibility by 
introducing the concept of “level of knowledge.”375 Article 7 of the ICTY Statute, for 
example, distinguishes between different levels of responsibility in relation to the 
level of knowledge of the act that was perpetrated.
376
 It established the notion of 
individual responsibility as distinct from command responsibility. So, while an 
explicit order to commit a crime constitutes individual responsibility, the omission of 
reasonable measures to prevent such an act further constitutes, in itself, another type 
of responsibility, equally deserving of condemnation.  
 The ICTR was, likewise, established by the UN to hear cases of those accused 
with committing crimes during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The ICTR was created 
in 1994 at the request of the Rwandan government, although that government was 
subsequently disappointed by the lack of power and control it had over the 
institution.
377
 Most importantly, the ICTR held the first trial based on charges of 
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genocide held at an international tribunal,
378
 and was also the first to establish rape as 
an act of genocide.
379
 
 These mechanisms contributed to the development of a norm of “international 
judicial intervention,” in that they demonstrated that some acts could not remain 
unpunished, and deserved international attention.
380
 They also exemplified the 
international community’s commitment to retributive principles, which were further 
institutionalized with the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
While there existed a general consensus that an independent, permanent criminal 
court was needed, various nations were initially reluctant to engage in the 
establishment of a body that could prosecute its own nationals. After the drafting of 
several statutes between 1951 and 1998,
381
 the ICC finally came into force in 2002 
with the ratification of the Rome Statute. As of September 2003, 92 countries were 
party to the Rome Statute, and by 2009, the number had risen to 110 signatories.
382
  
 Teitel explains that retributive justice is an effective means through which 
public condemnation of events and public legitimation of the rule of law can be 
expressed.
383
 Orentlicher adds that victims of human rights abuses sometimes thirst 
for justice in the form of judicial prosecution more than anything else.
384
 States often 
choose to pursue retributive justice by conducting domestic trials when facing the 
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legacies of a difficult past. Establishing justice through domestic trials, however, is 
often difficult, since the infrastructure of the state apparatus, and its judicial system, 
have often been severely affected and weakened by years of conflict and 
corruption.
385
  
 As a result of this distrust of state judicial institutions in transitional societies, 
local tribunals and institutions are sometimes used as a part of a larger process and are 
internationalized, in that they incorporate international laws and sometimes invite 
foreign prosecutors.
386
 Hybrid or mixed courts occupy a middle ground between the 
purely international model and aspirations adopted by the ICTY, the ICTR, the ICC, 
and domestic courts and trials.
387
 Hybrid courts “hold a good deal of promise and 
actually offer an approach that may address some of the concerns about purely 
international justice, on the one hand, and purely local justice, on the other,”388 and 
embody “the best of both worlds.”389 These kinds of hybrid courts were established in 
Sierra Leone and Timor Leste.  
 The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was borne out of an agreement 
between the UN and the Sierra Leonean government. It relied on a mixture of 
international and domestic law, but only dealt with the most serious crimes.
390
 It was 
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mandated to try individuals who had violated international humanitarian law (Art. 2) 
and Sierra Leonean law (Art. 5) through crimes committed in Sierra Leone from 30 
November 1996.
391
 The court was also fully independent from the government and 
the UN, and was managed by a committee made up of representatives from funding 
countries.
392
 As a hybrid court, the SCSL was staffed by “internationally and 
domestically appointed judges, prosecutors, and registrars.”393 Hybrid courts, in 
Sikkink and Walling’s view, represent a “third generation criminal body.”394 Drumbl 
argues that the “infusion of international officials within a process that is vested with 
and anchored in local capacity may augment credibility.”395 The hope was that these 
hybrid courts would affect reconciliation more broadly and effectively in societies.
396
 
By using local infrastructure and laws, these mechanisms have a better chance at 
winning the trust of society. They are also more likely to reflect local, social and 
cultural values and needs. Cruvellier adds that these hybrid courts are best equipped 
to act as a catalyst for the strengthening of the domestic judiciary institutions and 
confidence building.
397
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 These judicial mechanisms are sometimes complemented by other, less 
retributive means to enact justice. Truth commissions or customary mechanisms of 
justice, for instance, often operate alongside tribunals, and serve to supplement weak 
judicial systems.
398
 This was the case in Latin America where nearly all countries 
where truth commission had been set up, also conducted criminal trials to hold former 
government officials accountable for their actions.
399
 These countries enacted 
retribution through criminal prosecutions, without entirely negating restorative 
justice, by engaging in a truth-telling exercise.  
  
 While some consider the exercise of truth-telling, engendered by truth 
commissions, an instrument of repair,
400
 others, such as Llewellyn, Villa-Vicencio 
and Verwoerd, believe truth commissions and other truth-telling mechanisms to be 
central elements of restorative justice.
401
 Hayner identifies four aspects that are 
common to all truth commissions and truth seeking bodies, which, in her view, often 
represent the first sign of the acknowledgment of a victim’s past.402 (1) Truth 
commissions focus on the past; (2) they investigate a pattern of events over a certain 
period of time rather than one single and specific event; (3) they are temporary 
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bodies; which are, (4) officially sanctioned and authorized by states.
403
 The first truth 
commission was created in Uganda in 1974,
404
 but it is the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission that has triggered the most interest, by far. In 1994, 
Hayner compared fifteen truth commissions at work in Africa (Uganda, Zimbabwe, 
Rwanda, Ethiopia, South Africa), Latin America (Bolivia, Argentina), and Europe 
(Germany). Since then, the existence of truth commissions has multiplied. In 2007, 32 
countries had established truth commissions to deal with the legacies of their pasts.
405
 
At the time of writing, this number had increased to 40, and will, no doubt, continue 
to do so. In April 2011, for instance, Ivory Coast’s President Alassane Outtara 
promised the creation of a Truth Commission to investigate abuses committed during 
regime transition.
406
  
 Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan noted that truth commissions could 
positively complement any effort at bringing about justice.
407
 They occupy a space, 
between amnesty and broad scale criminal prosecutions for those who committed 
crimes,
408
 and are generally the product of political compromise.
409
 Truth-telling is a 
central element of the process. Victims are often, although not always, invited to tell 
their stories. Sharing their stories and having their experiences validated by society 
may induce and contribute, to a certain degree, to the emotional healing of individuals 
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who have suffered injustices.
410
 Dignity is restored to the victims.
411
 Minow also 
notes, with particular reference to the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, that “the creation of a setting quite distinct from court held a special 
value.”412 The fact that a different setting from the court system, which had been used 
to reinforce the apartheid regime, was used, was a strong signal and symbolic break 
from the past regime.   
 Truth commissions have a wide range of mandates and operating procedures, 
and as such, vary case by case.
413
 Argentina, for instance, was one of the first 
countries to establish a truth commission with its National Commission on the 
Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP). CONADEP functioned behind closed doors 
and recorded testimony from victims in private.
414
 The South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission preferred to hold public hearings.
415
 Both commissions, 
however, sought to create a national public record of their country’s pasts, through the 
publication of a publically accessible report.
416
 
 Despite their wide ranging mandates, the work carried out by truth 
commissions can have a social, emotional and healing impact.
417
 It is argued, for 
instance, that the healing and acknowledgment provided by truth commissions may 
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play a crucial role in the democratization process.
418
 Or it may contribute to the 
creation of a national narrative that may enhance national efforts at reconciling.
419
  
Allowing victims and their families to learn about the ‘when,’ ‘why’, ‘how,’ and 
‘who’ of an event brings about closure, and, in this sense, justice.420 In the South 
African case, it was generally believed that the objective of national unity and 
reconciliation could be achieved only if truth about the past was publicly known.
421
 
This belief was anchored around the assumption that a society cannot reconcile itself, 
and, therefore, cannot achieve justice on the grounds of a divided memory.
422
  
 As explained earlier, the restorative and reparative traditions share some 
similarities, notably their emphasis on repair. Truth Commissions, as restorative 
justice mechanisms, in fact, offer a perfect illustration of this overlap. Reparations 
policies and measures sometimes result from the work carried out by truth 
commissions, which are “quasi-judicial mechanisms focused on providing a 
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framework for truth-telling.”423 This is because the work conducted by truth 
commissions allows the identification of individuals deserving reparations.
424
 They 
also facilitate access to information regarding the wrongs committed, through its 
truth-telling process. In this respect, truth commissions can sometimes be useful 
instruments for enacting reparations policies.  
 While this is not common practice, it is interesting to note that in a few cases, 
reparation programs followed the lead of truth commissions that had been previously 
established. This was the case in Morocco, where a National Forum on Reparations, 
an initiative of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission, was held in October 
2005.
425
 The Forum relied on the findings and work conducted by the Commission to 
fine tune its reparation measures. One decision, for instance, was to include gender 
mainstreaming as a priority its reparations policy.
426
 South Africa is another example, 
wherein the work conducted by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to 
deal with the legacies of the apartheid was crucial. The TRC provided a list of 
individuals to be considered by the South African state for individual financial 
reparations. This list was made up of individuals who had provided testimony to the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
427
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 Reparations may entail both a material and a symbolic dimension, and can be 
implemented on a national, community or individual level. They are sometimes 
enacted as part of a national policy of acknowledgment, and in isolation of any other 
judicial process.  Apologies, for instance, are a form of symbolic reparation. One 
example is the apology given by the Canadian government to Canada’s First Nations 
people, in 2008, for the Indian Residential Schools policies that were in place from 
the late 1900s until the last school was closed in 1996.
428
 A similar step was taken, in 
the same year, by the Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, who made a public 
apology for the wrongs caused to the Australian Aboriginal population by successive 
governments in the forcible removal of Aboriginal children from their families from 
1869 to the 1970s.
429
 A National Sorry Day is observed every May in Australia, to 
commemorate the harms perpetrated against the “Stolen Generations.”430 The act of 
taking responsibility and making amends is a central aspect of reparative justice. For 
those who suffered under the Canadian government’s policies, this is widely seen as a 
first step towards the acknowledgment of a painful history, and the harm that it 
caused First Nations people. Essentially, this kind of symbolic reparation “constitutes 
a message to victims from the rest of society, recognizing that victims belong, and 
expressing solidarity in the face of unjust suffering.”431 It is important to note, that 
these reparations are still largely individualistic in nature. Indeed, while apologies and 
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reparations may be offered to a specific group, the concern in not for the fabric and 
wellbeing of the relationships that make up that community, but rather for individual 
members themselves. This is evident is the examples below. 
 Reparation can also take a material or monetary form. In Chile, for instance, 
families received financial compensation in the form of monthly cheques from the 
government for the loss of a family member under Pinochet’s military rule, which 
was characterized by the systematic disappearances and/or imprisonment of anyone 
suspected of opposing Pinochet.
432
 This financial gesture was seen as a means to 
ensure some form or reparation in the form of revenue. The belief was that 
reparations could “reestablish to the extent possible the situation that existed before 
the violation took place.”433  
 In 2006, the Canadian government publicly apologized for the wrongful 
implementation of the Chinese Head Tax policy that was charged to Chinese 
immigrants to Canada between 1885 and 1923.
434
 As an added gesture, the Canadian 
government handed out $20,000 CAD as compensation and repair to those who had 
paid the tax, and their families.
435
 In both cases, it is argued that reparations are an 
essential dimension of transitional justice, which “focuses most specifically on the 
recognition of victims' rights and the harms they suffer.”436 Reparations are not aimed 
at punishing offenders, even though offenders sometimes, themselves, contribute to 
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repairing the wrong they have caused. Rather, reparations are aimed at redressing the 
negative impact of the wrong committed.  
 In fact, there exists an obligation on the part of states to provide reparations, 
which is set out in the United Nations’ Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right 
to a Remedy and Reparation for Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law 
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.
437
 In its Preamble, the 
document states the importance in “honoring the victims’ right to benefit from 
remedies and reparation.” This commitment to reparation is reiterated throughout the 
document, with particular emphasis on “adequate, effective and prompt reparation,” 
which can take the form of public apologies, judicial sanctions, commemorations, the 
inclusion of accurate account of violations of human rights in national history, 
restitutions, where possible, and compensation, as well as guarantees of non-
repetition.
438
 The Guidelines, therefore, provide a rather long list of options from 
which states can choose to deal with legacies of past violations of human rights.  
 It is important to note that these measures are not exclusive of each other. In 
fact, they are often mutually supportive. Public apologies, for instance, contribute to 
the documentation of historical events and abuses. Publicly acknowledging past 
wrongs contributes to the recognition of a period of history that may have been, until 
then, ignored, whether voluntarily or not.
439
 This kind of acknowledgment and 
recognition is also, in its own way, a type of reparation and directly contributes to 
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doing justice.
440
  Prior to its apology to Canada’s First Nations people in 2008, for 
instance, the Canadian government had committed to providing a forum for the 
critical re-evaluation of Canadian history and the implication of its residential schools 
policy for the First Nations people. As a result, the Aboriginal Healing Foundation of 
Canada was set up in 1999, with a $350 million CAD grant to “encourage and support 
Aboriginal people in building and reinforcing sustainable healing that address the 
legacy of physical abuse and sexual abuse in the residential school system.”441 
 
 
Toward a Communitarian Approach 
In attempting to move outside the legal sphere, communitarian approaches to justice 
can make a significant contribution. While this research is clearly influenced by the 
work of a number of postcolonial and feminist indigenous and non-indigenous 
scholars,
442
 it adopts a communitarian approach to bypass the deontological liberal 
lens through which to view justice, because of the approach’s primary focus on the 
idea of community and its relationship to the self. Indeed, there is merit in the 
communitarian approach, as outlined by Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, which 
emphasizes “the relation between the individual and her society and community, and, 
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more specifically, …the extent to which it is the societies in which people live that 
shape who they are and the values that they have.”443 The idea and sense of 
community, as it will become clear in the subsequent exploration of Ubuntu, 
Canadian Aboriginal healing justice and tikanga is often central to non-Western 
approaches to justice. 
  It may well be that different understandings of the role and purpose of justice 
are embedded within cultural particularities. Communitarianism, in this respect, is 
useful, in that it gives precedence to the community as a provider of values and 
norms. Human beings cannot be moral subjects outside of a community, as it is the 
community that provides them with notions such as good, bad, just and unjust.
444
 
Selznick adds that “individuals are enculturated,”445 which is to say that individuals 
are educated and socialized to think and adopt certain values and conceptions of 
human interaction. More specifically, individuals are socialized into an 
“understanding of why the established way of doing things is the right way of doing 
them.”446 Every community devises its own moral standards,447 and sets parameters of 
what to believe and practice.
448
 Communities provide a “social support for individual 
identity and fulfillment.”449  
Essential to the communitarian approach is the belief that the community 
ought to be taken as a central unit of analysis to understand various conceptions of 
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justice, which are considered the reflection of societal values.
450
 Understandings of 
justice are in no way impartial and unbiased, but are embedded within specific moral 
values and experiences, and are therefore contextually bound. Indeed, “as an 
integrative ideal and as a foundation of community, justice is necessarily contextual 
and historical.”451 Conceptions of justice are what underlie all social interactions and 
provide a basis upon which a society is organized, such as the distribution of goods 
and access to services and opportunity. In an analogy of justice, Drummond notes that 
”there is no claim to truth beyond the common, ordinary, historical world into which 
we were born, no language unendowed with an accent to utter it.”452 In this respect, 
there is not one meaning. Instead, there are a number of ways to understand and carry 
out justice; deontological-liberal approaches are one of the many ways to do this, and 
cannot claim any universality. Deontological-liberal conceptions of justice are merely 
a way to categorize our thinking about justice but tend to dominate our thinking about 
reconciliation and transitional justice.   
The existing transitional justice scholarship emerged out of a Western concern 
for the transition to democracy in postwar Europe.
453
 The field of transitional justice 
grew rapidly to include democratization efforts in Latin America, as well as 
theorizing about peace building and reconciliation in Eastern Europe and Africa. The 
range of cases addressed also widened to include issues that grew out of post-war 
rebuilding, and deeply divided societies.  
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The scope of transitional justice also matured from a purely legalistic concern 
for the re-establishment of the rule law to include social, political and psychological 
aspects of dealing with the legacies of past violations of human rights. Christine Bell 
alludes to the decolonization of the field of transitional justice, through the inclusion 
of interdisciplinary work, in an attempt to reduce “law’s hold on the discourse” of the 
field.
454
 McEvoy warns against the over-legalization of transitional justice, which 
would narrow its potential for development.
455
 Facing old injustices requires more 
than just a legalistic endeavor and necessitates input from a range of other disciplines. 
Although interdisciplinary, the scholarship of transitional justice remains true to its 
roots and espouses a Western, deontological, and legalistic focus. It is, as yet, unable 
to contemplate alternative approaches, and most particularly alternative mechanisms 
of justice, outside of its own legal and deontological-liberal framework. 
 
A Disciplinary Shift 
While the majority of the literature on transitional justice deals exclusively with state-
centered modes of dispute resolution, more attention is starting to be paid to 
grassroots, non-Western conceptions and mechanisms of justice.
456
 This is visible in 
the work of Quinn,
457
 Baines
458
 and Finnström
459
 on Uganda, for instance, or the 
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work of Drumbl on the gacaca courts in Rwanda,
460
 and Huyse and Salter in Sierra 
Leone, Mozambique and Burundi.
461
 The transitional justice scholarship theorizes 
extensively about the best approach to bring about some form of justice, but remains 
confined within a deontological, and consequently, inherently Western, liberal 
framework. To this point, it has been unable to account for alternative understandings 
of justice that do not conform to the deontological-liberal lens through which justice 
is perceived in the West, and are, as a result, dominant in the field of transitional 
justice. So while transitional justice recognizes and tolerates the existence of 
alternative conceptions and mechanisms of justice, it is yet unable to consider it in its 
wholeness and difference.  
 This study argues for a movement toward the communication and 
understanding of alternative mechanisms of justice. It does not seek to funnel 
reflections on customary mechanisms of justice and their conceptions of justice 
through a Western, deontological-liberal approach. Rather, this research seeks to 
allow alternate viewpoints to blossom in their entirety. “An ethic of communication… 
works towards a cosmopolitan ethic from the communitarian premise that life is 
constituted within particular, concrete webs of meaning.”462 As such, it does not 
endorse cultural relativism in any shape or form, but, rather, adopt a minimal 
universalistic approach. It does so recognizing the existence of a universal yearning 
for justice, while at the same time acknowledging the existence of multiple views and 
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conceptions of justice. As explained above, while this research is influenced by 
postcolonial and feminist approaches, it uses a communitarian lens that will allow the 
identification of differing views of justice, while at the same time engaging these 
views in a conversation, “which in itself contributes to the building of a community, 
of shared understandings and practices.”463 While recognizing the universal yearning 
for justice, the use of a communitarian approach will allow for a different 
understanding of customary mechanisms of justice. It does so by emphasizing the 
primacy of the community in shaping one’s values and beliefs. This approach 
facilitates the consideration of the field of transitional justice and the issues it deals 
with, from a radically different standpoint. At the same time, this research hopes to 
engage the field of transitional justice in the exploration of alternative conceptions of 
justice, which ought not to be ignored when addressing the legacies of mass 
violations of human rights. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PHILOSOPHIES OF JUSTICE 
 
This research argues for the need to engage with customary mechanisms and the 
approaches to justice they embody. This particular chapter carries out an investigation 
of two philosophies of justice, namely the Bantu concept of Ubuntu and the Canadian 
Aboriginal notion of “healing justice.” It examines these approaches for two reasons. 
First, the Bantu concept of Ubuntu and the Canadian Aboriginal notion of “healing 
justice” have been the subject of more systematic investigation than almost any other 
approaches to justice. Secondly, both are representative of indigenous, non-Western, 
and alternative conceptions and mechanisms of justice. As such, they are likely to 
provide important clues regarding the ways to think about justice, outside of a 
deontological-liberal lens. 
 There is a real risk in my trying to capture these philosophies and convey 
them in a manner that is understandable to individuals “outside” of their cultures. “It 
is one kind of activity to speak or write about indigenous philosophy; it is quite 
another to weave indigenous thinking into Western philosophical thinking…Any 
hopes for a rich dialogue must be articulated in the language of the dominant 
culture.”464 It is essential, therefore, to keep in mind that capturing the meaning and 
essence of such philosophies is a challenging task, particularly since some of the 
concepts discussed are not always directly translatable. Secondly, this research does 
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not presuppose, in any way, that all customary mechanisms and approaches to justice 
are the same. Rather, it seeks to illustrate some of the commonalities that they share, 
and which set them apart from the legalistic and individualistic framework used by 
transitional justice scholars. Exploring these two approaches give us important cues 
about what other customary mechanisms and approaches to justice, such as tikanga, 
may look like and the common challenges they face.  
 
Ubuntu 
Ubuntu is often described as “a foundational component of African conflict resolution 
and peacemaking,”465 which has been rendered popular by Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu’s use of the concept within the context of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. It is, however, much more than that. Generally speaking, 
ubuntu is a form of African humanism that significantly differs from its Western 
counterpart. It is attributed to the Bantu people, generally, who inhabit the southern 
and eastern part of the African continent and make up two thirds of the African 
population.
466
 While Bantu people live in different countries across the African 
continent, they share some similar social characteristics.
467
 And despite the diversity 
of cultures and languages, the ethic of ubuntu remains similar. Desmond Tutu spelled 
out his own definition of the intricate term, as follows:   
Ubuntu is very difficult to render into a Western language. It speaks to the very 
essence of being human. When you want to give high praise to someone we 
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say,‘Yu, u Nobuntu’; he or she has Ubuntu. This means that they are generous, 
hospitable, friendly, caring and compassionate. They share what they have. It 
also means that my humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in theirs. 
We belong in a bundle of life. We say, ‘a person is a person through other 
people’ (in Xhosa Ubuntu ungamntu ngabanye abantu and in Zulu Umuntu 
ngumuntu  ngabanye). I am human because I belong, I participate, and I 
share.
468
  
 
 Ubuntu designates a number of characteristics, including a way of being, a 
human trait or quality or a view of the self and its relationship with others. It is “the 
root of African philosophy.”469 Many others have tried to identify and define the 
concept of ubuntu. Some characterize any feature that exemplifies this humanity, such 
as caring, tolerance, and generosity. It exemplifies group solidarity and 
interdependence. Mokgoro prefers to define ubuntu as a “philosophy of life, 
which…represents personhood, humanity, humaneness and morality.”470 Prinsloo 
contends that ubuntu represents an African collective consciousness.
471
 A person who 
has ubuntu, according to Mthembu displays a full range of virtues, such as sharing 
and compassion, but also discipline, hard work, generosity, kindness, respect, and the 
ability to live in harmony.
472
 The individual and his relationship with the community, 
and the strong interconnectedness is strongly emphasized in the concept of ubuntu.  
 Dirk Louw identifies Descartes’ Cogito Ergo Sum (I think therefore I am) as 
the best illustration of Western humanism, whereby the “individual exists prior to, or 
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separately and independently from, the rest of the community or society.”473 Other 
individuals in society are simply complementary to what is already a self-sufficient 
person.
474
 By contrast, the traditional African conception of a person is of one that is 
intrinsically connected to the wider community.  
 Roughly translated, ubuntu stands for “I am, because we are, and since we are, 
therefore I am.”475 People are only people through other people. Personhood is 
defined by the web of the relationships to which a person belongs. Ubuntu identifies 
and defines a person’s connection to the community through a means of constant 
interaction and feedback between personhood and the community.
476
 It is important to 
keep in mind that the principle of ubuntu departs from any form of oppressive 
communalism with which it may wrongly be associated. Indeed, “every person gets 
an equal chance to speak up until some kind of an agreement, consensus or group 
cohesion is reached.”477 This is an important element, which not only characterizes 
social behavior and interaction, but also influences the way justice is carried out. “The 
African conception of man does not negate individuality,”478 but rejects the view that 
the person should take precedence over the community. Teffo explains that the aim of 
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Ubuntu is to maintain “the other in his (or her) otherness, in his (or her) uniqueness, 
without letting him (or her) slip into the distance.”479  
  The philosophy emphasizes the collective responsibility shared by community 
members. It is concerned with maintaining “harmony in all spheres of life.”480 
All members have a responsibility towards the well-being of the network of 
relationships that make up the community. Each individual is unique, but part of a 
whole. Taking away a piece of the whole would weaken the community and the 
individual since neither would be complete without the other. This conception is 
roughly translated back within traditional justice mechanisms whereby the loss of an 
individual (e.g. through murder) is a loss to the community as well as to the direct 
family. While the link to the family may be a sentimental one, that to the community 
is more functional. As Turnbull explains, what matters is the “social import of that 
death for society.”481 Justice must address and weigh the damage caused to the social 
fabric and the loss of a healthy child, functionally equates the loss of the contribution 
that child could have made to the well-being and functioning of the society. 
 
Canadian Aboriginal Justice  
Canadian aboriginal communities, despite their variety of traditions and history, also 
often have a strong sense of community-based justice, which, in some ways, reflects 
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some of the same elements as ubuntu.
482
 One of the striking resemblances lies in the 
common emphasis on interdependence. Relationships between community members 
are what matter.
483
 A healthy, peaceful community is defined by respectful and 
peaceful relationships between its members. The community is understood as the sum 
of the relationships it encompasses. In this sense, when a crime takes place, it is not 
only the relationship between a number of given individuals that is affected, but the 
balance of the whole community. From this results a different conception of 
wrongdoing and how best to treat it. A crime is either perceived as a misbehavior, 
which requires some form of teaching, or an illness, which requires healing.
484
 Justice 
is about healing the parties involved.
485
 It is all the more a “holistic vision of justice 
which draws from the wisdom of the elders and traditional teachings.”486 
 All victims, their families, offenders, and the community are engaged in the 
process of healing, and, therefore, justice.
487
 They take an active role in the process. 
Rather than being the object of justice, community members carry out justice 
themselves. Elders often play the role of mediators, while victims, their families and 
offenders have the opportunity to disclose their experiences, anger and pain.
488
 
Observers note that victims often receive a great deal of support in dealing with the 
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trauma of their abuse.
489
 Yet, the emphasis is on the responsibility of all. As Ross 
notes, “we are all assembled to help make life better for the next generation.”490 All 
community members are actively engaged in the healing process, since all are 
responsible for the well-being of their community. In aboriginal communities 
throughout Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, there exists a common concern and 
attempt to return responsibility for problem-solving and dispute resolution to those 
directly involved with the issue, rather than putting it in the hands of powerful 
strangers.
491
 As noted by Ross, there is a strong sense of collective responsibility 
centered on the idea of interdependence. Human communities “are not, as the 
Western view seems to hold, fundamentally a collection of rights against others, but a 
bundle of responsibilities towards others.”492 
 Generally speaking, throughout Aboriginal communities, rehabilitation is 
preferred to punishment, which is merely viewed as a Western and external 
mechanism of control.
493
 Punishment is generally looked upon with distrust, since 
incarceration is viewed as bringing only further imbalance to the individual and the 
community instead of addressing and redressing this imbalance.
494
 Theft, for instance, 
requires that community members get together to discuss and teach the offender about 
the harmful effects of such acts. Sexual abuse, on the other hand, requires healing for 
both offenders and victims. Victims may be helped, through various counseling 
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programs, to deal with what they have suffered. Sexual offenders may also be 
counseled and helped to deal with the psychological dimensions that spurred the 
violence, but also those that follow such acts, to better prevent them.  
 It is interesting to note that in a large proportion of the literature on Aboriginal 
justice, the term “offender” is rarely used. Rather, the term “victimizer” is preferred. 
This choice of word reveals an important aspect of the aboriginal view of “justice” 
and wrongdoing. By shunning the term “offender,” and favoring “victimizer,” the 
complexity involved in the identification of wrongdoing is exposed. Wrongdoing is 
seen as the symptom of a deeper malaise, or the result of a perceived injustice. 
Therefore, the focus of justice is not on the crime itself, but rather on understanding 
the reasons behind it.
495
 It is only by addressing the underlying cause of the 
misbehavior that the latter can be properly dealt with and prevented.
496
  
 
A Holistic Justice 
Customary mechanisms of justice have been largely under-researched. As a result, the 
scholarship and practitioners of the field of transitional justice have “failed to 
acknowledge, and thus comprehend, how the systems…[that are] idiosyncratic to 
specific sub-regional and cultural contexts…by which many people …[and] order 
their lives, function.”497 When acknowledged, however, customary mechanisms are 
often regarded as “unaccountable, opaque and contradictory to enlightened intentions 
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of liberal peace.”498 They are also generally described as embodying a mix of 
restorative and retributive values.
499
 Yet, describing customary mechanisms of justice 
as embodying a mix of restorative and retributive values is a mistake, since the way 
these approaches are framed in the field of transitional justice is inappropriate and ill-
suited to capture the essence of these mechanisms. This is, first, because, as explained 
earlier, the concern for retribution is entirely absent in the conception of justice that is 
embodied in customary mechanisms of justice. When a penalty is chosen by both the 
victim and the offender, it is viewed as a means to make amend and rejoin society.
500
 
Because both parties to the dispute agree on the penalty, it is often perceived as 
holding more weight and legitimacy in the eyes of both.
501
 The points of view, 
experiences and needs of both sides are taken into consideration, and the penalty is 
more likely to reflect these. The focus is placed on the rehabilitation of both victims 
and offenders. Second, the term restorative justice and subsequent conception of it 
“emerged as a movement in response to the shortcomings of the Western criminal 
judicial system.”502 Yet, it is applied to ancient traditions of informal methods of 
social control and dispute resolution that were predominant in non-state, and pre-state 
societies.
503
 As explained in the previous chapter, this restorative approach to justice 
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remains individually focused and fails to capture the spirit of such alternative 
conception of justice.
504
   
 This research argues that in some cases, customary and indigenous 
mechanisms have been re-appropriated and repackaged to suit the needs of the non-
aboriginal world. When discussing Mãori family group conferencing, for example, 
Blagg explains that these customary practices have been “appropriated, denuded of 
context and employed to meet the interests of the status quo”--in other words, the 
policy agenda of the government.
505
 This view strongly echoes that of Tauri, who 
discusses what he calls the “indigenization of New Zealand’s criminal justice 
system.”506 Tauri explains that customary mechanisms have been taken out of their 
context, and annexed of their indigenous landscape to be introduced in the 
government’s policies and legislations.507 This has certainly been the case in a 
number of countries, such as Australia and Canada, whereby these mechanisms have 
been used to provide an “avenue for reform with an element of Aboriginal culture 
onto an essentially unreconstructed white system.”508  
 Far from empowering indigenous communities and promoting their 
approaches to justice, the indigenization of criminal justice has stripped these 
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practices of their meaning.
509
 Customary law and practices have sometimes been 
“collapsed into restorative justice,” which is essentially a Eurocentric image and 
appropriation of traditional mechanisms and justice.
510
 Finnström refers to this 
tendency as the “imperial dialogue,” which is more of a “one-sided appropriation of 
meaning” whereby observers have “applied their assumptions concerning others, 
uncritically,” and, reached a “conclusion based on ideological hypothesis already 
designed.”511 Blagg even argues that what has been done to the study of customary 
mechanisms of justice is akin to Edward Said’s “Orientalism.”512 Said explained that 
the idea of the Orient was constructed for Western consumption, for which the 
“actualities of the modern orient were systematically excluded,”513 and its actual, real 
“identity withered away into a set of consecutive fragments.”514 Blagg argues that the 
same thing has happened to customary mechanisms of justice with the concept of 
restorative justice, which portrays “highly derivative and sanitized representations” of 
these mechanisms.
515
 The type of justice that customary mechanisms embody has 
been taken out of context, and as such rendered universal and ahistorical through its 
representation as restorative justice.   
 Customary law and customary mechanisms, and, more particularly, the type of 
justice they embody, is difficult to appreciate and make sense of within a Western, 
individualistic and legally based approach to justice. This may be due to the fact that 
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justice, in the case of ubuntu and Canadian Aboriginal approaches, “represent[s] a 
grammar for living and an intricate set of religious principles that make the world 
intelligible.”516 It is not just legal institutions that differ, but entire social structures 
and beliefs, which, in turn, get lost and sanitized in the restorative justice texts.  
 These approaches fundamentally antithetical to the individual-focused and 
based approaches to justice that inform the transitional justice scholarship’s way to 
think about mechanisms of justice. Moreover, they provide a context and a 
framework for thinking about alternative conceptions of justice in general, as well as 
in the particular case of the Mãori in New Zealand.   
 
Interconnectedness 
At the crux of both philosophies of justice are notions of interdependence and 
connectedness. In both instances, communities are conceived as a network of 
relationships, rather than a mere collection of individuals. This is most obvious in the 
following Xhosa proverb, which embodies ubuntu: “A human being is a human being 
only through its relationship to other human beings.”517 Accordingly, not only are 
individuals essential elements of the sustainability and well-being of the community, 
but they also play an important role in thinking about the self. It is through others that 
one is, meaning that one’s identity and self-perception are either confirmed by or 
influenced by one’s relationship with others. While self-respect, for instance, is 
inherently an individual feeling, respect can only be granted by others towards 
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oneself. Most importantly, one’s life is supported by the existence of others within the 
community, and vice-versa. Individual members of the community work together to 
contribute to its wellbeing and sustainability.
518
 
 This influences conceptions of justice and its value and role in the community. 
When a crime takes place, it is not only the relationship between a number of given 
individuals that is affected, but the balance of the whole community. It is the entire 
network of relationships that is damaged. From this results a different conception of 
wrongdoing and how best to treat it. A crime is perceived as an illness, which requires 
healing. Justice allows healing.
519
 Based on the premise that we are all related within 
a whole, justice is about honoring how we can each move with our relatedness in 
ways that are “ours to do.”520 This means that justice is also about maintaining that 
network of relations without which it would have no flesh. Often, and as a result, the 
rehabilitation of both the victim and the offender is favored. This is premised upon 
what Ross refers to the “law of respect,” which assumes that each individual makes a 
vital and irreplaceable contribution to the well-being of the community.
521
 While a 
crime may only directly affect a number of individuals, it is the well functioning of 
the whole community that is challenged. 
 From this conception of interdependence and interconnectedness, stems the 
notion of collective responsibility. Central to this notion of collective responsibility is 
the idea that if something has gone wrong and a crime has been committed, the 
community as a whole is responsible. When a crime is being committed, it means that 
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the community has been unable to prevent this crime from happening. Justice, in fact, 
involves much more than just redressing or dealing with the immediate consequences 
of a wrong. Instead, it involves “creating the social conditions that minimize such 
wrongdoing…it involves all the social mechanisms that teach people from the 
moment of their birth how to live a good life.”522 As such, the community is 
responsible for not creating conditions within which a crime cannot and should not 
happen, or, in other words, creating conditions favorable to the wellbeing of all its 
members. Theft for food, for instance, renders the community responsible, in that it 
failed to prevent any member from lacking food and starving. Justice requires 
identifying and addressing the root causes of the crime. Using the analogy of the body 
again, healing an illness or pain requires identifying what triggered it. Taking 
medicines will only help reducing the intensity of the pain, but will not always heal 
the body. It is important, for that reason, to identify what causes the pain to prevent it. 
Likewise, justice heals as long as it addressing the causes of the crime as well as its 
direct impact. Punishment or restitution is not sufficient since it only addresses the 
impact of the crime. Addressing what caused the crime to happen, in the first place, is 
more likely to allow healing and prevent re-occurrence.  
 
 Wholeness 
Common to both Ubuntu and Canadian Aboriginal philosophies of justice is the belief 
that everything is interrelated. One cannot understand something if one does not 
understand how it is related and connected to everything else. This may, at first, be 
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difficult to fully comprehend, but justice itself is a “constituent element of the very 
social fabric of the community,” meaning that justice is not limited to legal 
proceedings as in Western conception.
523
 
 Interestingly, a number of communities do not have a specific word for 
“justice.” The Mãori, for instance, use the term tikanga Mãori to talk about justice. 
Loosely translated, tikanga Mãori means “the Mãori way of doing things.”524 It 
includes conceptions of “right” and “wrong.” Most importantly, it establishes the 
organization of community life and interaction. Likewise, the derivation of the Luo 
language spoken by the Acholi population of Northern Uganda, has no equivalent for 
the word “justice.”525 This illustrates a disjunction between the Western conception of 
“justice” and which is embodied in traditional mechanisms of justice, whereby the 
restoration of the social order and spiritual harmony take precedence.  
 Healing the mind is another important element of justice. The spiritual is not 
outside of the realm of “justice.” Sawatsky explains that Aboriginal justice, for 
instance, tends to use “heart-thinking” rather than “head-thinking.”526 This means that 
Aboriginal approaches to justice emphasize the emotional aspect of justice as healing. 
He adds “the methods of justice reflect the virtues of justice,” namely, love, caring, 
respect, family values.
527
  Here, a different idea of what justice and restoration entails, 
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prevails.
528
 In this case, “restoring spirituality and cleansing one's soul are essential to 
the healing process for everyone involved in a conflict.”529 For a healthy community 
to exist, its members must be whole.
530
 Justice is holistic in that it seeks to address all 
elements of the self that need healing. Justice also permeates through all aspects of 
life, and is not limited to the legal sphere. Healing is initiated through an initial 
community gathering, but it is carried out incrementally, through counseling and 
community meetings and projects where offenders and victims slowly regain trust of 
and from fellow community members. 
 As explained earlier, justice seeks to identify the root causes of a crime to 
address them. Crimes are seen as a symptom of a deeper malaise. Accordingly, justice 
must be addressed in a holistic and integrated manner.
531
 Problems are handled in 
their entirety. Justice is not fragmented into pre-adjudication, pretrial, adjudication, 
and sentencing stages. Rather, it is seen altogether as a path towards transformation. 
Justice is not a mere tool in addressing and redressing wrongs, but, as Ross notes, a 
way of life.
532
 Justice is not solely about guaranteeing respect, rights and well-being, 
it is also about “enforcing customs.”533 “Justice” permeates everyday life and 
embodies the morals and customs of the community. As such, “justice” is “involved 
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in keeping social order but most importantly harmony.”534 There is no duality 
between the just society where all are equal individuals within a community and the 
justice that redresses wrongs. In fact, “justice is not primarily about what to do when 
things go wrong, but about how to live so that things go right.”535 Justice is a lived 
experience, which is acquired and understood through traditions, ceremonies and life 
as part of a healthy, caring society.
536
  
 
Concluding thoughts  
Both aspects discussed provide us with a window through which scholars of 
transitional justice may acquire insight into the nature and role of justice that goes 
well beyond the legalistic framework, within which scholars have tried to make sense 
of these alternative conceptions and mechanisms of justice It becomes clear that the 
communitarian conception of justice contradicts the rights-based and legalistic 
confines of the deontological-liberal approaches to justice. So, while these two 
elements are directly drawn from the Bantu and the Canadian Aboriginal 
philosophies, they give us cues regarding what to look for, when thinking about 
alternative mechanisms of justice and the type of justice they seek.  
 Most importantly, it is argued, here, that these approaches to justice, and their 
emphasis on interconnectedness, require that we adopt a “relational lens,”537 to make 
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sense of the nature and purpose of justice. Ross explains that “the relational lens” 
allows us to view the world around us as a “vast web of ever-modifying 
relationships,” rather than a mere “collection of things.”538 In this respect, customary 
mechanisms of justice provide a framework where parties to a dispute, may ”come 
together…to explore their ways-of-relating and to use that knowledge to design 
workable changes.”539 Justice allows the re-shaping of relationships. This “relational 
lens” leads us to “know” the world differently, and view the role of “justice” 
accordingly. Using the “relational lens” will therefore help and guide my approach to 
research and methodology, when exploring tikanga Mãori, or in other words, the 
Mãori way of doing things.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CUSTOMARY MECHANISMS OF JUSTICE 
 
 
Understanding the nature of customary mechanisms of justice is of great importance 
for the argument presented in this work, regarding the inability of the transitional 
justice scholarship to account that the philosophy of justice that underpins these 
mechanisms. Customary mechanisms of justice continue to play a significant role in 
the lives of many communities around the world. Yet, while there exist a number of 
individual and regional case studies of these mechanisms, assessments of what 
customary mechanisms of justice generally consist of, and how they function as a 
whole, remain sparse. For this reason, this chapter starts by providing a typology of 
customary mechanisms of justice. It also touches upon the importance of the 
traditions that give life to these mechanisms, and addresses some of the concerns 
raised regarding their continued existence. However, it is important to try not to 
romanticize these practices. While this study argues for caution in the promotion of 
the rule of law and its principles, it does not, however, blindly endorse the use of 
customary mechanisms of justice in all cases. Concerns raised by international 
agencies and transitional justice scholars, vis-à-vis the fact that these practices may 
violate fundamental rights and Western principles of justice, are sometimes raised for 
good reasons. This chapter helps shed light on some of the difficulties encountered by 
international actors and scholars when trying to engage with customary mechanisms 
 131 
of justice and the degree to which these processes can be accommodated. Customary 
mechanims of justice sometimes function in contradion to some of the values 
embodied, for instance, in documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.  
 This chapter draws particular attention to two concerns that are often raised by 
scholars of transitional justice and the international community at large. First, that 
women often face systematic gender-based discrimination that may be present in and 
perpetuated by customary mechanisms. Indeed, these mechanisms often function 
according to patriarchal traditions, which can be inconsistent with the principle of 
gender equality. Second, there are issues regarding the legitimacy of customary 
mechanisms of justice. Because these mechanisms are considered “traditional,” they 
are sometimes perceived as inherently more legitimate than other mechanisms of 
justice. In fact, customary mechanisms of justice are sometimes fraught with power 
struggles and dynamics that threaten their ability to provide justice.  
  
Defining Customary Mechanisms of Justice 
 
A Typology 
Local, traditional, customary mechanisms of justice have long been overlooked and 
under-researched in the literature on transitional justice. These mechanisms, for 
example, have been called “informal,”540 “traditional,” “localized,”541 “customary,” or 
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“indigenous” mechanisms of justice. In Australia, customary mechanisms of justice 
are referred to as “indigenous justice practices,”542 or simply “community justice.”543 
In Africa, these mechanisms of justice are generally referred to as “community 
rituals,”544 “traditional conflict resolution mechanisms”545 or even “traditional conflict 
medicine.”546 Quinn posits that the terms “customary” or “localized”547 are more 
appropriate terms to designate these mechanisms, since they embody traditional 
communal values, and may or may not have some kind of legal standing. Kerr and 
Mobekk insist on the use of the term “informal,” which, in their view, is the most 
appropriate way to capture the essence of these mechanisms, in that it denotes the 
absence of “formal structure created by the state.”548 Others argue that the use of the 
terms “customary” and “traditional”549 is highly problematic, since these practices are 
not static, and constantly evolve and adapt over time. They also criticize the use of the 
term “informal mechanisms” as these practices are often “state sanctioned and even 
state regulated.”550 More often than not, researchers prefer to refer directly to the 
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mechanism in question,
551
 while a number of international or national development 
agencies simply think about these mechanisms of justice as “non-state justice 
systems.”552  
 This research sympathizes with the use of the term “non-state justice system” 
although the term is problematic to a certain degree. Indeed, the state and its laws 
have, in some cases, formally recognized these mechanisms, as in Uganda
553
 and 
Bolivia.
554
 In the Rwandan case, the state has had the most striking and pervasive 
influence on the gacaca courts, which have had to absorb many of the formal and 
procedural aspects of the state’s judicial systems. Waldorf argues that only a few of 
the customary practices remain, and that gacaca courts are now more of “an official 
state institution intimately linked to the state apparatus of prosecutions and 
incarceration, and applying codified, rather than customary law.”555 As a result, the 
term “non-state justice system” is questionable. This study also disagrees with use of 
the term “informal,” since it assumes that all formality is derived from state-centered 
practices. Hence, Quinn’s use of the term “customary mechanisms of justice” is 
adopted in this research. While it is true that values evolve and change over time, 
these mechanisms are still the embodiment of traditional values and evolve and adapt 
over time accordingly. In this respect, the use of the term “customary mechanisms of 
justice” seems most appropriate. 
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 As mentioned earlier, customary mechanisms of justice have sometimes been 
recognized in formal state law, as in the cases of South Africa and Bolivia.
556
 In 
Rwanda, they have been administered by the Ministry of Justice.
557
 In the Ugandan 
case, not only have some of the country’s customary values and practices been 
recognized in the 1995 constitution,
558
 but their formal use was also discussed in the 
Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Ugandan government 
and the Lord’s Resistance Army.559 This movement toward the recognition and 
validation of customary mechanisms of justice coincides with what Tiemessen notes 
to be a shift toward “localization,” as a more legitimate and effective means to 
engender justice by including local constituencies and traditions.
560
 Often enough, 
such mechanisms serve to fill the vacuum left by unstable institutions and power,
561
 
or simply retain more authority in the eyes of the local population.
562
 While these 
mechanisms differ according to the context and region in which they are upheld,
563
 
some elements, generally shared by most practices, can still be identified. 
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 For instance, these mechanisms are often locally situated and inclusive of 
many community members.
564
 Gatherings can take place anywhere that is considered 
to be at the heart of the community, in improvised halls, temporary tents, or in a field. 
Participation in and involvement of various community members in the process is a 
striking characteristic of these practices. They are usually chaired by elders, clan 
leaders, or community members with perceived authority.
565
 All three parties to a 
dispute, namely victims, offenders and the wider community, may be present. The 
process of dispute resolution is “open and immediately accessible” to all in most 
cases.
566
 Victims and their families or clan representatives are given a chance to voice 
their concerns, pain and grievances, while offenders and their families or clan 
representatives get an opportunity to explain their actions and make amends. The 
wider community is also often present in the process, and serves to bear witness to the 
wrongdoing and acknowledges redress. The “law is immediately applicable, by 
adjudicators or preferably by the parties themselves.”567 In other words, community 
members themselves carry out the sentencing, rather than leaving it in the hands of 
some faceless state institution. Through their involvement, various parties are 
empowered, in that they are given a central role in the redress and sustainability of 
community values and norms.
568
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 Customary mechanisms of justice are also sometimes non-antagonistic and 
collaborative. They often encourage communication and exchanges between different 
parties to the dispute. These mechanisms aim at enacting a dialogue by “channeling 
retributive feelings.”569 The re-creation of social capital can only be initiated and 
sustained by communication and exchanges between the various sections of the 
community.
570
 Not only does such a process serve to ease tensions between affected 
community members, it also invites the exploration of past events, and, therefore, 
gives victims and offenders the opportunity to share their experiences. The outcome 
and the sentencing that result from such a process is fundamentally collaborative in 
the sense that it encourages the exploration of various versions of what happened. 
This collaborative process helps offenders and victims each to acknowledge the 
other’s experience of the same event and adopt a common understanding of it.571 It 
also often engages different members to support the outcome in various ways. For 
instance, community members can actively take part in the deliberation process or 
play a role in the rehabilitation of offenders and victims. 
 Customary mechanisms of justice are also sometimes rehabilitative, in that 
they seek the restoration and rehabilitation of community members affected by the 
harm caused to the social fabric.
572
 These practices embody “the preparedness of 
people to anticipate a shared future.”573 On a practical note, the reintegration of 
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offenders within the society, rather than mere imprisonment, is generally applied.
574
 
Turnbull notes that punishment, in African societies as elsewhere, is often “regarded 
as a welcome means of making restitution and of being restored to society.”575 It is 
important to note that the rehabilitation of past offenders through customary 
mechanisms of justice, therefore, does not preclude some sort of punishment, as long 
as the latter does not prevent the re-introduction of the individual within the 
community. A rehabilitative sort of punishment, such as community service, can be 
favored. Equally important is the social rehabilitation of victims who often feel 
misunderstood and isolated from the rest of the community.  
 While the social and psychological rehabilitation of victims may appear 
logical to most, many remain sceptical regarding the reintroduction of past offenders 
into the wider community. Offenders often feel they have suffered an injustice and 
may use this alleged injustice to legitimize their offences. Reintroducing past 
offenders into the community implies that there will be a place for the offender within 
the reconstructed society. By the same token, ensuring that the offender can rejoin 
society, as opposed to being ostracized, contributes to her own social recovery.
576
 
Offenders must, therefore, be given sufficient opportunity to reintegrate into the 
community. This can be done, for instance, by providing them with community 
service as a way to repair what harm they have caused to the community. Giving a 
past offender a role and place in the community she is about to re-enter is a crucial 
part of the process. Bypassing punishment without providing offenders with sufficient 
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opportunities to get involved in the community may seriously affect any attempt to 
bring justice. Victims, too, must be given the chance to actively engage with other 
community members. Their trust and confidence must be regained. This can be 
achieved incrementally by making sure that victims’ needs are being addressed and 
their sense of security increased. Victims, for instance, may be invited to actively take 
part in communal reconstruction projects. Compensation and the restoration of 
relationships are both important elements of these mechanisms.
577
 Although these 
processes, in some cases, remain un-codified, they often share some remarkable 
similarity.  
 A report published by the Australian Law Reform Commission, resulting from 
an investigation into aboriginal customary law, notes the existence of “sophisticated 
and ritualized processes,”578 which usually include the declaration of grievances, 
truth-telling, evaluation of evidence and sentencing as a result of consensus.
579
 When 
talking about customary mechanisms of justice, Wimmer, Goldstone and Horowitz 
identify the following four elements present in a number of these processes:
580
 The 
first consists of the mutual acknowledgement and identification of the substance of 
the dispute to be settled. The second serves to reflect on the underlying fears and 
hopes of the participants and the community as a whole. The third is the identification 
of shared interest in an attempt to secure what the authors call “practical 
                                                 
577
 Joanna R. Quinn, "The Role of Informal Mechanisms in Transitional Justice," a paper presented at 
the Canadian Political Science Association, London, Ontario, 2005, 15.  
578
 James Crawford, The Proof of Aboriginal Customary Law (Sydney: Australian Law Reform 
Commission, 1983), 14, 22. 
579
 Crawford, The Proof of Aboriginal Customary Law, 23, 26. 
580
 Andrea Wimmer, Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Toward a New Realism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2004), 176. 
 139 
cooperation.”581 Finally, the fourth phase engages all parties in a dialogue about the 
necessary conditions for the reestablishment of healthy relationships between 
community members. Each of the four phases necessitates the engagement in and 
participation of all parties to a conflict. The community is central in all steps, in that it 
serves to acknowledge, but also to take action against, what harm has been done. The 
recollection of past events also contributes to the creation of a common memory and 
recollection of events that is acceptable to all.
582
 
 A number of international governmental and non-governmental organizations 
have begun to recognize the value of customary mechanisms of justice. In a study on 
African customary mechanisms of justice, Penal Reform International explains that 
these mechanisms are often the first and only mechanisms of justice to which 
villagers, living in poor and remote areas, have access.
583
 Penal Reform International 
also identifies the elements that it considers typical of customary mechanisms of 
justice, including the agreement that customary mechanisms of justice require 
community involvement, public participation, and seek to restore social harmony.
584
 
They also make use of rituals for the re-integration of offenders, and seek to reach 
compromise on all decisions taken.
585
 
 The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) lists “ideal-
typical attributes of informal justice systems.”586 According to IDEA, customary 
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mechanisms of justice focus on reconciliation and restoring social harmony.
587
 They 
put emphasis on restorative penalties. The process, itself, is voluntary, and decisions 
are based on collective agreement. Arbitrators of these processes are also appointed 
from within the community, on the basis of status or lineage. There is a high degree 
of public participation and consultation.
588
 Likewise, the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), which recognizes access to justice as an essential 
element in the promotion of peace and democratic governance,
589
 describes 
customary mechanisms of justice as favoring community involvement and 
participation,
590
 targeting social harmony,
591
 and giving strong consideration to the 
community’s interest and well-being.592  
 Rituals, too, are a central element in many customary mechanisms of justice 
and carry a strong symbolic significance for the people who carry them out, as well as 
for those who participate in them. In a number of communities, justice is achieved 
through some kind of ceremonial gathering where individual experiences are 
acknowledged.
593
 Cleansing, for instance, may be partly achieved through the 
carrying out of some ritual like dancing. In the case of the Acholi people of Uganda, 
individuals are partly cleansed of their past and anger through the drinking of a soup 
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made of a bitter root.
594
 For the Navajo, ceremonial sweats and other purification 
ceremonies are used as a means to engender the healing and cleansing process for the 
individuals affected by a crime.
595
 Through this ritual, it is believed that individuals 
are reborn through spiritual renewal and healing,
596
 and they are thought to shed all 
their troubles.  
 Rituals, in fact, provide a certain continuity and unity amongst those who 
perform them.
597
 A number of rituals exist for different circumstances and stages of 
life in most communities. In fact, rituals often “accompany the passage of an 
individual…from one social status to another.”598 They embody and symbolize 
beliefs.
599
 Rituals also contribute to customary mechanisms of justice in that they 
provide them with some sort of grounding and elements that signal the steps to 
follow. The symbolic value of rituals is tightly linked to the traditions they 
embody.
600
  
 
                                                 
594
 Finnström, Living with Bad Surroundings, 35. 
595
 McCaslin, Justice as Healing, 327.  
596
 Vancouver Coastal Health, Aboriginal Health, [website]; accessible at  
http://aboriginalhealth.vch.ca/terms.htm; accessed October 2009. This webpage contains information 
regarding different healing practices used by Canadian Aboriginal communities.  
597
 John Mbiti, Introduction to African Religion (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1991), 20. 
598
 Mary Douglas, Implicit Meanings (London: Routledge, 1999), 181. 
599
 Ibid., 13. 
600
 Any culture and tradition, regardless of its geographical location, carries out its own rituals, 
including birthdays and weddings, for instance.   
 142 
Traditions 
Various reports on the existence of customary mechanisms of justice across the world 
have noted how “remarkably resilient,”601 and “adaptable to changing 
circumstance”602 these practices have been. This is not entirely surprising, given the 
fact that these mechanisms of justice are themselves the embodiment of a culture, its 
values and traditions.
603
 Every community defines its own moral standards, and what 
is acceptable to do or not.
604
 Customary mechanisms of justice represent a society’s 
conception of justice, its values and its ideals.
605
 Their existence and justification is 
anchored in a society’s beliefs and traditions. They are the very essence and 
inheritance of centuries of traditions, understood as the passing of values for peaceful 
life in community.
606
 Indeed, traditions (and, by extension, customary practices of 
law) provide a “framework in which the conversation, a story of particular lives, takes 
its meaning.”607 They provide a particular set of values and meanings that informs 
and, to a certain extent, shapes communal life.
608
 They can be considered “a 
constitutive element of societies.”609 
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 In their study of clan elders in Somaliland, Yasuf and Le Mar note the 
credence of traditions, which underpin customary legal practices.
610
 They discuss the 
existence and importance played by xeer, an accepted code of conduct that is orally 
transmitted.
611
 Xeer is a combination of Islamic Sharia law and customary law, which 
emphasizes the values of interdependence and inclusiveness.
612
 Most importantly, 
xeer, as a communally sustained mechanism of dispute resolution, embodies 
communal principles and ideals of justice, social conduct and collective 
responsibilities.
613
 It is an integrative part of traditions, their sustainability and 
transmission.  
 It is important, before going any further, to consider the way traditions are 
generally understood. Often enough, traditions are considered a thing of the past, and 
therefore are seen to have little or limited relevance to today. Traditions are 
“memories of memories,” meaning that they are the weak reflection of past actions 
and beliefs.
614
 The existing literature has, by and large, drawn distinctions between 
two types of traditions: “continuous” traditions, which date back centuries, and 
“invented” traditions, which “are easily tracable within a brief and dateable 
period.”615 While “invented” traditions rely heavily on “continuous” traditions, they 
are, in fact, “responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old 
                                                 
610
 Yusuf and Le Mar, "Clan Elders as conflict mediators." 
611
 Ibid., 460. 
612
 Ibid., 460. 
613
 Yusuf and Le Mar, "Clan Elders as conflict médiators,"460. 
614
 Jan Vansina, Oral tradition as History (London: Currey, 1985), 160. 
615
 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 1.  
 144 
situations.”616 They could be considered updated and adapted versions of 
“continuous” traditions.  
 This distinction is troublesome for two reasons. First, it ignores the 
embedded-ness of such concept of tradition within a specific experience. Glenn notes 
that this understanding of tradition and its “pastness” is inherently Western.617 He 
argues that the West, broadly speaking, considers traditions as “voices from the past” 
while a number of other cultures see them as voices of the present, “even though the 
owners of the voices may be absent.”618 He sees the latter as a preferable approach. 
Adopting Glenn’s view allows us to bypass the issue raised by a number of academics 
regarding the difference between “invented” and “continuous” traditions.619 Viewing 
traditions as voices of the present renders the debate regarding “continuous” and 
“invented” traditions, as well as their value and authenticity, obsolete.  
 In turn, this leads us to the second reason for discarding such a distinction: If 
we accept an understanding of traditions as “set of practices governed by overtly or 
tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature which seek to inculcate 
certain values,”620 then the distinction between the age of traditions is highly 
irrelevant, if people continue to value them. Shils captures the intricacy between 
change and continuity: 
All novelty is a modification of what has existed previously; it occurs and 
reproduces itself as novelty in a more persistent context. Every novel 
characteristic is determined in part by what existed previously; its previous 
character is one determinant of what it became when it became something 
new. The mechanisms of persistence are not utterly distinct from the 
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mechanisms of change. There is persistence in change and around change and 
the mechanisms of change also call forth the operation of the mechanism of 
persistence; without these, the innovation would fade and the previous 
condition would be restored.
621
 
 
 In other words, novelty and persistence are intricately linked. There can be no 
novelty without reference to what has been before, and there is consistency in change, 
which occurs continuously.
622
 Traditions change and evolve to adapt to new 
circumstances. As argued by Finnström, cultures, and, therefore, traditions, are 
“socially lived.”623 In his view, it is irrelevant to try to make a distinction between 
traditions of the past and today’s realities and practices since culture and traditions are 
“daily created and recreated.”624 They survive change because they have inherent 
value for the well-being of the entire community.
625
 Traditions do not preclude 
innovation and change. In a number of cultures, traditions are transmitted orally, 
which make them more vulnerable but also adaptable to change.
626
 Boyer notes that 
traditions and the values they transmit often become mere common sense.
627
 They are 
resilient but also reflect values and beliefs that give essence to a community and its 
practices. They have, as a result, shown a great amount of adaptability and strength.
628
 
 Customary mechanisms of justice evolve and change over time. They were 
often the first casualties of colonialism. Colonial rulers disparaged such traditional 
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customs.
629
 For Mamdani, the imported judicial system and its courts were a 
“testimony to effective imperial control.”630 Establishing the rule of law was very 
much part of the noble mission civilisatrice
631
 all around the world, and was seen as 
the hallmark of the modern state. Traditional mechanisms of justice were considered a 
threat to central authority and control in the eyes of some governments. This was the 
case in Burundi, where the Bashingantahe courts were abolished.
632
 In the United 
States, the Navajo’s traditional methods of dispute resolution were also discouraged, 
with the imposition of the state’s adjudication methods in 1892.633   
 It is legitimate to fear that such state actions may have a significant impact on 
the existence of traditional and customary mechanisms of justice. Customary 
mechanisms of justice often ended up being pushed underground, and continued to be 
practiced in the shadow of the state. They risked losing their credence and relevance 
to the population.  
 Yet, precisely because customary laws and practices were often subordinated to 
a common system of law during colonial times, these local practices often hold more 
legitimacy and authority in the eyes of the population.
634
 Sriram adds that traditional 
structures continued to evolve even as they were being co-opted by colonial 
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governments or during conflict.
635
 In fact, central and state-sponsored judicial 
systems were, and sometimes still are, often perceived as foreign to the local culture 
and practices and therefore distant from the populations’ beliefs.636 
 Customary mechanisms of justice also face renewed challenges due to the 
severe changes in the circumstances within which they function. While these 
mechanisms were often created and carried out to deal with local, intra and inter-
tribal disputes over theft, beating and matrimonial issues, they are now facing 
challenges of a radically different nature and magnitude. This is the case in a number 
of post-conflict African countries, such as in Rwanda, Uganda, Sierra Leone, 
Mozambique and Burundi.
637
 The Bashingantahe courts in Burundi, for instance, 
were initially designed to settle disputes regarding succession, property, theft and 
family as well as social quarrels. They were capable of dealing with disputes taking 
place at different strata of society.
638
 Now though, the Bashingantahe courts have to 
deal with the atrocities that were committed during the inter-ethnic massacres 
between 1962 and 1992.
639
 While, the courts were first denied their independence and 
authority under Belgian Colonial rule, they have regained vitality in the face of these 
unfortunate circumstances.
640
 Yet, the Bashingantahe courts have had to go through a 
number of changes to be able to deal with the magnitude of cases they have to pursue. 
In 2002, the Bashingatahe Charter was ratified, which formalized a number of 
elements, such as the training of acting members of the courts. These individuals, 
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rather than being chosen for their status and the respect they inspire, must now be 
trained in the areas of property laws, family law, and other legal matters.
641
  
 The Rwandan case is strikingly similar. Rwanda’s gacaca courts were initially 
community courts, which operated during the pre-colonial era, and which were used 
to settle minor disputes over land or cattle.
642
 They were generally composed of 
elders acting as judges.
643
 Gacaca courts were given jurisdiction to hear cases of 
crimes that fit within the first three categories, which include everything from mere 
property offences to more violent crimes, including raping and killing. “Leaders and 
organizers of the genocide… notorious killers who distinguished themselves by their 
ferocity”644 are adjudicated at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.645 
Attendance at the meeting of these courts is sometimes forced upon community 
members and this severely affected the nature of this customary mechanism of justice, 
which traditionally valued and relied on voluntariness.
646
 Gacaca judges, instead of 
being traditional community leaders, are laymen elected by the community, and 
receive only seven days of legal training.
647
  
 In both Burundi and Rwanda, traditional mechanisms of justice have undergone 
significant changes to their function and procedures. Attempts to reform and 
incorporate customary mechanisms into national legal framework have triggered 
substantial debate over the changing nature and authenticity of such mechanisms and 
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the relationship they entertain with state laws.
648
 Some criticism has been directed at 
the format of these modified mechanisms. In the case of Rwanda, Thomson attacks 
the lack of training received by the judges.
649
 Equally worrisome is the view that 
“justice is forced upon ordinary Rwandans in the name of national unity and 
reconciliation.”650 This view is echoed by Drumbl,651 and also by Tiemessen, who 
contends that the “state-imposed approach of command justice has politicized the 
identity of the participants in Gacaca.”652 Participants remain divided along ethnic 
lines. Perpetrators remain Hutus, and Tutsis continue to be perceived as victims of the 
genocide. A common concern and criticism of a number of customary mechanisms 
concerns the of re-traumatisation and renewed hostility that may arise out of poorly 
planned and implemented mechanisms of justice, as it has been showed by the 
Rwandan case.
653
 It appears, therefore, that various states’ attempt at formalizing 
customary mechanisms of justice has severely affected the nature, ownership and 
impact of these mechanisms. 
 The root of the change of these practices can also be identified in the ongoing 
social change that permeates societies. Quinn notes that Ugandan youth living in the 
country’s capital report remarkably less knowledge of, and faith in, traditional 
mechanisms of justice, than their rural counterparts.
654
 A similar concern is echoed by 
Finnström, who writes that “traditional values, cultural knowledge and social 
                                                 
648
 Chirayath, Sage and Woolcock, "Customary Law and Policy Reform," 8-9.  
649
 Thomson, "The Unity-Generating Machine." 
650
 Thomson, "The Unity-Generating Machine," 1. 
651
 Drumbl, "Restorative Justice and Collective Responsibility," 15, 16. 
652
 Alana Tiemessen, "After Arusha: Gacaca Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda," African Studies 
Quarterly 8 no. 1 (2004), 58. 
653
 Staub, "Justice, Healing, and Reconciliation," 27. 
654
 Quinn, "Here not there," 19. 
 150 
institutions of everyday life are threatened.”655 The decline in the use of these 
practices can be attributed in part to urbanization and the resulting alteration of 
“social interactions, institutions, stratification systems, and the elements of culture 
over time.”656 However, while there is justified alarm at the decline of customary 
mechanisms of justice, numbers show that they still occupy an important place in 
communities around the world. In a number of cases, people trust and understand 
these kinds of practices more than they do Western imposed judicial systems.
657
 
These mechanisms are also locally situated, which makes them more accessible, than 
other judicial mechanisms, to individuals living in remote, rural areas.
658
 Most 
importantly, they embody values and beliefs that are commonsensical to the 
population.
659
 Tessler adds that while traditions and traditional practices have 
changed over time, they “retain a place of significance.”660  
 Despite the changes made to the Bashingantahe courts in Burundi, reports claim 
that up to 80% of Burundians take their cases to the Bashingantahe courts as a first, 
and even sometimes only, means of dealing with disputes.
661
 In Malawi, between 80 
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and 90% of all disputes are processed through customary justice mechanisms.
662
 In 
Bangladesh, it is estimated that 60-70% of local disputes are solved through the 
Salish, a local mechanism of dispute resolution.
663
 In Sierra Leone, the general 
population still relies heavily on customary law.
664
 In Liberia, customary mechanisms 
of justice have survived the civil war and, it is said, “remain active in virtually all of 
Liberia’s rural communities.”665 Traditional, customary mechanisms of justice have 
been an essential element in the lives of poor, rural population, which has sometimes 
lost everything else.   
 One justification for the survival and credence of customary mechanisms of 
justice may be that these mechanisms represent deeply embedded beliefs and rituals. 
However, as noted by Quinn, the use of customary mechanisms of justice is not yet 
entirely understood.
666
 While some parts of the international community sees these 
processes as potentially useful in “fostering reconciliation and as a tool of conflict 
resolution,”667 they often continue to perceive them as archaic and backward.  
 
Weaknesses of Customary Mechanisms of Justice 
Chirayath, Sage and Woolcock explain that customary mechanisms are often seen as 
“as undemocratic—lacking democratic accountability mechanisms to induce 
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reform—and lacking in legal legitimacy, authority and enforceability.”668 There is 
fear on the part of development agencies and international organizations, including 
the UN, that the “acceptance of such systems poses the risk of institutionalization of 
low quality justice for the poor.”669 International organizations and scholars worry, 
for instance, about the nature of punishment applied to perpetrators, which can 
sometimes be quite severe. Dinnen mentions the use of “cruel and inhuman forms of 
punishment,”670 while the UK Department For International Development (DFID) 
expresses concerns regarding abuse of power, and customary mechanisms’ “non-
compliance with international human rights standards, such as discrimination or 
inhuman and degrading punishments.”671 Amnesty International is also very critical 
of the ability of some of these mechanisms to respect fundamentals of the rule of law. 
It expresses a number of concerns regarding fair trial standards and due process, and 
more particularly in the case of Rwanda, “questions the adequacy of … training for 
the majority of gacaca judges.”672 Thomson, as well as Reyntjens and Vandeginste, 
echo Amnesty International’s concern vis-à-vis fair trial standards.673  
 One of the most common critiques of customary mechanisms of justice is that 
they are perceived as being “incompatible with economic, social and civil rights, and 
dominant notions of ‘justice’ attributed to the Western notions of law.”674 As a result, 
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the enthusiasm of the international community for these mechanisms has come at a 
cost. Indeed, while the international community and various non-governmental 
partners acknowledge the value and utility of customary mechanisms of justice in 
providing access to justice, they often seek to modify these practices, so that they may 
be “improved” to espouse basic human rights principles. As was the cases in Rwanda 
and Burundi, customary mechanisms have often had to conform to the principles of 
the Western legal tradition, in order to be tolerated.  
 Before going any further, it is important to reiterate that customary 
mechanisms of justice are useful and valuable. They also represent and embody local 
values and beliefs, which we must acknowledge. For this section, a number of cases 
where women’s access to, and experiences of justice ought, rightly, to be questioned, 
and when the legitimacy and authority of those in power, is equally debatable, were 
purposefully selected. This does not mean that all customary mechanisms of justice 
function similarly and present the same challenges. It is worth noting that not all 
customary mechanisms of justice, for instance, marginalize women. Rather, these 
cases provide a selected sample of the kinds of challenges and ethical questions that 
transitional justice scholars must be ready to face when examining customary law and 
mechanisms.   
 
Women and Customary Mechanisms of Justice 
Internationally and officially in many countries, the rights of women are considered 
equal to those of men. The UN Declaration of Human Rights asserts that the “dignity 
and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
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foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”675 The Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women further stresses that: 
discrimination against women violates the principles of equality of rights and 
respect for human dignity, is an obstacle to the participation of women, on equal 
terms with men, in the political, social, economic and cultural life of their 
countries, hampers the growth of the prosperity of society and the family and 
makes more difficult the full development of the potentialities of women in the 
service of their countries and of humanity.
676
 
 
Other documents affirm that all persons should have equal status before the law and 
its institutions.
677
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for 
instance, clearly specifies that: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination 
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection 
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.
678
  
 
Some states have also independently adopted and endorsed national provisions that 
ensure equal protection of men and women before the law. The 2003 Rwandan 
Constitution, for example, specifies that any discrimination, including those based on 
sex, is punishable by law.
679
 The Rwandan government even voluntarily ratified, by 
Presidential Decree in 2004, the Optional Protocol of the African Charter on Human 
and People Rights Relating to Women’s Rights in Africa.680 Article 8 of this protocol 
states that “women and men are equal before the law and shall have the right to equal 
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protection and benefit of the law.”681 It also stresses the need for institutions and 
services that facilitate women’s access to justice and the need to “sensitize everyone 
to the rights of women.”682 Other countries, such as New Zealand, have set up their 
own Ministry of Women’s Affairs, in order to provide policy advice on improving 
women’s lives and continuously monitor the governments’ work in the matter.683 
 In short, there exist a number of international provisions that guarantee 
equality between men and women in all endeavors, not least before the law.
684
 In 
practice, however, the experiences of women in accessing justice, particularly by 
customary means, are not always in accordance with these nationally and 
internationally agreed upon principles, and their rights are not always upheld. It is 
argued that women and their interests have generally been “underrepresented in 
transitional justice processes.”685 Both formal and informal judicial institutions 
present important drawbacks in the matter. Reilly notes that “because they appear to 
be non-adversarial, holistic, and inclusive, informal approaches to transitional justice 
might seem more amenable to recognizing women’s experiences.”686  
 Recent research, however, shows that this is not the case. In New Zealand, for 
instance, it appears that women’s access to, and role in, traditional justice practices, 
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differs depending on their iwi
687
 and that particular iwi’s traditions. In the iwi of 
Tuhoe, women do not get to talk during a hui.
688
 Chant notes that this is not the case 
across the board, and that the iwi of Ngati Whatua has very active and strong female 
leaders who sit in, participate in, and sometimes chair meetings.
689
  
 In Latin America, Sieder and Sierra explain that both formal state institutions 
and indigenous justice systems discriminate against women.
690
 In Yemen, Amnesty 
International notes that “women’s rights are routinely violated because of laws, tribal 
and customary practices treating women as second-class citizens.”691 A similar 
observation can be made in Africa, where a number of “traditional systems are 
patriarchal in nature and often systematically deny women’s rights to assets or 
opportunities.”692  
 Limits on women’s access to, and experiences of, justice can be explained 
both qualitatively and quantitatively. First, women are often affected 
disproportionately by gross violations of human rights.
693
 As mothers, sisters, 
daughters, wives, and often primary caretakers, women are often the ones who bear of 
burden of the economic, social and emotional impact unrest, conflict or state-
sponsored human rights violations have on communities.
694
 In conflict as well as non-
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conflict settings, women are also the victims of gender-specific crimes such as rape 
and sexual slavery. In fact, sexual violence has become a weapon and means of 
oppression.
695
 Rape, for instance, was widely reported during the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina,
696
 and continues to be used today in a number of conflict situations.
697
 It 
is also used in cases where human rights violations are carried out and sponsored by 
peaceful, democratic states. This was the case in Canada, where the Indian 
Residential School Survivors’ Society reported that sexual violence and abuses were 
rampant in the state’s residential school system.698  
 Second, and most importantly for this discussion, women are also 
disproportionately affected by traditions that often place them in a marginalized 
position. Nkiruka Ozoemena explains that “within the context of customary law, most 
women in African society are hugely affected by rules and practices that affect them 
adversely, thereby entrenching gender inequality.”699 In Burundi, for instance, women 
are usually considered the property of men, like their husbands and fathers, and draw 
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their rights from those of the men who possess them.
700
 This understanding is 
reproduced in contemporary Bashingantahe courts whose 2002 Charter specifies that 
“women are invested together with their husbands.”701 A woman, therefore, has a 
limited role in the traditional justice process, and, then, solely in her capacity of wife. 
Similar patriarchal traditions have contributed to the unequal treatment of women 
under the law in Saudi Arabia, where, according to the system of mehrem or male 
guardianship, decisions are taken their behalf by male family members.
702
 In New 
Zealand, protocol regarding the participation and decision-making power of women 
in a hui,
703
 depends on the woman’s own iwi. Arena Williams notes that in Tuhoe, for 
instance, women do not get to participate and share their views in communal 
meetings, beyond the initial karanga.
704
 
 Combined, these two tendencies have an enormous impact on women’s 
experiences with, and access to, justice. Women are sometimes victims of cultural, 
social, physical and economic discrimination, which restrict their access to judicial 
mechanisms.
705
 When they do have access to justice mechanisms, however, their 
experiences are often fraught with difficulties. Customary mechanisms of justice can 
be the direct embodiment of deeply rooted patriarchal traditions. Existing social 
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hierarchies and power imbalances tend to be reinforced in customary mechanisms of 
justice.
706
 As such, they often reproduce the same bias and are not always successful 
in providing a forum for the sharing of some of the traumatic experiences lived by 
women. This is visible, for instance, in Burundi, through the Bashingantahe Charter, 
which reproduced, as explained earlier, traditional patriarchal structures in its neo-
traditional mechanisms of justice. The Afghan customary system of jirga, and the 
Somali system of xeer are another instances where traditions severely affect women 
experiences of justice. In cases of rape or sexual assault, both endorse, and often 
recommend, the transfer of young women from their families to those of their 
offender as a means of reparation or compensation. Young women are simply 
considered family property and currency.
707
  
 As with Afghan and Somali customary laws, Timorese local, traditional law is 
found equally deficient when dealing with sexual crimes. Indeed, it makes little 
difference between the crime of rape and adultery, which are both perceived as 
property offence.
708
 Since women are indistinguishable from their families, amiable, 
consensual outcomes are often reached between the two families, in the name of 
honour, and with little or no consultation with the victims.
709
 In these cases, the 
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harmony of the community and the restoration of the social order take precedence 
over women’s rights and existence.710  
 Human Rights Watch argues that despite the existence of laws governing 
Rwanda’s gacaca courts regarding sexual violence, “deficiencies in the law and in its 
implementation greatly discourage reporting and proper investigation and prosecution 
of these crimes.”711 There is, for instance, insufficient protection of women and 
witnesses of crimes against women who wish to come forward. The lack of training 
and gender sensitivity of judges and authorities can render the process even more 
difficult for women testifying about sexual violence.
712
 As a result, many women and 
girls prefer not to come forward, for fear of stigmatization or retribution. As noted by 
Barfield, customary mechanisms of justice are simply often inaccessible to women, 
since they “lack direct access unfiltered by a male representative, but also because of 
the unwillingness of many informal systems…to consider family and matrimonial 
matters.”713 Justice is not carried out when sexual violence and crimes are neither 
investigated, nor documented and prosecuted. More often than not, sexual offences 
are swept under the rug.  
 
Legitimacy 
As mentioned earlier, international law guarantees equal status to all before the law. 
Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for instance, specifies that 
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“all are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal 
protection of the law.”714 The UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, adopted by the General Assembly in 1985, for 
example, is one of the most detailed legal documents prescribing equal access to 
justice and fair treatment of all, through both formal and informal mechanisms of 
justice.
715
 Yet, despite the existence of international and legal guarantees, customary 
mechanisms sometimes fall short of realizing these ideals.  
 It is clear that customary mechanisms of justice are no panacea. Beyond the 
questionable tendency of these mechanisms to reproduce patriarchal traditions that 
lead to the marginalization of women, customary mechanisms can also be challenged 
on the basis of their legitimacy. Too often, the legitimacy of these practices is based 
solely on their perceived “authenticity” and their perceived relevance to local customs 
and traditions. Yet, traditional processes are sometimes carried out by persons, who, 
“although at first glance, appear to be the justifiable wielders of power, may, in fact, 
be abusing this power.”716 In a report on non-state justice systems in Indonesia, the 
World Bank reveals the power imbalances that sometimes plague these processes. 
The report discusses how these power struggles and disparities affect the quality of 
the justice that is delivered, “leaving the weak open to accepting…unwanted 
resolutions or unable to enforce agreed outcome.”717 This has important implications 
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regarding the legitimacy of these mechanisms, and for the poor and remote 
populations that often resort to their use.  
 Many have expressed similar concerns about the unequal power relations that 
may permeate informal processes of justice. There is, indeed, fear that customary 
mechanisms may reproduce and reinforce “existing power hierarchies and social 
structures at the expense of disadvantaged groups.”718 Research has shown that these 
fears are justified in some cases, where the local elite has managed to capture these 
processes to represent its interests. In Bangladesh, for instance, a group of influential 
men control customary justice practices, known as shalish, as part of the local 
governance structure and agreements.
719
 These men, however, are often connected to 
ruling parties and, therefore, have vested interests in how local affairs are run. Next in 
line are village elders, who often double as moneylenders, and whose impartiality in 
the process must also be questioned.
720
 The Madaripur Legal Aid Association, in 
Bangladesh, has been very active, and involved in trying to set up its own reformed 
shalish courts, using trained professionals, in an attempt to redress these power 
imbalances.
721
 In Rwanda, Amnesty International is concerned with local power-
wielders who manipulate gacaca courts and engineer the capture and imprisonment of 
certain individuals for monetary gain.
722
 These same individuals also often use their 
power and influence to manipulate community participation, including who can talk, 
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and what can or cannot be said.
723
 These power imbalances severely shape local 
justice processes, and may, in fact, undermine communal peace.  
 This is particularly problematic since customary mechanisms put enormous 
emphasis on consensus and communal decision-making. Yet, these power imbalances 
prevent decision-making from being truly communal and consensual when they 
represent the interests of the few powerful individuals that chair customary 
mechanisms. In those cases, the ideal of consensus often translates into the imposition 
of the desire of the few, and serves to “suppress dissent.”724 Customary mechanisms 
of justice, therefore, are not always representative of the communal will and 
preferences. It is important to remember that these processes are supposed to provide 
a forum for the expression of differing opinions with the aim of reaching a consensual 
decision that will satisfy all. The strength of these mechanisms, in fact, stems from 
this participatory and consensual dimension. The International Council on Human 
Rights Policy notes that in the Philippines, communal justice processes, known as 
barangay, are “dominated by lowland Christians and sometimes fail to take account 
of Muslim or indigenous values…leading to conflicts and misunderstandings.”725 In 
Somalia, Le Sage explains that minorities including Bantus and Arabs are “heavily 
discriminated against” within the xeer communal justice processes.726 The views of 
these minorities are simply, and often, ignored.  
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 Customary mechanisms of justice, it appears, tend to isolate those who are 
already in a marginalized position, such as the poor, women and children. As 
explained above, customary mechanisms of justice already have a “tendency not to 
include women in the decision making process.”727 In the name of communal 
harmony, the voices of the marginalized are often further silenced. As noted by 
Wojkowska, “the goal of harmony can be used to force weaker parties to accept 
agreements and local norms, which in turn can result in discrimination against 
minorities and women.”728 In Somalia, for instance, a woman who has been raped is 
generally forced to marry her attacker.
729
 As explained earlier, this is perceived as a 
form of reparation for the family whose honor was violated. The views and fears of 
the victims are disregarded. Marrying a defiled woman to her attacker is deemed to 
strengthen communal bonds, and to protect the harmony and survival of the 
community.
730
 It is, therefore, crucial and important to question who, and whose 
interests, these mechanisms represent. The claim, that the legitimacy of customary 
mechanisms of justice is rooted in the interests of “the people” and the community as 
a whole, is simply not always valid.
731
 
 Finally, the authority and legitimacy of those who chair grassroots, traditional 
mechanisms of justice, also needs to be questioned. The International Council in 
Human Rights warns about the fact that “the stereotype that “community” or 
“traditional” leaders know the local area and people intimately clearly no longer 
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applies.”732 Quinn, for instance, notes the existence of a “disjuncture…between 
government-appointed chiefs and traditional cultural leaders.”733 Under the colonial 
powers, chiefs and leaders were sometimes appointed by the state, rather than chosen 
by community members according to their lineage, as is traditional. According to 
Mamdani, “customary law consolidated the non-customary power of the chiefs in the 
colonial administration.”734 As a result, the responsibilities and source of authority of 
state-appointed chiefs very much differed. The role of clan leaders was undermined. 
In Somalia, “elders themselves began to be perceived as corrupted when Somali 
governments, beginning in the colonial era, started to pay the elders to serve state 
interests in maintaining public order.”735 Urbanization and modernization have also 
brought new challenges to the role of elders and traditional leaders. As outlined 
above, concerns have been raised regarding the relevance of customary mechanisms 
of justice in urbanized areas where the youth may not have strong knowledge of 
traditional practices and values, and where urbanization has severed social 
cohesiveness. In addition, “Westernized returnees from the Diaspora often reject their 
clan’s authority,” thereby renewing challenges to the perceived authority and 
legitimacy of customary law and traditional clan leaders.
736
 In the face of these 
challenges, and in spite of the concerns raised by many international agencies, 
customary mechanisms of justice continue to be used across the world. The World 
Bank justifies this popularity in the inability of state-centered judicial institutions to 
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respond to populations’ needs, and demand for justice.737 Faundez explains that in 
Latin America, indigenous communities view state judicial institutions as the symbol 
and root of their longstanding social, cultural, economic and political oppression.
738
 
As a result, they often prefer to use their own traditional processes, as imperfect as 
they may be.  
 It is important to note that, at no point, does this thesis argue that customary 
mechanisms of justice need to be conditioned by basic human rights principles. 
Concerns raised vis-à-vis the marginalization of women and the powerless serve to 
illustrate some of the difficulties encountered by some customary mechanisms of 
justice, and shared with other judicial mechanisms. Some of the weaknesses identified 
in customary mechanisms of justice, including corruption, legitimacy, marginalization 
of women, lack of accountability, are, in reality “shared with the often under-
resourced and over-stretched state justice systems found in such countries.”739 The 
fact that these mechanisms do not always embody our ideals and conceptions of 
justice, and rarely fully conform to international legal and human rights standards, is 
just another reason for engaging with them.  
 Customary laws, traditions and mechanisms, in fact, often have a profound 
respect for human life. In this instance, they are no different from any other Western-
style mechanisms of justice, which are victims of poor administration, limited 
funding and corruption. Coomaraswamy wrote “tradition, like all memory of the past, 
is full of contradictions and alternatives. What we choose to highlight from the past 
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often reveals more about our judgment than about our ancestors.”740 The lact of 
respect for women’s rights or lack of legitimate authority in some of these customary 
practices is more often a reflection of power imbalence than of the traditional, local 
values, which may, in fact, hold a strong respect for women.  
 This research adopts Thorne’s position when she writes that “if we are seeking 
to guarantee a quality of justice rather than just recreating a formal structure, work 
with the informal structures becomes an imperative.”741 Feminists scholars, such as 
Guerrero,
742
 Gunning,
743
 An'Aim,
744
 for example, all underline the need for better 
respect of women but stress that improvement of women’s situations ought to be 
undertaken from within communities and cultural groups. These changes should not 
be the subjet of the “outside” and the “universal.” As noted by Coomaraswamy,  “if 
cultures are to be evaluated and judged, it must not be from the vantage point of an 
arrogant outsider.”745 An’Aim maintains that there are plenty of women’s groups 
throughout indigenous communities and developing countries, which fight for the 
improvement of their status. The international community’s intervention, therefore, 
should be limited to the support of these local initiatives.
746
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Reaching Common Ground 
Engaging with customary mechanisms of justice is crucial. Transitional justice 
scholarship can and must play a constructive role in the process. As this research 
illustrates, customary law and customary mechanisms of justice continue to be central 
to the lives of many around the world, by indigenous communities in democratic, 
peaceful settings, such as New Zealand and Australia, as well as by the general 
population in post-conflict situations, such as in Burundi, Somalia, Rwanda and 
Uganda. As a result, the effectiveness of these mechanisms in achieving justice ought 
to be a central concern of transitional justice research. Yet the dominant paradigm 
remains anchored in a top-down, legalistic, state-centered approach to doing 
justice.
747
 Over the years, the international community has focused its assistance 
around the recreation, and strengthening of formal state institutions, including courts, 
security forces, and the rule of law. This tendency reflects our own conception, and 
expectations of what justice ought to look like, in other words, “formal, predictable, 
and equitable, with strict procedures and accountability at every level.”748  
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 Generally, however, these ideals do not correspond to local realities and 
preferences. In a number of post-conflict situations, resources are scarce, and the 
judicial system is in shambles. In other cases, such as in New Zealand and Australia, 
indigenous communities sometimes mistrust state institutions, and prefer to rely upon 
their own ancestral practices to carry out justice. There is an undeniably increasing 
trend towards the promotion of customary mechanisms of justice, along with other 
hybrid mechanisms, and legal pluralism.
749
 Unfortunately, this movement towards the 
inclusion of local norms and practices in the promotion of justice and the rule of law 
remains constrained within the legal paradigm afore mentioned.
750
 As a result, 
customary mechanisms of justice are often criticized for not meeting international 
legal standards, including fair standards, transparency, and equality of all before the 
law. It is important, however, to be clear on the criteria used to evaluate such things 
as fair standards, legitimacy and equality before the law, as they may take different 
shapes in different contexts. Evaluating the legitimacy of judicial mechanisms from a 
rational-legal perspective or from a ‘traditional,’ ‘local’ or indigenous perpective is 
likely to wield different results. In the case of New Zealand, for instance, 
Kaumuatuas, as opposed to legally trained lawyers, are perceived as the legitimate 
source of authority when carrying out justice.  
 This study argues that failing to engage with these mechanisms and simply 
disparaging them contributes to the further marginalization of customary law and 
practices, often pushing them underground, rather than assisting them. It adopts Betts’ 
view, which argues that instead of “reifying notions of legal positivism, there should 
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be greater awareness of the cultural and historical contingency of the successful 
application of justice at the local level.”751 This means that transitional justice 
scholars should capture this opportunity to engage with customary law and practices 
in an unbiased and indiscriminatory manner, so as to better understand their 
underlying assumptions. While various customary mechanisms may not embody 
notions of procedural fairness, transparency (in the rational-legal sense) and other 
legal and human rights principles, they illustrate how local populations perceive 
justice. It is important to keep in mind that different legal traditions function in 
various ways, and that “what may appear as a failing—from the perspective of one 
tradition—could well be regarded as a virtue from the perspective of another 
tradition.”752 As argued by Thorne, “there is a case for accepting that the local 
perception of justice [is] equitable in more ways than just the strictly legal one.”753 It 
remains for transitional justice scholars to explore. 
 Transitional justice efforts and scholarship must take into account the specific 
characteristics and attributes of the traditions and practices of the countries in which 
judicial reforms are launched. At the most basic level, credibility, in the eyes of the 
local population, is vital for any institutions and practices, if justice is to be 
successfully carried out. As noted by Le Sage, any justice system that does not take 
into account local realities and needs, as well as engage local stakeholders will most 
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likely fail.
754
 In many of cases, as in New Zealand, Somalia and elsewhere, customary 
mechanisms of justice do not function in complete isolation from state structures, but, 
rather, complement the state’s judicial system in the sense that they fill in the void 
them by it.  
 Again, it is important to reiterate that respecting and engaging with local 
norms and customary practices should not serve as an excuse for the violation of 
some basic rights. Access to, and the right to justice necessitates that the process and 
its outcome be fair, representative, equitable, and accountable to all, in a sense that 
make sense to the local population rather than according to some hightened universal 
standards. For this reason a middle ground must and can be created. For instance, this 
could be accomplished by marrying “the social accessibility, authority and legitimacy 
of informal processes with accountability to the community and the state.”755 This can 
only be achieved with proper consultation with and engagement of community 
members, rather than the imposition of a state-centered approach.  
 In order to reach common ground and start a dialogue about how local and 
customary practices can be both empowered and respectful of the rights all, 
“unhelpful dichotomies such as ‘relativism versus universalism’ and ‘retribution 
versus restoration’ should be discarded in favour of a more nuanced understanding of 
the dynamic relationship between the global, national and local.”756 After all, 
traditions and customary practices are flexible, and always changing, and adapting to 
circumstances. Dinnen notes that respect for human rights is not alien to a number of 
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these customary practices, which are rooted in a profound respect for humanity.
757
 
The altruistic nature of a number of these traditions, coupled with international 
programs designed to raise awareness, surrounding women’s rights for instance, may 
help accelerate change and respect for some of these norms.
758
 Further research on 
customary mechanisms of justice, and the conceptions of justice they embody is 
needed before anything else can be achieved. It may just be that deontological 
approaches to justice and the legalistic understanding of justice adopted by 
transitional justice scholars is simply imcommensurable to the philosophies of justice 
embodied in customary mechanisms of justice. Yet, we must understand these 
practices rather than simply trying to co-opt them. Furthermore, when engaging in 
research on customary law and customary mechanisms, we must not forget the need 
to “turn the lens of observation back upon ourselves and to question the certitude of 
the international legalist worldview.”759 Respectfully engaging and exploring 
customary law and practices may provide transitional justice scholars with the 
opportunity to do just that.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
When working and conducting research with indigenous communities, it is important 
to be aware of the potentially harmful and colonizing effect social science research 
has had, and may still have on these communities.
760
 Early explorers and observers of 
New Zealand put forward distorted images and accounts of Mãori ways and social 
reality. For instance, the Mãori were described as “savage and barbaric”761 and a 
“Neolithic folk.”762 Little was done to engage and understand the Mãori. Mãori 
society was observed and dissected according to unquestioned epistemological 
assumptions, and observations and research were “validated by scientific method and 
colonial affirmation.”763 As a result, it is crucial when researching indigenous 
knowledge and communities to recognize the potentially colonizing effect of 
research,
764
 which has often been used as an instrument in “defining legitimate 
knowledge.”765 
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 For this reason, a research methodology that offered “internal validity from 
the perspective of the community being studied and external validity according to 
accepted norms of research practices” was adopted.766 This was important in showing 
respect for these communities’ values, wisdom and knowledge, which often differ 
from the Western way of knowing and doing things.
767
 Indeed, the Mãori, and 
Aboriginal Peoples elsewhere, have distinctive epistemological foundations that 
frame the way they see the world and how they relate to it.
768
 When thinking about 
“justice,” the questions asked, the solutions sought and the lens used are consequently 
different. 
 Kaupapa Mãori, a Mãori methodology committed to the promotion of Mãori 
knowledge from a Mãori point of view, inspired my approach to this research.  
Kaupapa Mãori is primarily concerned with the transmission and protection of Mãori 
knowledge and heritage.
769
 It asserts the legitimacy and intrinsic value of Mãori 
epistemology and knowledge.
770
 This approach challenges accepted norms and 
assumptions about knowledge and the way it is constructed. It also seeks the 
promotion of Mãori knowledge, from a Mãori point of view.
771
 Kaupapa Mãori 
influenced this research, in that it shed light on the power dynamics that seep through 
research, the construction of knowledge, and “the ways in which dominant groups 
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construct concepts of common sense.”772 This research breaks away from this by 
attempting to contribute to “a body of knowledge that asserts a Mãori worldview as 
legitimate… [and] move toward a greater acceptance of what Mãori see as 
‘successful’ and ‘robust.’”773 
 This study, therefore, employs an interpretive approach to reveal the multi-
faceted dimensions of “justice” rather than one that draws on formal quantitative 
methods.  An interpretive analysis supports the belief that there exist “diverse images 
of reality that need to be understood inter-subjectively,” thereby providing a space for 
exploring and relaying non-Western ways of knowing.
774
 This approach to doing 
research stems from the belief that interpretation permeates every step, and aspect of 
research and social life. All human action is context specific and imbued with 
meaning. As Clifford Geertz put it, “man is an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun.”775 This means that social science and interpretive 
research is about finding meaning, making sense and providing an intelligible account 
of these “structures of significance,” that make up a culture or beliefs.776  
 The interpretive approach to research aligns closely with Kaupapa Mãori in 
its distrust towards any method, approach or theory that claims “a universal and 
general claim to authoritative knowledge.”777 In other words, it recognizes the 
plurality of dimensions and interpretations reality may hold without giving 
precedence to one over another. An interpretive approach values and emphasizes the 
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fact that different ontological and epistemological approaches inform and influence 
the way one comprehends and conceptualizes reality. Different ontological and 
epistemological positions define the kind of questions that are asked and the kind of 
research and findings that are ultimately acceptable. Adopting an interpretive lens 
allowed me to appreciate the necessity for a culturally sensitive approach to doing 
research in indigenous communities and to understanding and making sense of Mãori 
conception of justice.
778
  
 This research used both secondary as well as primary sources. Before, as well 
as during, and after, fieldwork in New Zealand, research papers, field reports, 
conference proceedings, and speeches along with various legal documents available 
in both Canada and New Zealand were collected and analysed. I specifically collected 
documents, legal briefs and research notes that relayed the existence of Mãori 
customary practices and their recognition, or the lack thereof, by the New Zealand 
government. A number of anthropological, historical and linguistic sources were 
consulted to gain a knowledge of the Mãori culture, the colonial history of New 
Zealand and to become familiar with the Mãori language. 
 The Folk Bayesian approach to doing and analyzing research was employed. 
This allowed me to move “back and forth between theory and data, rather than taking 
a single pass through the data.”779 In this way, the evidence gathered through 
ethnographic research helped confirm, test and develop the hypothesis around which 
this study is anchored. Going back and forth through the findings allowed for the 
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refining of the theory and conceptual formulation of an alternative approach to 
justice. 
Three months of ethnographic research were conducted in New Zealand, 
where I acquired a better knowledge and understanding of events as well as local 
customs, behaviours and beliefs that inform the communities’ thinking about 
“justice.” Conducting ethnographic research was instrumental in acquiring a sense of 
the strength, credence and layers of the Mãori culture as well as an introduction to its 
“web of meanings.”780 During my stay in New Zealand, I was affiliated with the 
University of Auckland, where I had access to the university’s library and its 
extensive collection of sources on New Zealand’s colonial history and Mãori cultural 
practices. Auckland, the largest city in New Zealand, was a convenient place to 
contact and interview individuals from a variety of backgrounds. I did, nonetheless, 
travel to the capital, Wellington, where I interviewed a Mãori MP and to Rotorua, 
which has a large Mãori population. During my stay in Auckland, I joined the Law 
School’s field trip to the University’s Waipapa Marae.781 I was invited to visit whare 
whakairo
782
 and was introduced to the symbolism of the meetinghouse and its 
importance in thinking about “justice” and jurisprudence in a way that would 
accommodate a Mãori worldview. I also attended a week-long conference organized 
by the New Zealand Mãori Centre of Research Excellence, on the topic of Indigenous 
Traditional Knowledge, where a number of Mãori academics, activists and 
community members presented their views and experiences. This gave me access to a 
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range of opinions and allowed me to hear the views of some prominent Mãori 
community members who were difficult to reach or refused to be interviewed. 
Throughout, I continued to consult secondary sources and obtained a number 
of unpublished governments briefs and reports from the Ministry of Mãori 
Development as well as the New Zealand Law Commission, which had investigated a 
possible accommodation of Mãori practices within the national legal system. I 
broadened my knowledge of the Mãori culture and history by participating in Mãori 
cultural practices such as Powhiri
783
 and by visiting Mãori communities, families, 
museums and sites of cultural significance to the Mãori.
784
 By visiting and staying 
with Mãori families, I had the opportunity to observe Mãori ways in everyday life. 
This helped me get a deeper sense and understanding of the Mãori culture and its 
credence in contemporary New Zealand society. It gave me a unique vantage point 
from which to experience and witness the things that my Mãori respondents told me 
during interviews. It also allowed me to further appreciate how Mãori principles 
influence their thinking about justice. In addition, I read national newspapers daily to 
get a better awareness of the relationship between the pakeha
785
 and the Mãori and 
recorded daily observations and impression through journaling. 
 Many of the Mãori I approached were often suspicious and initially reluctant to 
take part in the study. I learnt, during these 12 weeks, that conducting research within 
indigenous communities required breaking away from the traditionally held 
observer/subject or researcher/researched approaches to conducting research. 
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Sawatsky explains that conducting research with indigenous communities requires 
“developing relationships rather than being a neutral observer.”786 Mãori would 
sometimes say to me a variation of “Your steps on my whariki, your respect for my 
home, open my doors and windows.”787 In a discussion of this proverb, Barnes 
explains that “information and knowledge cannot be asked for without respecting 
those who choose to share and without an understanding of the responsibilities and 
accountabilities of researchers.”788 One of the implications of this for researchers is 
that gaining access to communities and Mãori knowledge is a slow process. It 
requires gaining trust, showing respect, accountability and giving back to 
communities by “providing a tool for assisting positive transformation of our [Mãori] 
conditions.”789 I did my best to gain my respondents’ trust and respect, and actively 
shared my own French heritage with them, for instance, by teaching an introductory 
French class at a local school. I often traveled to Mãori homes to meet with 
respondents and their families. I found that to be the best way to gain access to 
respondents.  
 I left Canada intending to rely on a directed snowball sampling method to 
obtain interviews with Mãori, once in New Zealand.
790
 I had planned to select an 
initial sample of respondents based on their knowledge and/or experience of the 
processes investigated and the Mãori culture, in the hope that they would refer me to 
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other potential respondents. I started, for instance, by contacting Mãori academics and 
students at the University of Auckland, as well as Mãori governmental officials, who, 
in turn, suggested or introduced me to other potential respondents whose knowledge 
and experiences would be relevant to my inquiry. As outlined above, however, 
obtaining interviews with Mãori proved to be more difficult than I had anticipated. 
Approximately one quarter of the individuals contacted agreed to be interviewed. I 
also found that simply being referred to respondents was insufficient. It was often 
necessary for a previous participant to take me to meet another potential respondents. 
This required participants to take the time, often out of their working hours, to 
personally introduce and recommend me to potential respondents. The Mãori I tried 
to contact all wanted to know who they would be talking to, and as a result, wanted to 
meet with me to hear about my research and my own personal background before 
accepting to take part in my research. And while gaining access to Mãori 
communities and respondents proved to be a slow process, I ended up gathering a 
wealth of information from a broad cross-section of respondents. I obtained 
information and opinions that may not have been publicly expressed and entered into 
contact with less visible, yet equally knowledgeable, individuals. Most importantly, 
part of the information sought out, such as traditional beliefs and practices, is 
inscribed within an oral tradition and therefore only accessible as such 
 The questions asked were purposely open-ended to accommodate a diversity of 
responses. I wanted to know about my respondents’ level of activity within their 
community, their knowledge of the Mãori language and Mãori cultural beliefs and 
practices, as well as their experience and knowledge of customary mechanisms of 
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justice. In a few cases, participants asked that our conversation not be recorded, or 
that their identity remain confidential. For this reason, this work only reveals the 
identity of respondents who agreed to have their identity disclosed. By the end of 
three months spent in New Zealand, thirty-three open-ended interviews with Mãori 
individuals had been conducted.  
 I purposefully chose to interview only Mãori individuals, in accordance with the 
values of Kaupapa Mãori, because I strived to get a glimpse of the Mãori culture and 
conception of “justice” from a Mãori perspective. All participants expressed great 
pride in being Mãori. In total, nine participants were under the age of thirty, and four 
were older than sixty, two of whom were Kamautuas.
791
 It appeared, however, that 
individuals below the age of thirty and above the age of sixty often had only basic 
knowledge of the Mãori language and Mãori culture. Those individuals above the age 
of sixty were the ones who had been more severely affected by New Zealand’s 
assimilationist policies in place well until the Mãori renaissance in the 1970s. Youth 
under the age of thirty also showed huge discrepancies in degrees of knowledge of the 
language and the Mãori culture. As a result, the majority of participants were between 
the ages of thirty and sixty, and were active in several sectors, including academia, 
the judiciary, parliament, tourism. Individuals belonging to twenty different iwi, with 
the majority from Nga Puhi, Ngati Porou, Ngati Whatua, Te Arawa and Tuhoe, were 
interviewed. These iwis are located in the Northern and Northeastern region of the 
North Island. They are all within several hours’ driving distance of Auckland, the 
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only major urban center in the area, which explains why respondents usually lived 
and/or worked in Auckland. 
 183 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
MÃORI HISTORY AND CUSTOMARY LAW 
 
 
Early European explorers of New Zealand ignored the existence of Mãori customary 
law and often viewed the Mãori as a violent people.
792
 In Captain Cook’s words, war 
was considered to be the Mãori’s “principal profession.”793 Eldon Best, one of the 
first European explorers and observers, described the Mãori as an “uncultured,” 
“savage,” “Neolithic folk,” and “barbaric society.”794 His work was reflective of the 
ethnocentric bias of the work produced by early explorers and anthropologists. The 
idea that there were no or few social norms and law in indigenous and pre-contact 
societies was a common and persistent one in European jurisprudence.
795
 Quince 
explains that Europeans brought with them a different system of laws “centered 
around strongly defined notions of individuality” and visible legal institutions.796 
What they failed to see, and later to recognize, was the existence of a complete 
system of beliefs and values regulating social interaction. Tikanga Mãori, or the 
Mãori way of doing things,
797
 became marginalized as the state’s judicial system 
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strengthened its hold and Mãori principles and practices were considered “quaint 
custom, belittled, or ignored.”798 The tumultuous relationship between the Mãori and 
European explorers, and tikanga Mãori, are explored below.  
 This chapter is important for two reasons. First, there have been, so far, very 
few recent and systematic examinations of the Mãori conception of justice and the 
state of tikanga Mãori today. Second, this chapter substantiates, using field research 
findings, the argument that customary law and practices, and in this case tikanga 
Mãori adopt a view of justice that does not easily fit within the existing 
deontological-liberal framework.  
 
Mãori History 
The Mãori were New Zealand's first settlers. It is estimated that the Mãori arrived in 
New Zealand, from Polynesia, about 1000 years ago.
799
 It was not until 1662 that the 
first documented European encounter took place, with the arrival of the Dutch 
navigator Abel Tasman.
800
 This was followed by the arrival of French, British and 
American explorers in the late 17th and early 18
th 
centuries.
801
 New Zealand quickly 
became the centre of a hub of activities surrounding whale trade and hunting.
802
 
While “early relationships between the Mãori and Europeans were usually of mutual 
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convenience and economic benefit,”803 the ever-increasing arrival of explorers 
resulted in a number of violent incidents between the Mãori and the traders,
804
 which 
culminated in the Musket War (1820-1835) and the New Zealand Wars (1845-
1872).
805
  
 In 1840, 540 Mãori chiefs and Captain William Hobson, representative of the 
British Crown at Waitangi, ratified the Treaty of Waitangi, which became the nation’s 
founding document.
806
 It constituted an agreement between the British Crown and the 
Mãori, and established British law in New Zealand, while the Mãori understood the 
treaty as guaranteeing Mãori authority over their land and culture. Different 
understandings of the Treaty, however, have long been the subject of debate and 
continue to affect the politics of today. The treaty, composed only of three articles, 
was written in both English and Mãori, but resulted in vastly different understandings 
of what it precisely entailed.
807
 What may appear, at first, as a mere question of 
linguistics has had tremendous implications for the development of the Mãori-Pakeha 
relationship and New Zealand’s history.  
 While early explorers to New Zealand did not recognize the existence of a 
value-based system of social control, the Treaty of Waitangi did guarantee the 
protection of Mãori culture and customs.
808
 Mãori customary law was also, to a 
certain extent, tolerated under the Native Exemption Ordinance of 1844, which 
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stipulated that the Crown was not required to intervene in Mãori affairs, and, in 
crimes committed against Mãori, by Mãori.
809
 In an a poor adaptation of the principle 
of utu,
810
 and exclusively for cases of crimes committed against Pakeha, the Crown 
allowed any Mãori convicted of theft to pay four times the value of the stolen good in 
lieu of punishment.
811
 The 1852 New Zealand Constitution further specified that 
Mãori laws and customs were to be preserved so long as these were not “repugnant to 
the principles of humanity.”812 Latent to all these legislative acts was the belief that 
“English law and culture were innately superior,” and that customary practices were 
to be subsumed to the dominant culture.
813
 As a result, a mixed measure of “denial, 
suppression, assimilation and co-option put Mãori customs, values and practices 
under great stress.”814 This was particularly visible through land tenure disputes 
between the Mãori and the Crown, which incrementally ignored customary land titles 
in favor of its own statutory claims.  
 Mãori resistance to the British, in the years following the ratification of the 
Treaty of Waitangi, gave way to a set of policies designed to eliminate the Mãori 
identity and unity in the struggle against the colonial powers. For instance, a Native 
School Act was passed in 1867, under which the government set up state controlled, 
secular schools in Mãori communities.
815
 The Act required that only English be 
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taught and used in the education of Mãori children.
816
 Often, corporal punishment 
was used to enforce such cultural and linguistic surrender.
817
 The intensification of 
the New Zealand Wars forced the closure of these schools in 1865, and gave way to 
even more aggressive government policies including the New Zealand Settlement 
Act, which allowed for the confiscation of Mãori land by the government, as a form 
of punishment for rebellion.
818
  
 Despite years of oppression and policies aiming at cultural assimilation, tikanga 
Mãori did not die out. Adherence to this system helped preserve a social system based 
on mutual expectations and collective responsibility, aimed at avoiding dispute.
819
 
The strength of tikanga Mãori comes from the fact that it is not a separate set of laws, 
but rather a worldview and set of beliefs sustained through “the interaction and 
arrangement of the people that are to be the subjects of the law.”820 It survived 
“outside of formalized structures”821 and in “Mãori controlled environments such as 
marae and hui, in a significant number of Mãori homes,” where the state could not 
meddle.
822
 In the words of Quince, New Zealand ended up with a “kind of accidental 
pluralism,” whereby the traditional Mãori legal system continued to operate in non-
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urban areas, without the knowledge and sanction of the state.
823
 Throughout the years, 
the relationship entertained between Mãori customary law and the New Zealand legal 
system has remained ambiguous, with the possibility of giving full and formal 
recognition to tikanga Mãori only ever half-heartedly considered.
824
  
 Dispute and resentment between the Mãori and the increasing number of 
European settlers continued for many years.
825
 Belgrave notes that the ability of 
Mãori to officially exercise customary law and practices has been “restricted by loss 
of resources, by lack of recognition by the courts and by Parliament and by persistent 
and prolonged promotion of individualism and assimilation.”826 With the exodus from 
rural communities to urban centers in the mid-twentieth century, “the long arm of the 
colonial legal system began to be comprehensively extended to Mãori.”827 It was not 
until the 1970s, feeling increasingly economically marginalized, that Mãori started to 
call for the terms of the Treaty to be honored.
828
 The Mãori “renaissance” signaled an 
era of protests and expression of grievances,
829
 which culminated in the creation of 
the Waitangi Tribunal
830
 and Mãori Party.
831
  
 The Mãori “renaissance” also directly contributed to the revival and legal 
recognition of Mãori culture and, by the same token, tikanga Mãori. This revival of 
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Mãori culture and customs took different forms, and was most visible through the 
Kohanga reo and Kura Kaupapa Mãori movements, which promoted Mãori language 
in schools and institutions. Recognition of Mãori customs vis-à-vis land tenure was 
given more serious acknowledgment through the Mãori Land Court and the Waitangi 
Tribunal. Both reviewed and redressed land claims, in the name of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. The 1962 Mãori Community Development Act even established Mãori 
councils and district committees through which Mãori were given the authority to 
employ Mãori customary law by ways of by-laws.
832
 The most significant recognition 
of the value of tikanga and its principles in terms of justice, was the creation of 
Family Group Conferencing (FGC) under the Children, Young Persons and Their 
Families Act 1989, and, to a certain extent, the Sentencing Act 2002.
833
  
 The purpose of setting up FGCs and the Sentencing Act 2002 was twofold: 
First, the New Zealand government sought to address the high number of young, 
usually Mãori, offenders in the legal system and limit recidivism.
834
 Secondly, the 
government saw the restorative conferencing model as a way to reform the existing 
judicial system into “a modern system of justice, which is culturally appropriate,” and 
thereby incorporate some of the values of New Zealand’s indigenous population in 
the legal system.
835
 A report published by the Law Commission of New Zealand 
stated that, in accordance with the spirit and terms of the Waitangi Treaty, “the law 
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and legal and political institutions should reflect the values underlying tikanga.”836 In 
many ways, the creation of FGCs and the derived restorative initiatives proved to be 
“a test case of the ability of the present justice system to adapt to the needs of 
indigenous peoples.”837  
 Today, New Zealand is a bi-cultural nation. It has a diverse, multi-cultural 
population of 4 million people, 15% of which are Mãori.
838
 A number of laws have 
been passed and institutions set up to acknowledge the Mãori culture and the social 
and political difficulties encountered by the Mãori population due to the initial 
colonization and the assimilationist policies of subsequent governments. Yet, despite 
these measures, the Mãori continue to be over-represented in jails, and often have a 
lower socioeconomic status and poorer health than the rest of the population.
839
 While 
the Mãori renaissance of the 1970s has been successful in repositioning the 
legitimacy of Mãori culture and language, it has been far less successful in addressing 
the social and economic inequalities experienced by Mãori.  
 
Tikanga Mãori 
While tikanga corresponds to a widely shared set of beliefs as to what is right and 
wrong, its application or kawa may differ from iwi to iwi.
840
 One must abide by the 
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kawa or protocol of the iwi whose land on which one is standing.
841
 The protocol may 
affect practical aspects of community life,
842
 including for instance, when it is proper 
to call for a hui
843
 or when and whether women can talk during hui.
844
 As a result, 
while the ideals and values that make up tikanga are vastly similar from iwi to iwi, 
Mead notes that “what we see happening when tikanga is put into practice is not 
necessarily the ideal manifestation of that tikanga.”845 This variety in protocols 
between iwi, however, does not preclude the existence of common, fundamental 
values that underpin tikanga Mãori.
846
 
 When asked, 25 out of the 33 Mãori interviewed agreed that tikanga is 
important in thinking about justice in a Mãori way. I was told that tikanga was 
“absolutely essential in thinking about Mãori justice”847 or simply that tikanga was 
justice.
848
 Judge Durie adds that tikanga Mãori can be defined a body of “Mãori 
principles for determining justice.”849 Not abiding by tikanga would have severe 
consequences in communal life and would result in oneself, and one’s community 
“being hurt.”850  
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 In fact, tikanga Mãori is a normative system that prescribes correct ways of 
behaving and processes to use for correcting problematic behavior.
851
 It can be seen 
as a set of principles determining right from wrong and prescribing actions on how to 
deal with it.
852
 Tikanga also includes “measures to deal firmly with actions causing a 
serious disequilibrium within the community.”853 Burrows explains that indigenous 
people around the world have developed various sets of spiritual, economic, political 
and social principles in order to foster their relationships with one another and the 
environment. These principles and conventions, he adds, “became the foundation for 
many complex systems of governance and laws.”854 Tikanga Mãori can be seen as a 
set of principles to determine justice, and is, therefore, generally referred to as Mãori 
customary law.
855
 
 Metge explains that the failure of Europeans to recognize the existence of a 
system of law in the Mãori society was the result of a “defect in the way of 
observation rather than any actual absence of law.”856 They could not see tikanga 
Mãori, an orally transmitted code of conduct and set of beliefs, because they were 
looking for written records of law, duties and rights sustained through formal 
institutions such as courts of law.
857
 The system of social control implied in tikanga 
“was interwoven with the deep spiritual and religious underpinnings of Mãori society 
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so that the Mãori people did not so much live under the law, as with it.”858 Hibbitts’ 
research on what he calls “performance law” is useful in understanding the difficulty 
encountered by Western legal observers when studying Mãori society and customary 
law. Hibbitts writes: 
As a culture that can physically separate contracts, judgments, and statutes from 
their  proponents, we consider law to exist apart from, and indeed above, human 
individuals. This attitude is perhaps best captured in the aspirational phrase “a 
government of laws and not of men.” In performance cultures, however, laws 
and men are virtually coincident. Finding the law generally means finding 
someone who can perform or remember it.
859
 
 
In other words, the law and its practice are inseparable from those who practice it. It 
does not, and cannot exist separate from everyday life and is not captured in any one 
institution or document. The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, for 
instance, found that Aboriginal customary law could not be dissociated from 
Aboriginal culture and way of life and governed “all aspects of Aboriginal life, 
establishing a person’s rights and responsibilities to others, as well as to the land and 
natural resources.”860 In the context of the Mãori, tikanga guides interpersonal 
relationships but cannot be located in one place. Indeed, when it comes to indigenous 
beliefs and laws, there are no tangible written resources to which we can refer for 
study, and “there is sharp caution from the people within the communities against the 
collection and codification” of these beliefs.861 The strength of these conventions and 
norms, as well as their survival, is largely due to their fluidity and adaptability. 
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Tikanga Mãori “has been receptive to change while maintaining its basic beliefs.”862 
As explained earlier, tikanga Mãori is a value-based, ancestral set of beliefs that 
guide everyday action and life in the community. As such, it is extremely flexible 
and, while relying on ancestral beliefs, always adapts and re-invents itself to suit the 
circumstances. It is the adherence to principles rather than rules, which allowed 
tikanga to maintain its cultural integrity and survive.
863
 In the words of one of my 
respondents, the values that make up tikanga “give us our identity.”864  
 In part, what renders tikanga Mãori difficult to observe and translate into 
Western legal thinking is precisely its flexibility and the fact that it is not a “technical, 
standalone system: rather it is part of culture.”865 In other words, it is a “way of life 
that makes law a living concept that one comes to know and understand through 
experience.”866 In this respect, it is strongly reminiscent of Bourdieu’s habitus, which 
can be described as a system of cognitive dispositions acquired through social 
interaction and guiding individual action.
867
 The precepts of customary law, and in 
this case tikanga, “have nothing in common with the transcendental rules of a judicial 
code: everyone is able, not so much to cite and recite them from memory, as to 
reproduce them (fairly accurately).”868 Tikanga Mãori is an integral part of the 
culture, way of life and identity of the Mãori.   
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 “The traditional system of tikanga for resolving dispute still exists”869 and is 
routinely used in some areas of the country. Mãori generally prefer to deal with 
offenses and crimes amongst themselves, without any external state intervention.
870
 
Only a few decades ago, the police rarely got involved or intervened in Mãori 
communities.
871
 Today, while the police are sometimes called, they still do not always 
come to the help of Mãori living in rural communities.
872
 As noted by Stafford, 
“historical legacies of indigenous peoples and police interaction have resulted in… 
feelings of mutual suspicions held by both parties.”873 Mãori often feel disempowered 
and disadvantaged by the judicial system. They are also often distrustful of the police 
forces, which they see as “amplifiers of crimes.”874 That is the police is often 
perceived as being more severe towards the indigenous population than against the 
white population.
875
 Moreover, there exists a shared belief, amongst the Mãori, that 
New Zealand laws and judicial procedures are foreign and imposed legal norms. 
These imposed pakeha laws and mechanisms are considered “part of the mechanism 
of colonization,” that has “shaped and helped create the circumstances which lead to 
much contemporary Mãori offending.”876 And so, as a result of a combination of 
factors, including the police’s attitude towards Mãori communities, the remoteness of 
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some communities, as well as their “know how,” non-urban Mãori communities will 
generally deal with disputes and offenses themselves.
877
  
 Traditional Mãori dispute resolution “is still happening but it is not entrenched 
in the New Zealand legal system. It’s like a parallel thing that we do not want to say 
too much about because it is outside of the legal system and could attract the wrong 
kind of attention.”878 It would be inaccurate, however, to say that all Mãori 
communities and all crimes are dealt with the traditional ways of tikanga. Each iwi 
may deal with crimes differently. The type and severity of offences committed often 
determine whether Mãori community members choose to use the traditional Mãori 
ways or resort to police intervention. For the “everyday type of offending, people do 
not even consider calling the police.”879 Mãori community members often deal with 
offences, such as theft, youth misbehavior and domestic violence, through the marae 
and tikanga.
880
 In some cases, sexual offence is also dealt with at the community 
level, without external judicial or police involvement.
881
 Mãori community members, 
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however, do tend to reach toward more formal legal authorities to deal with severe 
offences including murder, which they do not feel appropriately equipped to deal 
with.
882
 The kawa of the community, as well as the number of people involved in a 
dispute or crime, will also affect the location and the participation of community 
members in the dispute resolution process.
883
 For instance, dispute resolution may 
take place in the marae, when more than one family is involved in the dispute. 
Holding a hui in the marae allows all community members to attend. When a crime 
or dispute is confined to a family, the hui may take place in a home, where the 
process remains more private.  
 Belgrave explains that “an understanding of the nature of customary law has 
become a matter of growing urgency,” for the Mãori have continued to renew their 
demands for Mãori sovereignty under the Treaty of Waitangi, to be recognized.
884
 
Moreover, the rights of indigenous peoples have been recognized under a number of 
international documents, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Political Rights, and more recently the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, which, under Article 34 specifies: “indigenous peoples have the 
right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their 
distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases 
where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international 
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human rights standard.”885 Understanding the principles that underpin indigenous 
customary law, and in this particular case tikanga Mãori is therefore of paramount 
important.  
 To understand tikanga Mãori, we must approach the body of thought and sets of 
beliefs and principles that define it.
886
 The existing scholarship surrounding the 
existence of Mãori customary law and the traditional system of tikanga for dealing 
with offences and dispute, however, is sparse. The work of anthropologists, legal 
philosophers, lawyers and judges, such as Joan Metge, Justice Eddie Durie, Hirini 
Moko Mead, Khylee Quince and Moana Jackson provide the few discussions of the 
concepts and values that make up tikanga. The following section identifies some of 
the chore principles of tikanga Mãori in order to gain an understanding of the Mãori 
approach to justice.  
 
Relational Justice  
Customary and indigenous law is said to originate in social values “expressed through 
the teachings and behavior of knowledgeable and respected individuals and elders.”887 
The principles and beliefs that underpin tikanga Mãori are themselves transmitted 
from generation to generation through korero tawhito, which are a collection of myths 
and stories that “reflect the philosophies, ideals and norms” of the Mãori world.888 
Central to these Mãori norms and ideals is the primacy of kinship. Relationships are 
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of paramount importance to the Mãori.
889
 No discussion of the principles that 
underpin tikanga Mãori can bypass the primacy of relationships, which in turn 
influence and affect the Mãori practice and approach to justice. In fact, tikanga Mãori 
is fundamentally relational, and, just like other indigenous traditions, is centered on 
the primacy of kinship.
890
 
 The importance of relationships is visible through a number of principles that 
Mãori abide by, including whakapapa (genealogical connection) and 
whanaungatanga (human connection). Both point to the strength and importance of 
connections between people and their communities.
891
 While whakapapa is 
concerned with the spiritual, whanaungatanga deals with present relationships and is 
not restricted to the genealogical order.
892
 In other words, both whanaungatanga and 
whakapapa remind each person of the centrality of relationships, both past and 
present, and his or her responsibility towards these. These values, which resonate in a 
number of other traditions found throughout the South Pacific, remind individuals of 
“the importance of group unity and of maintaining relationships.”893 They provide the 
understanding that all Mãori are related to one another and their environment.
894
 As a 
result, it is in the interest of all to act in ways that strengthen and sustain relationships, 
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whether they be with other human beings or with the natural world.
895
 The whanau,
896
 
to Mãori, is “a pivotal social and cultural force,” that gives its members a sense of 
identity and safety.
897
 To many, the whanau is everything.
898
 It is “what we are made 
of”899 and “makes us the way we are.”900 To a Mãori “you are nobody unless you 
belong to a community, to some land and some people.”901 Mãori identity is defined 
by community membership and the relationships that comprise it. 
 According to Huffer and So’o, “Pacific values must be seen in the context of a 
network of social relationships.”902 Indeed, to Mãori and other Pacific Islanders, 
society is seen as a “collective unit meaning everyone within that unit has the 
responsibility of working together.”903 As a result, “connections… must be respected 
and fostered.”904 Mane notes that the creation and maintenance of relationships, for 
Mãori, “is a matter of considerable significance highlighting the required sense of 
reciprocity, accountability and mutual respect.”905 This has important consequences 
on the Mãori practice and approach to justice and requires re-thinking our approach to 
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criminal behavior. Crime is seen no longer as breach of contract and law, but rather as 
a “breakdown in relationships.”906 It must, therefore, be treated as such.907 Implicit in 
the centrality of the whanau and relationships to Mãori is the sense of collective 
social responsibility.
908
 In turn, this sense of interconnectedness and collective 
responsibility, begets active involvement and participation of all community members 
for the well-being of the collective.
909
  
 
Interconnectedness and Collective Responsibility 
The Mãori approach to justice is built around “fundamental values such as 
collectivism and interconnectedness.”910 Mãori “collective identity lends itself to 
collective responsibility.”911 This has important consequences for justice and how it is 
viewed and carried out in Mãori communities. Relationships being the most valued 
element of Mãori social life and worldview, they are the focus of justice.
912
 Justice 
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becomes a way to nurture and sustain relationships. This is strongly reminiscent of 
Ross’ “relational lens” discussed concerning Ubuntu and Aboriginal healing Justice. 
This emphasis on relationships, interdependence and collective responsibility 
encourages us to think of wrongdoing as a “relational event.”913 A crime becomes the 
symptom of “disharmonies within the offender’s relational life.”914 It is therefore the 
relational life of the offender that must explored and restored.   
 Accordingly, one of the first steps in dealing with offences, for Mãori, is to 
uncover the relational ties, each of the parties to the dispute, sustains with other 
community members.
915
 Many indigenous traditions, such as those of the Navajo, 
view a person who harms another as a person who “has no relatives.”916 Accordingly, 
justice is very much about reinstating these relationships. It is concerned with 
“retaining, teaching and maintaining relationships.”917 Only once the relationships 
between the parties to the dispute have been explored, can discussions about why a 
dispute took place and how it can be solved, begin.
918
 Exposing the relational ties 
between the whanau, the offender and the victim lifts the veil of anonymity and 
contributes to accountability. “You know your victims and they know you. That puts 
more of an onus on you for your actions.”919 By the same token, highlighting the 
connections and kinship between all community members serves to demonstrate how 
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the wrong and the pain caused “reverberates through the individual and the 
community.”920  
 This, in turn, directly influences how justice is carried out, and who is 
involved in the process. “Offenders and victims must be seen in the context of 
extended family.”921 After a crime or dispute, people come together, whether in the 
marae or in a home, depending on the severity of the crime, to discuss what has been 
done and what needs to be done. According to the Mãori way, “it is all about the 
collective, rather than the individual.”922 Individuals and their communities share a 
co-dependent and almost symbiotic relationship. This means that when a crime takes 
place, everyone in the community is affected to some degree, because the harmony of 
the community is threatened.
923
 The focus of the process of justice is more than just 
the offender and the individual wronged. Both are “inextricably linked to family, clan 
and culture,”924 thereby giving a kind of derivative responsibility to the individuals’ 
whanau and the wider community. Traditionally, the system of tikanga simply 
attributed “responsibility for wrongdoing on the family of the offender.”925 Because 
Mãori society is largely based on collective responsibility, if an individual member is 
wronged or hurt, the entire whanau is equally liable to redress the harm caused.
926
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“When you hurt one member, you hurt the rest of the whanau.”927 Each member of a 
community will “either feel some sense of having being wronged or some sense of 
responsibility for the wrong.”928 It is, therefore, in the interest of all to contribute to 
the process of justice.
929
  
 This sense of collective responsibility “does not resonate quite so strongly in 
non-Mãori communities.”930 It requires providing support to those who have been 
wronged as well as to those who have wronged.
931
 One is never alone in the Mãori 
world, and that means everyone has to look after one another to sustain the 
community.
932
 This principle of collective responsibility also influences everyday life 
in contemporary New Zealand. “As children, we grow to learn the importance of the 
community and involvement and responsibility.”933 A significant number of my 
respondents appeared to be socially aware and responsible, in that many actively 
contributed, and in some ways, supported community life.
934
 Some individuals 
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admitted to having taken into their homes and raised another family’s child,935 
periodically chairing or attending marae meetings,
936
 or working on the construction 
of a marae for their iwi.
937
 A schoolteacher explained “these are our kids. They’re not 
that family’s or that family’s; they’re all our kids. And all, whoever they are, belong 
to our whanau and we have a social responsibility as a community to help them.”938 
 This sense of collective identity and responsibility urges community members 
to take part in communal matters and decision-making. As a result, the participation 
by and consultation of community members becomes a central element in doing 
justice within Mãori communities, and according to tikanga. This stems from the 
“very real sense that a conflict belongs to the community itself,”939 and constitutes a 
violation of the community’s interwoven relationships and harmony.940  
 
Community Participation and Engagement 
Mãori processes to carry out justice are not a “formal court sitting that a lawyer would 
recognize.”941 When a hui is organized, it is open to all who wish to contribute.942 
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“Whoever may feel that they have an interest” is included.943 There is no audience, 
per se, since everyone is encouraged to participate and share their views.
944
 Hearings 
usually take place in the marae, because it is inclusive of all and represents a neutral 
“place to reconcile difference.”945 During a hui, community members talk through 
things in an attempt explain what happened, why it happened, and to solve the issues 
at hand.
946
 Customary mechanisms of justice use a “talking-out process among 
relatives (by blood and clan)” to reach a practical solution to the problem.947 Justice is 
the result of “what the society…considers to be fair and just.”948 Both parties to the 
dispute must be present to exchange their views and opinions.
949
 Their participation 
and the expression of their interests are central to a process that relies on 
voluntariness.
950
  
 The active participation and contribution of community members to the 
process is an inherent element of a worldview based on the centrality of relationships. 
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“Justice has to be done with the families.”951 The inclusion of community members in 
the process, however, also serves to reinforce the community’s values, and “generates 
a more compelling sense of justice.”952 Holding offenders verbally accountable for 
their wrongdoing is “essential to expressing remorse to the victims,” and facilitate the 
communication of suffering, and possibly apologies.
953
 By participating, the 
community shows its commitment to social stability and harmony. It emphasizes the 
“solidarity of the collective” towards upholding communal well-being and empowers 
community members to make decisions.
954
 Justice, then, becomes a “communal 
asset” to be safeguarded by all.955 On top of regenerating communal values of respect 
and care, the presence of community members in the process contributes to what 
Braithwaite calls “reintegrative shaming.”956 The purpose of reintegrative shaming is 
not to exclude, but, rather, to reintroduce offenders within a supportive network of 
relationships, and discourage further misbehaving.
957
 Shaming helps produce 
compliance with the values upheld by the community and limits potential deviance.
958
 
 The process engendered by tikanga, a form of relational justice, creates a 
venue where “offenders, the victims and their support system get to see how the crime 
has affected each of them.”959 Offenders get to experience justice, as it is not handed 
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down to them, but requires their participation, their commitment and agreement. 
Participation is also entirely voluntary.
960
 The strength of relational justice lies in the 
fact that community participation lends authority to the process and the decision 
reached.
961
 In horizontal and acephalous societies, communities tend to take a very 
active role in the process.
962
 “Consensus development for the resolution of disputes or 
grievances between or within communities” is an important element of these 
processes.
963
 And because all are held accountable by their whanau, which engages in 
the process, parties to the dispute “have to own up to the decision and carry out what 
has been decided collectively.”964 
 Moreover, relational justice is about showing aroha, support and care to both 
offenders and victims, regardless of their actions.
965
 Indeed, the “methods of justice 
reflect the virtues of justice: respect, love, engaging family and community, land, 
elders and the Creator.”966 These values “bind the individual to the group and the 
group to supporting the individual.”967 The exploration of the crime, truth-telling, and 
confrontation between offenders and victims can be emotionally trying, but also 
contributes to the acknowledgment of their experiences.
968
 The support and presence 
of the community also serves to alleviate the pain and contributes to the collective 
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healing.
969
 The sense of interconnectedness and collective responsibility discussed 
previously requires all to engage in the restoration and rehabilitation of those 
affecting by injustice. 
 
Well-being and Rehabilitation 
To Mãori, justice is a way of life, not simply a response to crime. It is houhou rongo, 
literally sewing the seeds for peace.
970
 Justice is “a conversation around living.”971 It 
is an “everyday thing, so you don’t have a special courtroom, special lawyers or 
special language.”972 The way justice is carried out, as a public space for all to 
participate, very much reflects that. In fact, it is argued that justice in indigenous 
communities is “inseparable from issues of social well-being.”973 The occurrence of a 
crime causes a serious imbalance in the community and reflects the community’s 
failure to set favorable living conditions for all. Implicit in the sense of collective 
responsibility that underpins relational justice is the belief that all community 
members are responsible for sustaining community wellbeing. Justice, therefore, 
serves as a means of maintaining or redressing that harmony and balance within the 
community.
974
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 The Mãori approach to justice is essentially holistic and oriented towards the 
maintenance of mutually supportive relationships.
975
 It is based on the belief that 
justice is about healing the person who has wronged, the person who has been 
wronged and the entire network of relationships affected by the harm caused. As 
such, it seeks to deal with harm in its entirety, while recognizing the centrality of 
emotions.
976
 The emphasis on healing is the “necessary manifestation of a 
[indigenous] world-view.”977 Zion notes that indigenous justice “attempts to reach 
into the mind.”978 Justice cannot succeed and heal without dealing with the person in 
his entirety.
979
  Justice is about healing the spiritual, emotional, physical or mental 
imbalance in the person, and goes beyond the legal sphere. It allows one to “fix one’s 
spirit.”980 This means that justice is not simply about redressing a wrong and restoring 
a balance, but it is also about healing those involved.
981
 It can only be successfully 
achieved if it restores the “spiritual, emotional and physical balance within the social, 
environmental, and cosmic sphere.”982  
 Relational justice requires working “collectively in a manner to help rebuild 
the person that has done wrong. It is a daily process of doing things together, and 
surrounding that person with normality, to show them caring and aroha.”983 In turn, 
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healing those directly affected by wrongdoing contributes to the well-being of the 
entire community.
984
 Healing the harm provides the opportunity to “transform 
suffering and root causes of harm… to cultivate conditions of respectful living within 
the interrelated aspects of the self, other, communities, social structures, environment 
and spirit.”985 Viewing justice through a Mãori lens leads us to focus on relationships 
as the source of restoration and rehabilitation for individuals affected by a dispute or 
crime. Mãori justice is not about retribution, but about restoration and 
rehabilitation.
986
 This “derives from long held indigenous customs in which 
kin…seek to meet the need if all involved in a harm situation.”987 
 At a hui, “the basic question asked is what happened and how can we fix 
it?”988 The discussion engaged at a hui help to identify the reasons that led a 
community member to wrong another member,
989
 provides a space for exploring and 
“understanding what made offenders do what they did, who they are, where they 
come from.”990 Justice, therefore, is sought when the community tries “to restore that 
balance within them and between the individuals involved in what happened.”991 This 
is done in accordance with the principle of utu, which emphasizes reciprocity and the 
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maintenance of harmonious relationships between members of society.
992
 Whatever 
harm has been caused by an item being stolen or damaged, for instance, must be 
returned or repaired.
993
 The kind of reparations must fit the circumstances and needs 
of all parties, keeping in mind the collective concern for harmony and balance.
994
 
 Because all community members are considered integral and essential parts of 
a collective, “it is not as simple as just removing [offenders.]”995 The emphasis 
remains on restorative penalties, such as community service.
996
 This approach is 
based on the understanding that removing someone from the community, such as 
sending him through the penitentiary system, does not mend relationships or 
contribute to healing the harm. It is, on the contrary, more likely to cause further 
suffering and victimization for all involved.
997
 Removing someone from the 
community would also signal a break in communal relationships and result in 
additional imbalance. It would absolve the Mãori notion of collective responsibility, 
which bestows responsibility on all community members, for the wrong committed 
by one.   
 The Mãori approach to justice is clearly embedded within a kinship-based 
tradition that highly values principles of collective responsibility, social harmony and 
well-being. Dyhrberg argues that “central to Mãoridom is the right and the 
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responsibility of a community to care for its own, and to seek… solutions to its social 
problem.”998 Over the years, Mãori have remained critical of New Zealand’s formal 
legal apparatus, which many viewed as a “system imposed upon them by an 
aggressive colonizer,”999 and which incessantly worked against indigenous 
communities and their rights.
1000
 The existing legal system never fully empowered 
Mãori communities to take care of their own, according to their own traditions and 
beliefs.
1001
 Despite the increasing number of Mãori going through the criminal justice 
system, New Zealand’s formal legal system continued to uphold Western judicial 
values and to adjust to the needs of the Pakeha society.
1002
 Upon mounting criticism 
from Mãori communities that the existing legal system “was wholly foreign to its 
traditional values and destructive of the kinship networks essential to Mãori society,” 
Family Group Conferencing was set up.
1003
 The FGC model put in place by the New 
Zealand government is often said to epitomize the restorative justice approach.
1004
 It 
is also frequently presented as a Mãori process.
1005
 Judge McElrea goes as far as to 
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claim that the restorative model employed by FGCs is the “direct descendant of the 
whanau conference long employed by Mãori people.”1006 
 In fact, part of the debate surrounding restorative practices and traditions 
concerns the “claims that restorative justice draws on traditional processes for 
resolving disputes among indigenous peoples.”1007 Daly has coined this the “myth of 
origin,” according to which restorative justice “uses indigenous justice practices and 
was the dominant form of pre-modern justice.”1008 Restorative justice practices and 
indigenous approaches to justice are often seen as one and the same. As mentioned 
earlier, a common assumption, in the case of the New Zealand restorative 
conferencing model, is that the practice is rooted in Mãori culture.
1009
 This belief is 
particularly striking in that it reveals a lack of understanding of the cultural, social 
and spiritual principles that underpin Mãori society and its approach to justice. 
Hakiaha expresses concerns at the New Zealand government’s use of Mãori 
principles, which may result, in his view, in “the dilution, bastardization and 
disenfranchisement of these revered and sacred principles.”1010 This amalgamation of 
restorative justice practices and indigenous approaches illustrates the worrisome 
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propensity to romanticize and homogenize indigenous philosophies and practices.
1011
 
The ongoing attempt to include and represent Mãori values in the legal system, 
according to Jackson, only serves to “capture, redefine and use Mãori concepts to 
freeze Mãori cultural and political expression within parameters acceptable to the 
state.”1012 The tendency to equate the FGC restorative model with the Mãori approach 
to justice, in his view, is simply part of the continuing history of colonization and co-
option of Mãoridom.
1013
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CHAPTER NINE 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND TIKANGA: A COMPARISON 
 
 
As the restorative justice model continues to attract attention as a potentially healthier 
alternative to the criminal court system, concerns have been raised regarding the 
extent to which restorative mechanisms can accurately represent indigenous practices 
and philosophies of justice.
1014
 Often, the restorative approach to justice is said to 
have its roots in customary practices, such as healing circles used by American and 
Canadian Aboriginal communities.
1015
 Yet, as mentioned above, a number of 
indigenous scholars and Mãori communities have expressed concern regarding this 
tendency to equate, in this particular case, tikanga, with the restorative justice 
philosophy and the family group conferencing model launched by the government. 
This chapter examines this issue by carrying out a comparison between New 
Zealand’s FGCs and the practice of tikanga, as restorative justice mechanisms. It is 
argued that even though both mechanisms appear to adopt similar approaches to 
doing justice, for instance, by putting emphasis on active participation of victims, 
offenders and the community, their underlying values differ significantly.  
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Principles of Restorative Justice Practices 
There are a variety of understandings regarding what restorative justice practices 
entail. They are usually described as being “more humane, participatory, inclusive, 
need-meeting and effective response to state-defined crime.”1016 Marshall depicts 
restorative justice as a “process whereby all parties with a stake in a particular offence 
come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the 
offence.”1017 The UN also recently adopted its own, and rather all-encompassing, 
definition of restorative practices as “any process in which the victim and the offender 
and, where appropriate, any other individuals or community members affected by a 
crime participate together actively in the resolution of matters arising from the crime, 
generally with the help of a facilitator.”1018 
 Restorative justice is often presented as a social movement,
1019
 and an 
alternative to the adversarial approach of the court system, which “prefers inclusive, 
collaborative processes and consensual outcome.”1020 While restorative principles are 
said to have roots in indigenous cultures and non-state societies, the scope of 
restorative justice has expanded considerably to include a number alternative dispute 
resolution processes.
1021
 Roche argues that restorative justice has become a “unifying 
banner sweeping up a number of informal traditions of justice and capturing the 
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imagination of many of those interested in reforming the criminal justice system.”1022 
In fact, the rather broad definition adopted by the UN, in its Handbook of Restorative 
Justice Programmes, reflects this tendency to subsume a wide range of judicial 
practices under the restorative justice category. This has resulted in a lack of 
consensus regarding the nature of restorative justice, and the processes that are said to 
embody restorative values. This may be due to the fact that, as Zehr warns, restorative 
justice is “a compass, not a map,”1023 and is used freely to designate a number of less-
retributive practices put in place in parallel to traditional court systems.  
 Building on the existing literature and the discussion of the restorative justice 
approach presented above, this chapter lists four elements generally associated with 
restorative practices, namely (a) active participation and engagement, (b) community 
involvement and ownership, (c) informality and flexibility and (d) restoration. These 
are recurrently identified as elements that feature through restorative mechanisms, 
such as the family group conferencing model in New Zealand. This chapter will then 
look at how these four elements feature in FGCs, and how the nature and 
implementation of these elements substantively differ in the Mãori tradition. Doing so 
will help highlight some of the similarities and differences that underlie both the FGC 
and the Mãori approach to justice. 
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Active Participation and Engagement  
Restorative processes encourage the attendance and participation of both parties to the 
dispute.
1024
 These processes are supposed to provide a space where victims and their 
offender(s) can discuss a crime and explore how it has affected each of them.
1025
 It 
gives victims and offenders an opportunity to participate in and interact with the 
process, in a respectful and less antagonistic manner. This, in turn, is more conducive 
to the expression of grievance and to reconciling both parties. Most importantly, 
restorative justice is concerned with identifying the harms and needs of those affected 
by a crime, as well as dealing with the obligations that stem from redressing it.
1026
 
Victims and offenders are empowered by a process that is less alienating and that 
gives them a voice and a choice in what they expect from justice.
1027
 The restorative 
process often encourages a face-to-face encounter between the parties to the crime, in 
an attempt to encourage truth-telling and foster acknowledgement and 
reconciliation.
1028
 Restorative justice practices also “rely in large part upon voluntary 
cooperation” between victims and offenders.1029 The non-coercive aspect of 
restorative processes is an important contributing factor in facilitating 
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acknowledgment, and in encouraging offenders to take responsibility for their 
actions.
1030
 
 
Community Involvement and Ownership 
The participation of the community in the process is also central to the effectiveness 
and uniqueness of restorative justice. Restorative justice processes give any crime a 
“social context,” and stresses viewing the incident as an issue to be fixed 
collectively.
1031
 The presence and support thereby provided by the community is 
supposed to render the process less stigmatizing for all affected by it.
1032
 Restorative 
justice practices are described as being generally “community driven and 
controlled,”1033 implying that the community ought to have ownership in the process. 
The community, for instance, ought to actively participate in the decision-making 
process with regards to the measures to be taken for redress and restoration. Indeed, 
the restorative approach to justice recognizes the “role of the community as a prime 
site of preventing and responding to crime and social disorder.”1034 The participation 
of the community renders the process more powerful and effective, in that it signals 
the community’s commitment to justice and contributes to the shaming process, 
which is itself inherent to restorative practices.
1035
 Frank also notes that survivors’ 
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narratives shared with the community are critical because “it does not simply affect 
those who receive it; testimony implicates others in what they witness.”1036 The 
community is caught in the dispute and thereby forced to take action.
1037
 In this 
respect, restorative processes engage the community in “the rehabilitation of 
offenders and victims.”1038 
 
Informality and Flexibility 
Restorative processes are often described as being more flexible than existing 
retributive mechanisms that are entrenched in states’ legal apparatus.1039 This 
flexibility and relative informality, compared to the court system, allows these 
practices to respond to the needs of the victims and accommodate their personal 
experiences. Braithwaite explains that restorative processes are to address “whatever 
dimensions of restoration matter to the victims, offenders and communities affected 
by the crime.”1040 The United Nations considers the restorative process more suitable 
to deal with a variety of offences, precisely because of the flexibility of the 
process.
1041
 The process can be re-organized in a manner which suits both the type of 
offences and the needs of the victims in dealing with harm. In a way, this enables the 
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exploration of events that may not be directly relevant to the crime investigated, but 
related to its underlying causes.
1042
  
 Restorative processes must also remain flexible enough to deal with a variety of 
cases and circumstances. Sexual offences and theft are substantively different, and 
will, therefore, require different responses and means to deal with the psychological 
and emotional impact on the victims. Johnstone explains that the type of restitution 
offered by the offender will be chosen “not by professional sentencers, but by the 
victims and offenders” in a way that will suit them both.1043 The flexibility of 
restorative practices is, as a result, more likely to allow for an outcome that will 
satisfy and correspond to the needs of all those affected.  
 
Restoration 
One of the central tenets of restorative justice is the rehabilitation and restoration of 
those primarily affected by harm, and those close to them. It requires facing the legal, 
emotional and physical impact a crime has had on those party to it. The flexible 
nature of the process previously identified is a useful asset in the restorative process, 
as it allows the process to be adjusted to the needs of the participants. Indeed, 
restorative practices provide room for participants to devise ways of addressing harm 
in a manner that they understand and prefer. The attendance of victims and offenders, 
as well as community members, also factors in the restorative process. Indeed, the 
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sharing of experiences directly contributes to restoring dignity to the victims.
1044
 The 
dialogue-engaged offenders, victims and their community is said to have a therapeutic 
impact on all.
1045
 Marshall notes that this is most visible for offenders who have to 
“face up to the reality of what they have done.”1046 At the same time, acknowledging 
the experiences of the wrongdoers is a “crucial step towards their taking 
responsibility and being accountable for their actions.”1047 They can also actively take 
part in the restoration of victims and their own rehabilitation, to a certain extent, 
through reparation and restitution. The nature of the reparation is determined through 
a consensual process between the parties, thereby empowering them all.
1048
 The 
restorative process strengthens and heals communities by restoring a sense of safety 
and respect, as well as by rehabilitating both victims and offenders.
1049
 Howse and 
Llewellyn add that addressing and preventing the alienation of offenders upon their 
return to communities, is an important aspect of restorative justice, that differentiates 
it from other mechanisms.
1050
 
 Active participation and engagement, community involvement and ownership, 
informality, flexibility of processes and restoration are, therefore, generally 
considered attributes of restorative justice practices. Together, they form the 
restorative justice umbrella, under which Family Group Conferencing and tikanga are 
often placed. Daly warns against putting “different types of innovative justice 
practices under one umbrella,” and stresses the need to pay attention to the significant 
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differences that underlies all these so-called restorative mechanisms.
1051
 The next 
section examines how these four restorative elements feature through the family 
conferencing model set up by the New Zealand government, before carrying out a 
similar examination of tikanga in a subsequent section. Doing so will help emphasize 
and highlight how each of these four attributes of restorative practices are interpreted 
and implemented differently in theory and practice, and according to cultural 
sensibilities. 
 
Restorative Justice in New Zealand 
The New Zealand criminal system, as an adversarial legal system, is antithetical to the 
values embodied in tikanga Mãori and its practice.
1052
 Yet a number of efforts have 
been made to introduce and reflect some of the values of tikanga under the cover of 
restorative justice. Family Group Conferences represent an important attempt of the 
New Zealand government to breakaway from its traditionally adversarial and 
individualistic approach to justice, specifically when dealing with young offenders 
between the ages of 14 and 17.
1053
 The FGC was also the first restorative program set 
up and entrenched in the criminal justice system of New Zealand, under the Children, 
Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989.  
 A Family Group Conference is a meeting convened by the Youth Court, where 
the young offender and his immediate family, the victims and his representative as 
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well as a police officer, social worker or other state mediator, meet. During the 
hearing, the young offender is first expected to admit the offence committed. Only 
then, can the meeting proceed to a discussion about the reasons for offending, its 
impact and solutions to be agreed to by all parties.
1054
 The Family Group 
Conferencing Model is considered the “lynch pin, and the jewel in the Crown of 
Youth Justice in New Zealand.
1055
  
 One of the main criticisms of FGCs was that, in spite of the government’s 
efforts, these processes failed to include Mãori practices and principles in 
conferencing.
1056
 Moana Jackson criticized existing attempts at introducing Mãori 
values in the judicial system for simply “continuing the historical trend whereby 
whatever form Mãori justice practices take is co-opted by the state.”1057 While the 
government of New Zealand boasted about how FGCs could “better cope with 
cultural diversity,”1058 it did little to actually include tikanga in their practice. FGC 
hearings, for instance, were most commonly held in government offices,
1059
 and did 
not incorporate many elements of the traditional Mãori legal system, including the 
presence and leadership of Mãori elders. The schism between FGCs and the practice 
of tikanga will become evident in this chapter’s examination of both mechanisms.  
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 Since the creation of FGCs, and in an effort to enhance and further develop the 
conferencing restorative model, the government has launched a number of other 
initiatives, sometimes on an ad hoc basis.
1060
 These initiatives include several pilot 
projects, such as the New Zealand Court Referred Restorative Justice Pilot, which 
specifically targeted adult offenders.
1061
 More recently, some youth court hearings 
and FGCs were moved to maraes under the Rangatahi Courts Initiative. The first one 
of its kind was set up in Gisborne in 2008.
1062
 As of August 2010, only 6 Rangatahi 
courts had been set up across the country.
1063
 Essentially, Rangitahi are a form of 
tikanga infused FGCs. A judge, familiar with the principles of tikanga, and local 
marae elders chair the hearing. The process is similar to that of FGCs, but takes place 
on the marae and follows the protocol of tikanga Mãori.
1064
 This means that 
participants may start the meeting with a karakia
1065
 and recite their whakapapa.
1066
 
This initiative was launched to “better link Mãori young offenders with their culture 
and the local Mãori community,”1067 and to further integrate Mãori values into the 
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conferencing model.
1068
 Indeed, a common assumption amongst Mãori is that one of 
the reasons for the high rate of young Mãori offending is their disconnect from their 
own communities and culture.
1069
 It appeared, therefore, logical that reconnecting the 
youth with their heritage when carrying out justice, would contribute to reducing their 
chances of re-offending.  
 FGCs, representing the New Zealand government’s first statutory attempt to 
become more culturally sensitive and include Mãori values in the legal system 
through restorative practices, are of critical importance to this study.
1070
 They are also 
the template used by the government to develop restorative programs and initiatives. 
Other pilot projects, such the Rangitahi Courts initiative, heavily borrow from the 
FGC model, and are often too recent to be examined in much depth. Most 
importantly, FGCs having been in operation nationally since 1989, have been subject 
of much scrutiny, and “judgments can be made about its [FGC model] ability to 
deliver what it promised in its early years.”1071 For this reason, the FGC model is 
considered a benchmark of the restorative justice approach espoused by the New 
Zealand government, which is used, here, to compare to tikanga. 
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Active Participation and Engagement  
FGCs encourage the attendance of the victim and the offender along with the 
immediate family members of both.
1072
 The participation of both parties is central to 
the process, and is what differentiates it from mainstream criminal procedure. Their 
participation contributes to the “inclusive, informal, and dialogic nature of the 
FGCs.”1073 It is expected that by listening to each other’s points of view and 
experiences and collaborating throughout the conferencing process, the offender may 
feel “genuine remorse” and make amends.1074 The victims, in turn, have their 
experiences acknowledged and validated, which contributes to the healing process. 
The Ministry of Justice maintains that FGCs “can be an effective way of holding 
young people accountable for their actions.”1075 The onus throughout the process is on 
the individuals who are parties to the dispute and who must take responsibility. The 
role of immediate family members is limited to that of emotional support.  
 Judge McElrea claims that FGCs are most likely to produce “responsible 
reconciliation,” whereby both sides to the dispute collaborate and share responsibility 
for the crime.
1076
 However, this emphasis on individual responsibility “cuts against 
any conception that an individual is accountable to… and works in relation to social 
groups,” as in the case of the Mãori.1077 Furthermore, it is important to note that, in 
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accordance with the principle of voluntariness, victims may choose not to attend 
family group conferencing and send a representative in their stead.
1078
 A youth 
advocate may also be present to advocate on behalf of the young offender.
1079
 In such 
cases, the nature of the process is altered, since the strength of restorative justice 
processes comes from the physical presence, and direct and active engagement of the 
parties to the dispute and their families.
1080
  
 The fact that the entire process, and its organization, including the participation 
of the parties to the dispute, is entirely directed and orchestrated by a youth 
coordinator is however, problematic.
1081
 A study conducted by Morris and Maxwell 
demonstrated that almost half of the participants did not feel actively involved in the 
process, and felt that “decisions had been made about them, not with them.”1082 A 
follow-up study questioned the degree to which FGCs empowered their participants. 
Indeed, findings showed “evidence that… professionals dominated decision-
making.”1083 Often, the engagement and participation of offenders was virtually 
limited to the initial admission of guilt and exploration of crime-related facts, but 
went no further. As a result, it could be argued that the participation and engagement 
of the parties to the dispute in FGCs are, at best, superficial. 
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Community Involvement and Ownership 
The presence of family members, in accordance with restorative justice principles, 
serves in part to re-introduce the element of shame to the existing “antiseptic model 
of justice.”1084 A police officer, social worker, and a youth justice coordinator, who 
chairs the meeting, are also present.
1085
 The role of any state professionals involved is 
supposed to remain low key. They are to contribute to the discussion, when needed, to 
make sure that all issues are explored, and that the final decision respects the wills of 
all those involved, as well as the law.
1086
 According to McElrea, a staunch supporter 
of the Family Group Conferencing model in New Zealand, FGCs represent “another 
way to do justice, one which can promote the acceptance of responsibility and by a 
consensual process seek to heal the wounds caused by crime.”1087  
 While there is no explicit limit on the number of persons who can attend,
1088
 
FGCs generally do not include more than 12 individuals and are closed to the public, 
thereby restricting the participation of the rest of the wider community.
1089
 Immediate 
family members are allowed to share their opinions only privately during the family 
caucus, during which the offender and the victim develop separate proposals to bring 
back to the meeting.
1090
 Haines warns against a “victim-offender axis” of 
participation, without the proper involvement of the community, which in his view 
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results in nothing more than a traditional legal process disguising as restorative 
justice.
1091
  
 In this respect, the extent to which community members are involved in FGCs 
is questionable. Community attendance is limited to close family members, who have 
little say and no decision-making power. The community has no ownership of the 
process. FGCs are still very much entrenched in the existing judicial system. The 
Youth Court must endorse every decision agreed upon at FGCs.
1092
 The Youth Court 
also has the power to demand that an FGC be reconvened if the court does not deem 
the final decision appropriate or to be in accordance with the law.
1093
 This reliance on 
the state apparatus and authority is problematic for Mãori, who see the seeds of 
change in the legal system in the “restoration of authority to the community and a 
transfer of the focus from the individual to the group.”1094 
 
 Informality and Flexibility 
FGCs are meant to be more flexible than traditional courts of law.
1095
 Such flexibility 
is needed so that conferencing may accommodate the needs of the participants, and 
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the types of offenses dealt with.
1096
 It is evident, for example, when victims chose not 
to face their offender, if they do not feel comfortable.
1097
 The relative flexibility of the 
process also allows participants to share their experiences and views with reasonable 
freedom in comparison to the court system. They are expected to engage in a 
discussion on how best to redress the crime, and reach consensus on the penalty.
1098
 
In an effort to remain culturally sensitive, FGCs may be also convened on a 
marae.
1099
  
 Despite their relative flexibility, FGCs usually do follow certain required steps. 
The young offender, for instance, is required to admit to the offence, if conferencing 
is to continue.
1100
 Conferencing also must be convened within a statutory 
timeframe.
1101
 At the beginning of each conferencing, a youth justice coordinator is 
expected to explain the procedure and requirements of conferencing to both parties. 
Then follows an exploration of the crime committed, the reason behind the crime, and 
its effect on the victim.
1102
 Meetings last between one and two hours at the most,
1103
 
which does not allow for an in-depth exploration of the crime and its impact on the 
community. The principal objective of FGCs is to formulate, in accordance with the 
law, and the need of the victim, “a plan about how best to deal with the offending,” 
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keeping the ideal of restoration in mind.
1104
 The final decision must reflect the 
agreement between the young person and the state’s representatives.1105  
 It appears the state ownership of FGCs affects the flexibility of the process and 
the extent to which it can accommodate Mãori expectation of a community-based 
justice. The presence of state representatives and the state’s continued control of the 
process fail “to enable outcomes to be reached which were in accord with Mãori 
philosophies and values.”1106 Indeed, the conferencing model that exists, despite its 
collaborative nature, continues to function within a formal hierarchical structure with 
the state and its representatives clearly managing the system.
1107
 The degree of 
flexibility of FGCs is significantly restricted by their embededness “within the formal 
justice apparatus.”1108 
 
Restoration 
One of the stated objectives of FGCs, beyond reducing the rate of re-offending,
1109
 is 
to “promote the healing of the victim and the reintegration of the offender.”1110 The 
healing process is supposed to be facilitated by the potentially inclusive and 
collaborative nature of FGCs. The contextual exploration of facts surrounding the 
crimes gives both parties the opportunity to understand the causes for offending and 
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the harm it caused.
1111
 Research shows that victims’ sense of justice was usually 
higher for those who attended FGCs than courts.
1112
 FGCs’ approach to the idea of 
restoration favors the implementation of diversionary programs where young 
offenders do not have to be charged and prosecuted.
1113
 More often than not, FGCs 
put forth a plan of action, agreed upon by both parties and state representatives, which 
specifies the penalty incurred by the offender and the reparation to be provided to the 
victim. The agreement usually includes some form of apologies, financial payment or 
community work.
1114
 In serious cases, however, imprisonment and other court-
imposed sanctions can be chosen.1115 
 A number of concerns have been raised regarding the degree and nature of 
restoration offered by FGCs. Haines explains that, from a young person's point of 
view, the conferencing model can be no different from courtroom proceedings since 
both involve facing "a room full of adults."
1116
 Often, the participation, empowerment 
and the resulting rehabilitation of the young persons will depend on the professionals 
involved, their knowledge of FGCs, and their ability to encourage participation.
1117
 
Research also found that often “promised outcomes have not been delivered.”1118  
 While FGCs appear to effectively encourage young people to take responsibility 
for their acts, and diverting them from the traditional court system, they are far less 
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successful in following up and facilitating the rehabilitation of young persons 
involved. Indeed, the kind of restoration offered to participants is often a legal one, 
which simply seeks to divert young offenders away from the penitentiary system. The 
psychological, emotional and social dimensions of young offenders’ rehabilitation are 
generally left unaddressed.
1119
 When provisions are made concerning the educational 
or social rehabilitation of young offenders, they are, too often, not implemented.
1120
  
 
Tikanga and Restorative Justice 
The Family Group Conferencing model set up by the New Zealand government does 
share some similarities with Mãori processes, notably its focus on restoration and 
consensus.
1121
 It is important to note, however, that the principles that make up 
tikanga “hardly ever correspond exactly with those Western concepts which they 
appear, on the surface, to resemble.”1122 Rudin explains that even though restorative 
justice practices and various indigenous traditions share commonalities, there are also 
“substantive differences that are not always as readily recognized.”1123 This section 
explores how the four restorative justice elements identified earlier feature in tikanga. 
This will help bring to light the substantively different understandings of the nature 
and role of the community that underpin the Mãori approach.  
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Active Participation and Engagement  
The principles of inclusiveness and active participation are central to the Mãori 
approach and expectation of justice.
1124
 In the aftermath of a dispute, all parties, 
including their support systems, are expected to take part in a hui to discuss the harm 
caused to the community and its members. Throughout the process, each side gets to 
express its pain, grief and resentment. The offender explains the reason for his action 
and gets to see the suffering it has caused on the victim, and the community. 
Likewise, the victim gets the opportunity to face the offender and to gain an 
understanding of the reasons behind the crime. Throughout the process, everyone 
(victim, offender and community) is engaged in a respectful discussion around living 
together, and redressing the imbalance caused by the dispute.
1125
 An amiable 
outcome, agreed to by all parties, is sought.
1126
 The purpose of this exercise is to 
uncover the roots and contextualize the causes of harm, so as to better heal it.
1127
 It 
also serves to remind both parties, of the humanity of the other, and of their 
“connectedness as relatives” and members of the same community.1128 By putting 
emphasis on the connectedness between offenders and victims as community 
members, tikanga emphasizes the collective dimension and impact of the crime. It 
also gives credence to the decision and penalty agreed to by all. 
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 This emphasis on interrelatedness introduces a significantly different 
dimension to the victim-offender axis. While FGCs focus on the victims and 
offenders as distinct and unrelated individuals, the Mãori approach tends to view 
them as members of a wider network of relationships. Individuals and their well-
being are inseparable from their whanau.
1129
 The idea of victimhood does not only 
apply to the specific individual who has been directly violated, but rather to the 
individual and his whole support system.
1130
 Likewise, the offender and his support 
system are to shoulder the responsibility and redress for the harm caused.
1131
  
 So while the New Zealand conferencing model emphasizes individual 
responsibility,
1132
 the Mãori approach sees individuals in the context of relationships, 
and, therefore, seeks to address a crime and its impact on relationships, accordingly. 
Victims and offenders are not seen in isolation of each other but with reference to the 
network of relationships to which they both belong. As a result, the degree and nature 
of engagement and participation of victims, offenders and their support system, in 
FGCs and tikanga, differ significantly.    
 
Community Involvement and Ownership 
The community, as an extension of the self, plays a central role in “doing” justice. 
When a crime occurs, it is the mana
1133
 and status of the individual and his 
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community that is affected.
1134
 The entire social harmony is disturbed. The 
community, therefore, becomes equally victimized by the crime. Central to the Mãori 
society is the notion of collective responsibility.
1135
 As such, the community’s 
interest, needs and point of view also need to be considered. The emphasis of the 
Mãori approach to dispute resolution is “on reaching consensus and involving the 
whole community.”1136 Its participation cannot and ought not to be limited. All those 
who feel have a stake in the dispute are welcome to attend. Attendance and 
participation is not limited to immediate relatives, as is the case in FGCs. The Mãori 
legal tradition is also based on notions of equity and equality.
1137
 As such, it values 
contributions from all community members. Hui are conducted in a non-hierarchical 
manner,
1138
 where the community itself acts as the witness, “prosecutor and 
sentencing court.”1139 The process and its outcome must reflect and accommodate the 
wills of all, for the good of the community.
1140
 By the same token, the authority and 
legitimacy of both is strengthened in the eyes of the participants.  
 Underpinning this approach to justice and the role of the community is a 
fundamentally different understanding of ‘who’ the community is. To Mãori, the 
community is not a place, nor is it defined by blood. Rather, the community is one of 
care. It refers to a sense of kinship, belonging and connectedness that is difficult to 
                                                 
1134
 Robert, "Mãori Customary Laws and Institutions." 
1135
 Dyhrberg, "Mãori Based Justice," 6; Matiu Dixon, "Crime and Justice," in State of the Mãori 
Nation: Twenty-First Century Issues in Aotearoa, ed. Malcolm Mulholland (Auckland: Reed, 2006). 
1136
 Teresa Olsen, Gabrielle Maxwell, and Allison Morris, "Mãori and Youth Justice in New Zealand," 
in Popular Justice and Community Regeneration: Pathways of Indigenous Reform, ed. Kayleen 
Hazlehurst (London: Praeger, 1995), 45. 
1137
 Matt Hakiaha, "What Is the State’s Role in Indigenous Justice Process," in Critical Issues in 
Restorative Justice, ed. Howard Zehr and Barbara Towes (Devon: Willan Publication, 2004), 359. 
1138
 Anonymous social worker, interview with author, July 22 2010, Auckland, New Zealand. 
1139
 Jim Consedine, "The Mãori Restorative Tradition," in Restorative Justice Reader: Texts, Sources, 
Context, ed. Gerry Johnstone (London: Willan, 2003), 154. 
1140
 Larissa Behrendt, Aboriginal Dispute Resolution (Mayborough: The Federation Press, 1995), 17.  
 239 
find in contemporary urban societies.
1141
 The Mãori restorative tradition is based on 
certain meso-social structures, where individuals share thick social ties.
1142
 It is what 
gives the process strength and meaning. As a result, social pressure and shaming is 
more effective and likely these kinds of close-knit communities.
1143
  
 
Informality and Flexibility 
The relative informality and flexibility of the traditional Mãori process significantly 
affects how justice is carried out and its impact on the community. Tikanga seeks to 
deal with a crime holistically, which means that the process seeks to address the needs 
that arise from the harm caused. Understanding why an offense took place matters to 
the Mãori. It also requires time. A hui may take days to complete, during which all 
members are invited to participate in the hope of finding consensus.
1144
 The process 
engaged by tikanga is also entirely more informal that any other form of state-
sponsored program. Participation is not restricted to any topic or timeframe. All are 
welcome to attend and decisions are reached collectively and by consensus. There is 
no police or criminal record that will haunt the offender to rest of his life,
1145
 no “state 
machinery…no courts, no formal burdens of proof.”1146  
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 There is also great flexibility in the type of penalty that is handed out. The 
nature of the restitution can be either material, symbolic, or both, and the penalty 
must fit the circumstances of the crime and the needs that arise from it.
1147
 The parties 
to the dispute must agree on the nature of the restitution and repair, in accordance 
with their needs, rather than chose from a list of options provided by the state, and in 
accordance with the law. The validity of the outcome of Tikanga comes, in part, from 
the fact that it is agreed upon by all and reflects the needs of participants. As a result, 
and if needed for the well-being of the community, severe punishment, such as 
ostracisation, is not unheard of.
1148
  
 To the Mãori, justice is a discussion about living together rather than “a formal 
let’s sit around in a circle and sort stuff out”1149 In this respect, it fundamentally 
differs from FGCs, which tend to “fragment, compartmentalize and limit” the process 
of decision-making.
1150
 Rudin argues that the tendency to standardize and 
compartmentalize restorative justice mechanisms “frustrates the will of the aboriginal 
community and gets in the way of the community’s ability to deal with the real justice 
issues that confront it.”1151 While FGCs and other restorative initiatives launched by 
the New Zealand government are truly more flexible than the traditional processes 
engaged in the state’s courts of law, they remain anchored within a Western legal 
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framework, which is at odds with the informal nature and aspiration of the Mãori 
approach. 
 
Restoration 
The rehabilitation of offenders, victims and those affected by the crime is central to 
tikanga. Justice is primarily about social well-being, which can only achieved by 
ensuring the happiness of all individual community members.
1152
 As a flexible and 
holistic approach to justice, tikanga seeks to deal with the impact of the crime in its 
entirety. The minds, bodies and souls of those affected must be healed.
1153
 Each 
dimension is addressed as part of justice. From this perceptive, the response to the 
needs of the community and its members “do not come neatly packaged in boxes with 
labels like ‘justice,’ ‘health,’ and ‘social services.’”1154 They are all dealt with as part 
of the same process, rather than compartmentalized. The emotional and physical 
impacts of a crime, for instance, are brought to the forefront of the process when 
offenders and victims get to share their experiences and express their grievances.  
 Community members themselves, rather than state agencies, including social 
services, ensure the emotional and physical rehabilitation of victims and offenders.
1155
 
The Mãori approach to justice assumes an active community, ready and willing to 
make room for former offenders, by providing them with opportunities and support. 
While this is easily foreseeable in societies that espouse principles of collective 
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responsibility, kinship and interconnectedness, it is more problematic in liberal and 
capitalistic societies where the process of social fragmentation and individualization 
has weakened social ties.
1156
  
 Sanctions and punishment, agreed upon by consensus, also draw strongly upon 
ancestral and spiritual values and beliefs, without which the process would lose 
significance.
1157
 More often than not, amends, apologies and restitution are offered. 
Restitution and apologies offered by offenders directly contribute to the mending of 
relationships.
1158
 They also help in the emotional journeys of victims. At the same 
time, offenders can take responsibility for their actions, and thereby regain a sense of 
their own mana.
1159
 The emphasis of sanctions, rather than being on individual rights 
and desert, is on spiritual and emotional rehabilitation.
1160
 The idea of sanctions and 
repair are rooted in Mãori principles of reciprocity and harmony.
1161
 Hakiaha explains 
that while FGCs open the door for the expression of Mãori spirituality and approach 
to justice, they still do not “allow full scope for Mãori cultural expression and 
needs.”1162   
 The following table illustrates the differences outlined in the previous 
examination of FGCs and tikanga as restorative justice mechanisms. All four 
elements commonly associated with restorative practices, namely (a) active 
participation and engagement, (b) community involvement and ownership, (c) 
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informality and flexibility and (d) restoration, are clearly present. Yet, as this table 
demonstrates, the manner and degree to which they are implemented in both practices 
differ substantively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Restorative Justice  Family Group 
Conferencing 
Tikanga Maori 
- Active Participation and 
Engagement 
- Engagement limited to 
Victim-Offender Axis 
 
- Emphasis on individual 
responsibility 
 
- Engagement of victims, 
offender and the wider 
community 
 
- Emphasis on 
relationships and 
collective responsibility 
 
 
- Community Involvement 
and Ownership 
- Closed meeting with 
immediate family 
 
-Process directed and 
chaired by state 
representative 
 
-Outcome must satisfy 
victims, offenders and the 
state 
- Open gathering where all 
community members are 
welcome 
 
- Process chaired by 
community members  
 
- Consensus-based 
 
- Informal and Flexible - Room for 
accommodation of 
offenders and victims 
 
- Time and legal 
- Adaptable to 
circumstances and needs 
 
- Lengthy process 
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constraints 
 
- Embedded within 
hierarchical state structure 
 
- Restoration - Amends, apologies and 
repair. 
 
-Reduce re-offending 
 
-Alternative to 
imprisonment 
  
 
- Holistic approach (mind, 
body and soul) 
 
- Well-being (communal 
and individual) 
 
- Reciprocity and 
Spirituality 
 
 
 
 
Justice: Different Ways of Knowing 
It is undeniable that FGCs and tikanga share some of the same characteristics. Both 
value respectful and collaborative encounters between offenders and victims and their 
support systems. Both also prefer consensual outcomes, favoring the restoration of 
both parties to a dispute, rather than marginalization. Yet, the previous examination of 
restorative principles applied through FGCs and tikanga revealed some practical and 
qualitative differences. And while it appears, at first sight, that both practices adopt a 
similar approach to dealing with crime, the underlying values in each process are 
markedly different.
1163
  
 One of the most significant differences between the Western, legally 
entrenched approach to restorative practices, and tikanga, is the value and meaning 
attached to the community. The term has various meanings across, as well as within, 
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cultures. Often, it is used to designate a group restricted by geographical boundaries, 
or a group sharing similar beliefs, history and traditions.
1164
 To Mãori, as well as to a 
number of non-Western traditions, the community corresponds to “a perception of 
connectedness… to other individual human beings and to a group.”1165 This sense of 
community and relatedness is inseparable from the practice of justice, as a means of 
maintaining relationships. Individuals are never seen in isolation of fellow community 
members.  
 This approach to the community and its role in providing justice is rooted in a 
distinctive view of the self and its relationship to the other. As discussed earlier, the 
Mãori and a number of other indigenous communities adopt a relational 
understanding of the self. The strength of Mãori communities and approach to justice 
comes from a deep-seated sense of collective identity, which informs every aspect of 
living and knowing.
1166
 Such an understanding fundamentally differs from that of a 
society, which views the self as a fully independent and autonomous entity.
1167
 Clark 
explains that the Western legal tradition is anchored in an “understanding of events as 
interactions between independent objects.”1168 This is apparent in the New Zealand 
government’s approach to FGCs. With deep roots in individualism, the Western, 
Eurocentric approach to justice is unable to detach itself from the idea of justice 
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carried out, in part, through the punishment of individuals who violate the rule of law. 
It also generally “assumes that the voice of the community is the same as the voice 
and values of the state.”1169 It is therefore important to not underestimate these two 
different conceptions of the self and the community, which, in turn, establish “both 
how we work with the other and the solutions we imagine.”1170  
 Failing to look at communities from an indigenous perspective and to 
incorporate this dimension into any attempt to introduce Mãori values into the judicial 
system is likely to produce an ersatz of community-justice, which will quickly evolve 
into “little more than correctional alternatives.”1171 This is, to an extent, demonstrated 
through FGCs, which continue to function within a relatively formal, legalistic and 
individualistic framework. The strength of indigenous community-based mechanisms 
of justice cannot easily be reproduced in societies where individuality and autonomy 
are celebrated. Bottom suggests that restorative justice initiatives that do not 
recognize and capitalize on the value of community in indigenous worldviews result 
in a “blanket delivery of restorative justice.”1172 Second, and most importantly, is the 
risk of misrepresenting and re-appropriating customary mechanisms to fit the Western 
individualistic brief. The Mãori conception and processes of justice are “based on a 
different cultural orientation than the Western model.”1173 Part of the difficulty lies in 
the fact that the underlying philosophy of Mãori practices and approach to justice are 
not well understood.
1174
 While it is argued that any modern “Mãori system of dispute 
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resolution must incorporate fundamental aspects of tikanga,” such as whakapapa, utu 
and the centrality of community,
1175
 these principles are often simply “diluted to fit 
the system.”1176 Little is done to alter the existing judicial framework to truly 
accommodate Mãori cultural sensibilities.
1177
 
 Another difficulty can be found in the active role taken by the state in 
designing, implementing and managing restorative programs in New Zealand. The 
problem partly lies in the fact that, as mentioned earlier, state ownership and control 
over FGCs denies the primacy of communities in providing justice.
1178
 Mãori 
communities tend to view state led and controlled initiatives, such as FGCs, with 
suspicion.
1179
 A Mãori member of parliament explicitly expressed concern vis-à-vis 
the role of state agencies in shaping policies designed for the Mãori.
1180
 Such concern 
was echoed by a number of respondents who expressed distrust in the government’s 
attempt to include Mãori values in the judicial.
1181
 Jackson contends that a number of 
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the so-called Mãori restorative aspects of FGCs are, in fact, a poor adaptation and 
cooption of these principles. He adds that the so-called inclusion of Mãori principles 
is “part of the colonising ethic,” of the New Zealand government.1182 This concern is 
echoed by Tauri, who claims that the adoption of these alleged Mãori principles only 
serves to further deny Mãori autonomy and practices rather than empowering Mãori 
communities to take care of their own.
1183
 Essentially, breaking this distrust of the 
state and its effort to incorporate tikanga into its policies requires empowering Mãori 
communities to design, inform and implement these programs.
1184
 Most importantly, 
it also requires recognizing the harmful impact colonization has had, and continues to 
have, on Mãori, their culture and identity.
1185
 
 
Potential Implications for the Field of Transitional Justice 
The New Zealand government’s inability to truly engage with the Mãori approach to 
doing justice, this study argues, is illustrative of the general tendency in the 
transitional justice scholarship, to try to fit customary approaches and conceptions of 
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justice within a legal and individualistic framework. Transitional justice is, in fact, a 
field highly defined by legal norms.
1186
 It is an active promoter of judicalization and, 
as a result, it is a prime site for this universalizing tendency. Scholars of the field of 
transitional justice appear to remain unaware of the fact that the approaches to justice, 
and institutions the literature endorses in transitional societies are “held together by 
common concepts, practical aims, and distinctive claims for legitimacy," embedded in 
a specific intellectual tradition.
1187
 As explained above, the scholarship is driven by 
given norms and assumptions about the nature of justice, which is contrary to a 
number of indigenous traditions that see law and justice as a lived experience, always 
reflecting the needs and preferences of those involved, as opposed to a rigid body of 
rules disconnected from local realities. Moreover, as it has been argued above, the 
scholarship is unable to thinking about doing justice, whether retributive, reparative 
or restorative, outside of legal and individualistic confines it sets.  
 This research contends that the Western intellectual and legal tradition, rooted 
in an inherently universalizing discourse of enlightenment rationalism, threatens 
different ways of knowing, and doing justice. As argued by Bryan, “the rule of law’s 
guarantee of ensuring justice and justice for all collapses in on itself when the fact of 
its universality is exactly what ensures that all people are not treating equally.”1188 By 
claiming the universality of our conceptual knowledge, transitional justice scholars 
risk generating inaccurate accounts of the problems encountered in transitional 
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societies, and much worse, design solutions with little applicability. The irony, of 
course, is that, unconsciously, the rhetoric surrounding conceptions and mechanisms 
of justice, as illustrated by the transitional justice scholarship, “performs the same 
function of the imperialism it nominally scorns, relegating the non-European other to 
a less advanced stage of development.”1189 Other ways of knowing are simply 
relegated to second place or absorbed within the existing corpus of knowledge and 
conceptual framework. This is clearly visible in the transitional justice scholarships’ 
inability to think about justice beyond a deontological-liberal framework, as well as in 
the scholarship’s reticence towards mechanisms and conceptions of justice that do not 
espouse Western values and legal standards. It is important, therefore, for transitional 
justice scholars, to acknowledge the universalizing undercurrent of the legalist 
paradigm that underlies the transitional justice literature. Indeed, this undercurrent has 
both practical and ethical impact on the research that is undertaken in the field of 
transitional justice, thereby influencing the types of mechanism promoted, and the 
kinds of approaches to justice that are validated. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This research was born out of a personal interest in customary mechanisms of justice. 
It became clear when surveying the transitional justice literature for research relating 
to these mechanisms, that the existing scholarship was lacking, and its approach to 
customary mechanisms of justice problematic, for two reasons. First, most of the 
research relating to customary mechanisms of justice failed to engage with the local 
traditions, culture, and reality that surrounded these mechanisms. More often than not, 
customary mechanisms of justice were described using our own conceptual tools, 
without any critical evaluation of the implications this had for the quality and 
relevance of the transitional justice research. Indeed, customary mechanisms of 
justice were generally described as embodying a mix of restorative and retributive 
values.
1190
 Seldom were they ever considered and examined outside of the existing 
conceptual framework used to think about justice mechanisms in transitional justice. 
Second, the transitional justice literature’s interest towards customary mechanisms of 
justice was limited to post-conflict situations. The paucity of research on customary 
mechanisms of justice and the philosophy of justice they embody was all the more 
salient in cases where there had been no open conflict or regime transition. While 
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transitional justice scholars started to pay attention to customary mechanisms of 
justice in post-conflict situations, such as in Rwanda and Uganda, other customary 
justice mechanisms, in settler societies for instance were largely ignored.  
 This research, therefore, makes an important contribution to the field of 
transitional justice by examining the philosophy of justice embodied in customary 
mechanisms of justice, and by tikanga Mãori, a customary practice and philosophy of 
justice, using as a case study from a settler society. More specifically, this research 
argues that the existing framework used by transitional justice scholars is ill suited to 
account for customary mechanisms of justice. The argument put forth in this study 
was substantiated by an examination of the Mãori tradition and justice practices. This 
conclusion draws out the main themes of this research and the implications my 
findings have for the transitional justice scholarship. It starts by unpacking the 
argument according to which the framework used by transitional justice scholars to 
examine justice mechanisms is flawed. It explains how the scholarship’s approach to 
doing justice is fundamentally deontologically rooted. It then, discusses customary 
mechanisms of justice, and most importantly, the type of justice they embody. The 
conclusion also touches upon the implications these research findings have for the 
field of transitional justice, and seeks to push the boundaries of the transitional justice 
literature further by speaking to the need to revise the common understanding of what 
constitutes a transitional society. Finally, it identifies venues for potential further 
research that builds on the present argument and research findings.  
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“Justice” in Transitional Justice 
This research argued that, traditionally, the transitional justice literature has been 
dominated by a legal, and individualistic approach to doing justice. It appears that a 
large number of mechanisms used since the Second World War have primarily sought 
to carry out through retribution and punishment via the use of tribunals and courts, 
including, for instance, the ICC. Furthermore, transitional justice scholars generally 
resort to the use of three conceptions of justice to explain, and categorize transitional 
justice efforts. These three approaches to justice, namely the retributive, reparative 
and restorative approaches, each focus on different aspects of the crime and prioritize 
different elements. In a nutshell, the retributive approach emphasizes punishment for 
the crime committed. Reparative justice focuses on reparation and restitution for the 
harm caused, while the restorative approach emphasizes healing for all involved.  
 Yet, regardless of whether justice is to be categorized as retributive, reparative 
or restorative, each approach sees the individual as the primary source of concern, and 
justifies the need for justice either in the restoration, reparation, or retribution for 
individuals, whose rights have been infringed upon. Each of these approaches is 
rooted in a deontological-liberal view of justice, which gives precedence to the idea 
of a rational self, and conceives of the individual as a holder of rights, regardless of 
any other factor. These three approaches to justice, this research argued, are 
fundamentally grounded in a Western, liberal, and overly individualistic framework, 
which is often antithetical to the conception of “justice” embodied in customary or 
customary mechanisms of justice. By and large, transitional justice scholars have 
been unable or unwilling to engage with customary mechanisms of justice and the 
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conception of justice they embody, beyond the existing framework. This research 
argued that this poor conceptual imagination seriously affects the relevance and 
quality of transitional justice research. 
 
Customary mechanisms of justice and the “relational” lens 
Customary mechanisms of justice have long been overlooked and under-researched in 
the transitional justice literature. Mostly out of pragmatism, and in response to their 
growing use in post-conflict societies, transitional justice scholars have started to pay 
more attention to traditional justice practices and customary law. There is now a 
better understanding of why these mechanisms matter and what they look like.
1191
 
Yet, there is still very little knowledge about what they can and cannot achieve. The 
lack of conceptual imagination of transitional justice scholars has also limited their 
approach to these mechanisms and their ability to engage with the beliefs and 
conception of justice they generally embody. This study explored how indigenous 
traditions often adopt a community-centered view of justice that cannot fit within the 
existing deontological-liberal framework. Using evidence gathered through three 
months of ethnographic research in New Zealand, during which 33 Mãori community 
members were interviewed, this study contends that the Mãori approach to justice, 
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like many other indigenous approaches, adopts a relational lens. A relational lens 
requires that justice be seen in the context of relationships, and crimes dealt with in 
terms of the relationships they have affected.
1192
 Adopting a relational lens allows us 
to appreciate the primacy of the relationships that make up the community. As a 
result, justice must be carried out within the community, and the process owned by 
community members. To that, this research adds that the type of “justice” embodied 
in customary mechanisms has often been taken out of context, and rendered universal 
and ahistorical through its representation in restorative justice mechanisms. Indeed, 
more often than not, restorative justice is said to have its roots in indigenous 
practices.
1193
 Chapter Nine illustrated this point by demonstrating how, in New 
Zealand, the government easily equates tikanga Mãori with FGCs, which it claims 
embodies Mãori values and preferences. It has shown how inaccurate this claim is, by 
carrying out a comparison between both practices. This tendency to equate restorative 
justice with indigenous approaches to law and justice is harmful and dangerous, for it 
risks rendering the transitional justice scholarship homogenizing and universalizing, 
to the detriment of local preferences and practices.  
 
Implications for the field and transitional societies 
Throughout its development, the transitional justice scholarship has favored the use, 
and implementation of, specific judicial institutions, including courts and tribunals, to 
carry out justice and hold individuals accountable in the aftermath of mass violations 
                                                 
1192
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1193
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of human rights. These institutions are rooted in a neo-liberal framework that 
sanctions a certain understanding the nature of law and justice. In fact, it appears that 
the transitional justice literature is informed by certain assumptions about the 
“goodness” and “neutrality” of its approach to justice.1194 The propensity of 
transitional justice scholars to view “justice” as an unbiased and impartial instrument 
is highly problematic, for it fails to recognize the cultural contingency of legal 
practices and understandings. The universalizing tendency of the legalist paradigm 
that underlies the transitional justice scholarship dictates the kinds of activities that 
are undertaken in transitional societies. Customary practices often end up being 
tolerated only to the extent that they can imitate and adopt tenets of the legalist 
tradition. 
 Furthermore, this project underlined the propensity of the transitional justice 
literature to focus its attention on post-conflict societies and countries transitioning 
out of unrest toward democratic rule. It is argued that a number of settler societies 
actively engaged in a process of national reconciliation, face some similar challenges 
as post-conflict societies seeking to come to terms with a difficult past. While 
circumstances and the magnitude of human rights violations differ in post-conflict 
and settler societies, governments in both cases are seeking to re-establish, or 
consolidate their moral authority and legitimacy. As discussed in Chapter Nine, in 
Canada, just as in New Zealand, governments are actively seeking to acknowledge 
and repair historical wrongs committed against their indigenous populations. This 
                                                 
1194
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research contends that the boundaries of transitional justice must be pushed so as to 
include a wider array of cases and transitions. The transitional justice scholarship 
would strongly benefit from broadening its inquiry to include democratic countries 
dealing with legacies of past violations of human rights and the necessities of 
historical redress.  
 
Further Research 
This doctoral research opens up the way for further research in the field of transitional 
justice. While the examination of tikanga Mãori, conducted as part of this doctoral 
research, directly contributes to filling the existing gap in the literature, it only 
partially does so. Further systematic study of other customary mechanisms of justice, 
and the philosophy of justice they embody, would significantly deepen our 
knowledge and understanding of these mechanisms. A similar study could be carried 
out in Canada, for instance. Inuit communities living in the northern part of the 
country appear to display strong adherence to, and preference for, their local judicial 
customs.
1195
 And so, an investigation of their legal tradition may help confirm the 
argument made throughout this research, namely that customary approaches to justice 
are fundamentally relational, and that we need to adopt of a communitarian lens to 
view this approach to justice. An in depth study of other customary mechanisms and 
philosophies of justice would also possibly lead to further theorizing of what these 
mechanisms, in different regions of the world, have in common, and how they differ.  
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 Furthermore, and as mentioned earlier, little is known about the effectiveness 
of customary mechanisms of justice in promoting justice, and accountability. These 
processes are often the first, and sometimes only, mechanisms to which villagers, 
living in poor and remote areas, have access.
1196
 As this study has shown in New 
Zealand, people sometimes prefer to resort to their own traditional ways to carry out 
justice. Often, people trust and understand these kinds of practices, more than they do 
Western imposed judicial systems.
1197
 Yet, until recently, such practices as well as 
their impact on societies, have been largely overlooked. An empirical investigation of 
these mechanisms, and the conditions under which they are more likely to succeed, 
would provide much needed insight into possible ways to enhance present transitional 
justice efforts. Indeed, research could investigate the conditions and circumstances in 
which these mechanisms are more successful.  
 It would also be well worth looking into how attempts to reform and 
incorporate customary mechanisms of justice into national legal framework affect 
people’s participation in, and experience of, these processes. This research discussed 
how in Rwanda and Burundi, for instance, state laws have formalized a number of 
elements and functions of Gacaca and Bashingantahe courts.
1198
 In Uganda, the use 
of the country’s customary mechanisms of justice is even encouraged in the 
Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Ugandan government 
and the Lord’s Resistance Army.1199 This movement towards the recognition and 
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validation of customary mechanisms of justice, across the African continent, 
coincides with what Tiemessen notes to be a shift towards “localization,” as a more 
legitimate and effective means to engender justice by including local constituencies 
and traditions.
1200
 Yet, attempts to incorporate customary mechanisms into national 
legal framework have triggered substantial debate over the changing nature and 
authenticity of such mechanisms and the relationship they entertain with state 
laws.
1201
 An investigation of the impact of this wave of legalization on customary 
mechanism is well overdue and would also be needed. 
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 The Administration of Justice  POL 151 (Winter 2007)  Instructor:  Dr. 
Patrick Smith 
 Introduction to International Politics POL 241 (2005-2006) Instructor: Dr. 
Alexander Moens 
 
Simon Fraser University, Bureau des Affaires Francophones et Francophiles 
 French language tutor for students enrolled in the BA in Public 
Administration taught in French. 
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On-Line Teaching: 
 
Monitor/Facilitator, 
Introduction to International Politics POL 2260 (Fall 2007) Simon Fraser University 
 
Guest Lectures: 
 
“Torture,” International Human Rights (POL 3388e), The University of Western 
Ontario, March 2011. 
“Intervention(s): The disposition of land and culture,” Indigenous Peoples and 
Development (POL 2203), Huron College, October 2010. 
“Genocide,” International Human Rights (POL 3388e), The University of Western 
Ontario, April 2010. 
“Environmental Challenges Today,” Environmental Politics in a Global Age (POL 
3341), The University of Western Ontario, October 2007. 
“Terrorism and Human Rights,” The Administration of Justice (POL 151), Simon 
Fraser University, February 2007. 
 
Professional (Teaching) Development Seminars and Certificates: 
 
Getting Feedback on Your Teaching (The University of Western Ontario, Fall 2010). 
Facilitating Active Learning (The University of Western Ontario, Fall 2010). 
Advanced Teaching Program Certificate (The University of Western Ontario, Winter 
2010). 
New Problem Sets to Enhance Learning and Motivation  (The University of Western 
Ontario, Fall 2009). 
Developing a Course Outline  (The University of Western Ontario, Fall 2009). 
Diplome D’Enseignement du Francais – DAEFFLE (Alliance Française, 2007). 
Certificate in University Teaching (Simon Fraser University, 2007). 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE 
 
Senior Editor, UWO Journal of Legal Studies (June 2011- Present). 
 
Internal Graduate Program Reviewer, The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral 
Study, The University of Western Ontario (Spring-Summer 2011). 
 
Scholarship Expert Consultant, The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Study, The 
University of Western Ontario (Fall 2010). 
 
Member, Critical Theory and Practice Research Group (2009-2011). 
 
Academic Team Leader, ASB-Student Career Centre, The University of Western 
Ontario (2009 2010). 
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Member, TA Needs and Bursary Committee, Graduate Teaching Assistant Union 
(Fall 2009). 
 
Invited Chair, Multipaper Panel: Normes Esthétiques, La Norme et ses Infractions en 
Literature et Linguistique London ON (May 2009). 
 
Dept. Representative, Society of Graduate Students, The University of Western 
Ontario (Summer 2009). 
 
Fundraising and Grants Officer, Canadian Sudanese Volunteers for Development, 
London ON (2008-2009). 
 
Member, Executive Committee Collaborative Programs in Migrations and Ethnic 
Studies (2007-2008). 
 
Communications Executive, Teaching Support Staff Union, Simon Fraser University 
(2007). 
 
Manuscript Referee. Journal of Federal Governance (2006-2007), Canadian Journal 
of Ethnic Studies (2006-2007).  
 
Member, Graduate Issues Committee, Simon Fraser University (2006-2007). 
 
Graduate Student Representative, Hiring Committee, Dept. Political Science, Simon 
Fraser University (2006-2007). 
 
External Liaison Officer, Current Affairs Student Society, The University of Kent at 
Canterbury (2003-2004). 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS 
 
Canadian Political Science Association (CPSA) 
Canadian Association of Studies in International Development (CASID) 
African Transitional Justice Network 
Centre for Transitional Justice and Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
 
 
